Copyright 2020 by Travis Crum

Printed in U.S.A.
Vol. 114, No. 6

THE SUPERFLUOUS FIFTEENTH AMENDMENT?
Travis Crum
ABSTRACT—This Article starts a conversation about reorienting voting
rights doctrine toward the Fifteenth Amendment. In advancing this claim, I
explore an unappreciated debate—the “Article V debate”—in the Fortieth
Congress about whether nationwide black suffrage could and should be
achieved through a statute, a constitutional amendment, or both. As the first
significant post-ratification discussion of the Fourteenth Amendment, the
Article V debate provides valuable insights about the original public
understandings of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments and the
distinction between civil and political rights.
The Article V debate reveals that the Radical Republicans’ initial
proposal for nationwide black suffrage included both a statute and an
amendment. Moderate Republicans rejected the statutory option because
they believed that Congress lacked enforcement authority under the
Fourteenth Amendment to impose voting qualifications on the states and that
an amendment was the only politically viable option.
Given this historical evidence, this Article argues that the Fifteenth
Amendment was a significant expansion of congressional authority to
regulate voting rights in the states and that Congress’s Fifteenth Amendment
enforcement authority is distinct from—and broader under current doctrine
than—its Fourteenth Amendment enforcement authority. The Article V
debate offers a persuasive reason for overturning Boerne’s congruence and
proportionality test or, at a minimum, cabining it to the Fourteenth
Amendment. Accordingly, laws enacted under Congress’s Fifteenth
Amendment enforcement authority should be reviewed under Katzenbach’s
rationality standard and the Voting Rights Act (VRA) would be on firmer
constitutional ground.
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INTRODUCTION
The Fifteenth Amendment lives in the Fourteenth Amendment’s
shadow. The Supreme Court expansively interprets the Fourteenth
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Amendment to prohibit a wide range of racial discrimination in voting. 1 By
contrast, the Court has failed to clarify the Fifteenth Amendment’s scope in
voting rights cases. 2 Contemporary doctrine thus treats the Fourteenth
Amendment as the font for voting rights, whereas the Fifteenth Amendment
is a constitutional afterthought—a superfluous amendment.
There is an irony here. Despite its broad language, the Fourteenth
Amendment was originally understood by the Reconstruction generation to
not encompass the right to vote. 3 As the second Justice Harlan once
remarked, the Fifteenth Amendment’s existence “alone is evidence that
[Congress] did not understand the Fourteenth Amendment to have”
“extend[ed] the suffrage.” 4
Passed by the lame-duck Fortieth Congress in 1869 and ratified by the
states in 1870, the Fifteenth Amendment was the final act in the trilogy of
Reconstruction Amendments. 5 Its broad prohibition of racial discrimination
in voting 6 and its clause empowering “Congress . . . to enforce [its
provisions] by appropriate legislation” 7 represent the crowning achievement
of Reconstruction. In less than a decade, the United States fought a bloody
Civil War to preserve the Union and transformed itself from a slaveholding
nation to a multiracial democracy. 8
This Article aims to bring the Fifteenth Amendment out of the
shadows—an endeavor particularly appropriate given that this year marks
1

See Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1463 (2017) (racial gerrymanders); White v. Regester,
412 U.S. 755, 765–67 (1973) (vote dilution); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, 540–41 (1927) (vote
denial).
2 See Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146, 159 (1993) (“This Court has not decided whether the
Fifteenth Amendment applies to vote-dilution claims.”); City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 65 (1980)
(plurality opinion) (concluding that the Fifteenth Amendment “prohibits only purposefully discriminatory
denial or abridgment by government of the freedom to vote ‘on account of race, color, or previous
condition of servitude’” (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1)).
3 See infra Part II.
4 Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 166 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
5 Proposing an Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, Joint Res. 14, 40th Cong.,
15 Stat. 346 (1869) (sent to the states for ratification); 16 Stat. 1131–32 (1870) (ratification); see also
CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 1563 (1869) (passage in the House); id. at 1641 (passage in the
Senate).
6 U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1 (“The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied
or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of
servitude.”).
7 Id. § 2.
8 See ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863–1877, at xxiii,
448 (Henry Steele Commager & Richard B. Harris eds., updated ed. 2014) (1988). Although this
experiment was tragically cut short by the rise of Jim Crow in the late 1800s, it was a remarkable
accomplishment.
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the Amendment’s 150th anniversary. This Article argues that the
Reconstruction Framers’ deliberate decision to pass the Fifteenth
Amendment as an amendment—as opposed to a statute—provides a
powerful reason for differentiating between the Reconstruction
Amendments. In particular, this decision sheds light on the scope of
Congress’s Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment enforcement authorities
and provides a historical and textual basis for differentiating between them,
namely, the civil versus political rights divide.
In making this claim, this Article highlights an unappreciated debate—
which I call the Article V debate—in the lame-duck Fortieth Congress about
whether nationwide black suffrage could and should be achieved through a
statute, a constitutional amendment, or both. To underscore that debate’s
importance, this Article asks a deceptively complicated question: Why did
Congress pass the Fifteenth Amendment instead of the Voting Rights Act of
1869?
Given our contemporary understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment,
this is a difficult question. By the time the Fifteenth Amendment was sent to
the states for ratification, Congress had already passed legislation
enfranchising Blacks in the District of Columbia, the federal territories, and
the Reconstructed South. 9 Blacks, however, remained disenfranchised in
several Northern and Border States. The Reconstruction Framers—all of
whom were Republicans—backed nationwide black suffrage as both morally
imperative and politically expedient given the expected support of newly
enfranchised black voters. 10 If the Court’s current doctrine accurately reflects
the Reconstruction Framers’ understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment,
the Fortieth Congress would have been well within its newly established
enforcement authority to enact a nationwide black suffrage statute.
One potential answer is that the Fifteenth Amendment is an
entrenchment device. Given the Fourteenth Amendment’s lack of explicit
language protecting the right to vote, and the possibility that a nationwide
suffrage statute could be repealed by a future Congress or struck down by a
hostile Supreme Court, a suffrage amendment makes perfect sense. An
amendment would also prevent the readmitted Southern States from
disenfranchising Blacks at the first opportunity. 11
But this narrative only explains why there is a Fifteenth Amendment. A
suffrage statute would have needed only two-thirds of both houses of
9

See infra Section III.B.
See infra Section III.C.
11 See WILLIAM GILLETTE, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: POLITICS AND THE PASSAGE OF THE FIFTEENTH
AMENDMENT 49–50 (1965).
10
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Congress to overcome the inevitable veto by President Andrew Johnson, 12
and would not have needed to overcome Article V’s additional requirement
of ratification by three-fourths of the states. Thus, the Reconstruction
Congress could have first passed legislation enfranchising Blacks in the
Border States and the North and then relied on this newly empowered and
loyal voter base to help ratify the Fifteenth Amendment. Moreover, the
statute–amendment two-step had already proven successful during
Reconstruction: the Civil Rights Act of 1866 is rightly viewed as the
statutory predecessor of the Fourteenth Amendment. 13 Given these political
realities, why did Congress not follow the path already taken by the passage
of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the subsequent ratification of the
Fourteenth Amendment?
This inquiry is not merely hypothetical. The first substantive
discussions about nationwide black suffrage in the lame-duck Fortieth
Congress explicitly addressed whether Congress could and should enact a
statute regulating voting rights in the states. In fact, the Radical Republicans’
initial proposal included both a suffrage statute and an amendment.
Congress, however, ultimately rejected the statutory option and chose to pass
a constitutional amendment via Article V. 14
An examination of the motives and actions of the Reconstruction
Framers reveals two explanations for that choice: one constitutional, one
political. Turning first to the Constitution, moderate Republicans believed
that Congress lacked authority to impose voting qualifications on the states
under the Fourteenth Amendment. 15 Put simply, the Fortieth Congress did
not believe it had the power to enforce civil rights by expanding the right to
vote. This logic may seem alien today, but the Fortieth Congress’s actions
comport with Reconstruction-era views of citizenship and the hierarchy of
rights. Under prevailing Republican ideology, civil and political rights were
conceptualized as distinct spheres and the Fourteenth Amendment
guaranteed civil rights but not political rights. Given this understanding of
the Fourteenth Amendment, it is unsurprising that, prior to the Fifteenth

12 President Johnson vetoed numerous civil rights and voting rights bills during Reconstruction. See
FONER, supra note 8, at 247–50 (discussing Johnson’s vetoes of the Freedmen’s Bureau Bill and the Civil
Rights Act of 1866); EARL M. MALTZ, CIVIL RIGHTS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND CONGRESS, 1863–1869,
at 131 (1990) (discussing Johnson’s veto of the First Reconstruction Act of 1867).
13 See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 775 (2010) (“Today, it is generally accepted that
the Fourteenth Amendment was understood to provide a constitutional basis for protecting the rights set
out in the Civil Rights Act of 1866.”).
14 See infra Section III.D.
15 See infra Section III.D.
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Amendment, Congress limited suffrage legislation to areas of federal control
and never imposed suffrage requirements on the states.
On the political front, Republicans were constrained by their prior
positions. During the Fourteenth Amendment ratification debates,
“[m]oderate Republicans feared they could not sell the equal-suffrage idea
in the North, where white bigotry remained a stubborn fact of life.” 16 The
Republicans’ campaign to ratify the Fourteenth Amendment thus contained
a crucial promise: the Amendment would not mandate voting rights for
Blacks. Despite this pledge, Radical Republicans—most prominently
Representative George Boutwell and Senator Charles Sumner—later
advocated for a suffrage statute. The moderate wing of the party, however,
concluded that an amendment was the only politically viable option and
scuttled the Radicals’ attempt to pass a suffrage statute. 17
Unfortunately, this history has been virtually forgotten. Partly because
of this constitutional amnesia, the Fifteenth Amendment is missing from
current doctrine. One could read the U.S. Reports and conclude that the
Fifteenth Amendment was superfluous; the Fourteenth Amendment provides
the same—indeed, even greater and more defined—protections against racial
discrimination in voting than the Fifteenth Amendment. 18
But there is risk in relying solely on the Fourteenth Amendment as the
guarantor of minority voting rights. While the Fourteenth Amendment’s
scope was expanded to encompass voting rights during the twentieth century,
its protections have been weakened in recent decades. The Court’s penchant
for a colorblind Fourteenth Amendment, for example, has drawn into
question the constitutionality of majority-minority districts. 19 Moreover, in
City of Boerne v. Flores, the Court substantially curbed Congress’s
Fourteenth Amendment enforcement authority. 20 These doctrinal shifts have

16 AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 392–93 (2005) [hereinafter
AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION].
17 See infra Section III.D.
18 See infra Section I.A.
19 See Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 21 (2009) (plurality opinion) (“If § 2 were interpreted to
require crossover districts throughout the Nation, ‘it would unnecessarily infuse race into virtually every
redistricting, raising serious constitutional questions.’” (quoting League of United Latin Am. Citizens v.
Perry (LULAC), 548 U.S. 399, 446 (2006) (opinion of Kennedy, J.))); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 642
(1993) (recognizing a cause of action to challenge racial gerrymanders under the Equal Protection
Clause).
20 521 U.S. 507, 530 (1997).
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contributed to the invalidation of the VRA’s coverage formula 21 and could
spell trouble for the constitutionality of Sections 2 and 3(c) of the VRA. 22
As the Court established a colorblindness regime in antidiscrimination
law and cut back on Congress’s Fourteenth Amendment enforcement
authority, it neglected the Fifteenth Amendment. That neglect, in some ways,
is benign, as it has left undefined an area of doctrine upon which courts can
now expand. Reinvigorating the constitutional legacy and protections of the
Fifteenth Amendment could thus provide a powerful response to the Court’s
recent Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence and help preserve the VRA.
By showing that the Fifteenth Amendment is not superfluous, this
Article starts a conversation about reorienting voting rights doctrine toward
the Fifteenth Amendment. Indeed, the Reconstruction-era distinction
between civil and political rights continues to have relevance today,
particularly for Congress’s enforcement authority. As a first step in this new
conversation, this Article claims that Congress’s Fifteenth Amendment
enforcement authority is distinct from—and broader under current doctrine
than—its Fourteenth Amendment authority. The Article V debate further
provides a persuasive reason for overturning Boerne’s congruence and
proportionality test or, at a minimum, cabining it to the Fourteenth
Amendment. This doctrinal change would give Congress far more leeway in
passing voting rights legislation.

21 Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 557 (2013). Section 5 of the VRA required certain covered
jurisdictions to preclear all voting changes with federal authorities. See id. at 537. In 2006, Congress
reauthorized Section 4(b)’s formula for determining which jurisdictions were subject to Section 5’s
preclearance requirement. See id. at 539. When the Court invalidated Section 4(b), coverage was based
on data from the 1964, 1968, and 1972 elections. See id. at 537–39. The Court did not invalidate Section
5 itself. See id. at 557.
22 Section 2 is a “permanent, nationwide ban on racial discrimination in voting.” Id.; see 52 U.S.C.
§ 10301 (2012). Section 2 covers both vote-denial and vote-dilution claims and imposes liability based
on a finding of discriminatory intent or effect. See Veasey v. Abbott, 830 F.3d 216, 243–44 (5th Cir.
2016) (en banc). Section 2’s discriminatory-effects standard is broader than the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments’ standards and normally easier to prove in litigation than a constitutional claim. See infra
Section I.A.5.
Also known as the bail-in provision, Section 3(c) authorizes federal courts to require states and
political subdivisions that have violated the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments to preclear all voting
changes with federal authorities. 52 U.S.C. § 10302(c); see also Travis Crum, Note, The Voting Rights
Act’s Secret Weapon: Pocket Trigger Litigation and Dynamic Preclearance, 119 YALE L.J. 1992, 2006–
10 (2010) [hereinafter Crum, The Voting Rights Act’s Secret Weapon] (discussing Section 3(c)). Since
Shelby County, numerous lawsuits have been filed seeking to bail-in jurisdictions. See Travis Crum, The
Prospect of Bailing-in Texas: Recent Bail-in Litigation, ELECTION L. BLOG (Sept. 14, 2018, 9:39 AM),
https://electionlawblog.org/?p=101137 [https://perma.cc/88Y4-ZVGJ] [hereinafter Crum, Recent Bail-in
Litigation] (discussing lawsuits against North Carolina and Texas and bail-ins of municipalities in
Alabama and Texas).
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This Article makes several contributions to the field. 23 First, it provides
an unprecedented account of the Article V debate over the Fifteenth
Amendment, which, unlike the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the Fourteenth
Amendment, has received scant attention in the literature.24 Second, as one
of the first opportunities for Congress to interpret the Fourteenth Amendment
after its ratification, the Article V debate provides valuable insights into the
Reconstruction-era understanding of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments. Third, and relatedly, the Article V debate shows that the
substantive scopes and enforcement authorities of the Reconstruction
Amendments can be analytically distinguished: the Fourteenth Amendment
safeguards civil rights and the Fifteenth Amendment preserves political
rights. Finally, this Article argues that Congress’s Fifteenth Amendment
enforcement authority should be governed by the deferential standard
articulated in McCulloch v. Maryland 25 and South Carolina v. Katzenbach. 26
If the Court were to follow the original understanding of Congress’s
Fifteenth Amendment enforcement authority, the VRA would be on far
firmer constitutional ground.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides an overview of current
doctrine on the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments’ substantive scopes
as well as their enforcement authorities. Part II canvasses the
Reconstruction-era understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment’s
application to voting rights. Part III examines the expansion of black suffrage
from 1865 to 1869 and then analyzes the Article V debate in the lame-duck
Fortieth Congress. Part IV discusses the historical, normative, and doctrinal
significance of the Article V debate and shows how these insights help
insulate the VRA from constitutional challenge.27
23 As part of a larger project to revitalize the Fifteenth Amendment, this Article starts—
unsurprisingly—at the beginning. This Article, however, ends its historical journey at the conclusion of
the Article V debate—that is, when Congress rejected the suffrage statute and decided to pursue a
constitutional amendment to enfranchise Blacks nationwide. This Article does not purport to provide an
exhaustive account of the Fifteenth Amendment’s drafting and ratification. Accordingly, this Article does
not claim to identify the precise metes and bounds of the Fifteenth Amendment’s substantive scope.
24 See infra note 469 and accompanying text.
25 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819).
26 383 U.S. 301, 326 (1966).
27 Two points about language. First, the Fifteenth Amendment prohibits all racial discrimination in
voting, but this Article focuses on racial discrimination against Blacks. Although the rights of other
minorities were discussed during the Fifteenth Amendment’s ratification, the struggle for black suffrage
was at the center of the debate. See GILLETTE, supra note 11, at 58 (discussing moderate Republican
opposition to enfranchising “naturalized citizens of Chinese or Irish descent”); id. at 46 (“[T]hroughout
the congressional debate there was little question that the enfranchisement of the Negro was the object of
[the] proposed constitutional amendment . . . .”). Second, this Article focuses on questions of race—not
sex—even though the struggle for black suffrage shattered the longstanding coalition between the
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THE CONFLATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AND FIFTEENTH AMENDMENTS

The Fifteenth Amendment has been reduced to a vestigial organ. It is a
constitutional appendix, not an amendment. To provide useful background
information, this Part establishes that the Fifteenth Amendment is
superfluous under current doctrine by examining how the Court has
repeatedly relied on the Fourteenth Amendment—rather than the Fifteenth—
to scrutinize racially discriminatory election laws. As the remainder of this
Article demonstrates, current doctrine ignores the Reconstruction Framers’
original intent.
This Part first establishes that the Court views the Fourteenth
Amendment as the principal protector of voting rights. It then addresses how
the Court treats Congress’s Reconstruction Amendment enforcement
authority.
A. The Substantive Scopes of the Reconstruction Amendments
Today, the Equal Protection Clause is interpreted to prohibit racial
discrimination in voting whereas the Fifteenth Amendment is largely
overlooked. Because the Fourteenth Amendment’s substantive scope is
settled, a massive shift in the doctrine would require expressly overturning,
severely cabining, or outright ignoring numerous Supreme Court decisions.28
It would also require changes across the entire landscape of contemporary
civil rights jurisprudence. By contrast, the doctrine on the Fifteenth
Amendment’s substantive scope is littered with unanswered questions. This
gap in the doctrine creates possibilities for reframing voting rights doctrine
under the Fifteenth Amendment.
1. The Fourteenth Amendment and Racial Discrimination in Voting
The Court first interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal
Protection Clause to prohibit racial discrimination in voting in its 1927
decision in Nixon v. Herndon. 29 Striking down a Texas law that barred Blacks
from voting in the Democratic Party primary, the Court “f[ou]nd it
women’s suffrage movement and the (former) abolitionist community. See Reva B. Siegel, She the
People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality, Federalism, and the Family, 115 HARV. L. REV. 947,
968–70 (2002). Although the Fifteenth Amendment enfranchised only men of color and left women of
color without the right to vote, I will generally avoid using gendered terms for ease of reading.
28 For a helpful menu of options available to Supreme Court Justices who are interested in changing
precedent, see generally Richard L. Hasen, Anticipatory Overrulings, Invitations, Time Bombs, and
Inadvertence: How Supreme Court Justices Move the Law, 61 EMORY L.J. 779 (2012).
29 273 U.S. 536, 541 (1927); see also David A. Strauss, Does the Constitution Mean What It Says?,
129 HARV. L. REV. 1, 37 (2015) [hereinafter Strauss, Constitution] (noting Nixon’s unprecedented
holding).

1557

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

unnecessary to consider the Fifteenth Amendment, because it seem[ed] . . .
hard to imagine a more direct and obvious infringement of the Fourteenth.” 30
Without specifically addressing whether the Equal Protection Clause
protects political rights, the Court noted that the Fourteenth Amendment
“was passed . . . with a special intent to protect . . . blacks from
discrimination.” 31 Building off this premise, the Court held that the statute
irrationally “discriminat[ed] . . . by the distinction of color alone” and was
therefore invalid. 32 Since Nixon, the Court has continued to interpret the
Equal Protection Clause to prohibit racial discrimination in vote-denial
cases. 33
In addition to covering “first generation” barriers like racially
discriminatory voter-qualification laws, the Court has construed the
Fourteenth Amendment to encompass “second generation” claims, such as
vote dilution. 34 Second generation claims involve “packing” or “cracking”
minority voters, which dilutes their voting strength and effectively prevents
them from electing the candidates of their choice. 35 At its core, “[d]ilution
doctrine is designed to ensure that a group cannot obtain an unfair share of
political power by manipulating district lines.” 36
Since the early 1970s, the Court has recognized that intentional racial
vote dilution violates the Equal Protection Clause. 37 But despite this
constitutional imprimatur, the Court has narrowed the VRA’s statutory
protections and voiced apprehension about the role of race in the purposeful
creation of majority-minority districts.38 As Professor Heather Gerken has
30

Nixon, 273 U.S. at 540–41.
Id. at 541.
32 Id. The Court’s decision in Nixon was the first of the White Primary Cases. See Terry v. Adams,
345 U.S. 461 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932).
33 See, e.g., Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 233 (1985) (invalidating the felondisenfranchisement provision of the Alabama Constitution on intentional discrimination grounds under
the Equal Protection Clause).
34 Here, I borrow Professor Lani Guinier’s oft-used first- and second-generation terminology. LANI
GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY: FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS IN REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY
49 (1994). Throughout this Article, I use the term “vote dilution” to refer to racial vote dilution, unless
the context indicates otherwise.
35 See Heather K. Gerken, Understanding the Right to an Undiluted Vote, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1663,
1672 (2001) [hereinafter Gerken, Undiluted Vote].
36 Id. at 1680.
37 See White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 765–67 (1973); see also LULAC, 548 U.S. 399, 440 (2006)
(suggesting that a congressional district bore “the mark of intentional discrimination that could give rise
to an equal protection violation”).
38 See Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 21 (2009) (plurality opinion) (“If § 2 were interpreted to
require crossover districts throughout the Nation, ‘it would unnecessarily infuse race into virtually every
redistricting, raising serious constitutional questions.’” (quoting LULAC, 548 U.S. at 446)); Georgia v.
31
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remarked, these cases reflect “a concern that the VRA not dissolve into a
system of racial spoils, [and] a worry that voting rights protections will
entrench rather than undermine racial divisions.” 39
These concerns have found their most prominent expression in Shaw v.
Reno 40 and its progeny. In Shaw, the Court interpreted the Equal Protection
Clause to prohibit racial gerrymandering, that is, “separating . . . citizens into
different voting districts on the basis of race.” 41 Under Shaw, courts first look
to whether “race was the predominant factor motivating the legislature’s
decision to place a significant number of voters within or without a particular
district.” 42 If race predominated, the state must show that “the design of the
district . . . withstand[s] strict scrutiny.” 43 Because the VRA is frequently
cited by states to justify the creation of majority-minority districts and the
Shaw cause of action has been invoked by plaintiffs to challenge those
districts, Shaw’s requirement that these districts satisfy strict scrutiny puts
the Equal Protection Clause on a collision course with the VRA. 44
To be sure, the Court’s anxieties about race are not limited to voting
rights cases and are found throughout contemporary equal protection
doctrine—perhaps most prominently in cases concerning Congress’s
authority to impose disparate impact liability. 45 Indeed, Shaw’s hostility to
Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461, 482–83 (2003) (allowing influence and coalition districts to count as majorityminority districts under Section 5’s retrogression test); Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 885 (1994) (plurality
opinion) (concluding that Section 2 suits could not challenge the size of a governing body); Presley v.
Etowah Cty. Comm’n, 502 U.S. 491, 506–08 (1992) (holding that rules altering the allocation of power
within an elected body are not subject to preclearance).
Here, I use the term “majority-minority district” as a shorthand to “mean a district in which the
minority population is large enough . . . to exercise electoral control by voting cohesively.” Gerken,
Undiluted Vote, supra note 35, at 1667 n.3. This broad definition encompasses influence or crossover
districts, even though minority voters are not a numerical majority in such districts and even though such
districts are not mandatory under Section 2. See id.; see also Bartlett, 556 U.S. at 13 (plurality opinion)
(citing LULAC, 548 U.S. at 445). As the above-recited cases in this footnote demonstrate, the Court’s
skepticism toward such districts is not necessarily tied to a minority group being a numerical majority.
39 Heather K. Gerken, A Third Way for the Voting Rights Act: Section 5 and the Opt-in Approach,
106 COLUM. L. REV. 708, 745 (2006).
40 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
41 Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1463 (2017) (quoting Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd. of Elections,
137 S. Ct. 788, 797 (2017)); see also 509 U.S. at 649.
42 Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916 (1995).
43 Cooper, 137 S. Ct. at 1464.
44 See Gerken, Undiluted Vote, supra note 35, at 1697–98.
45 See, e.g., Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507,
2512 (2015) (“Courts should avoid interpreting disparate-impact liability to be so expansive as to inject
racial considerations into every housing decision.”); Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 594 (2009)
(Scalia, J., concurring) (“[T]he Court will have to confront the question: Whether, or to what extent, are
the disparate-impact provisions of [antidiscrimination statutes] consistent with the Constitution’s
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race-conscious redistricting epitomizes the Court’s move toward a
colorblind Equal Protection Clause. Viewed from this perspective, the
Court’s decisions cutting back on the VRA’s protections and creating the
Shaw cause of action are attributable to its treatment of voting rights under
the Equal Protection Clause.
2. The Fifteenth Amendment’s Unclear Scope
The Court has long held that the Fifteenth Amendment forbids racially
discriminatory laws that limit access to the ballot. 46 But whereas the Court
has squarely held that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits racial
discrimination in both vote-denial and vote-dilution cases, the Court has
declined to decide whether the Fifteenth Amendment forbids vote dilution.
Under the Court’s plurality opinion in City of Mobile v. Bolden, 47 the
Fifteenth Amendment prohibits racial discrimination only in vote-denial
cases. 48 In other words, the Fifteenth Amendment is solely concerned with
whether citizens can “register and vote without hindrance” regardless of
race. 49 Thus, the Fifteenth Amendment—unlike the Fourteenth
Amendment—does not protect against vote dilution under current doctrine.50
To be sure, the Court’s 1960 decision in Gomillion v. Lightfoot could
be read for the proposition that the Fifteenth Amendment encompasses votedilution claims. 51 In Gomillion, the State of Alabama infamously redrew the
City of Tuskegee’s boundaries from a square to a “strangely irregular
twenty-eight-sided figure,” an act that had the “inevitable effect of . . .
remov[ing] from the city all save four or five of its 400 Negro voters while

guarantee of equal protection?”); Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate Impact: Round
Three, 117 HARV. L. REV. 493, 495 (2003) (predicting that the Court will one day address “whether equal
protection could prohibit the passage of [disparate impact] statutes because of their overt concern with
race”).
46 See Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 523–24 (2000) (striking down a law that restricted suffrage
to citizens of Hawaiian descent); Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347, 356, 367–68 (1915) (invalidating
a grandfather clause that exempted from a mandatory literacy test any individual or their “lineal
descendant” who could vote prior to January 1, 1866).
47 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
48 Id. at 65.
49 Id.
50 See Reno v. Bossier Par. Sch. Bd. (Bossier Parish II), 528 U.S. 320, 334 n.3 (2000) (“[W]e have
never held that vote dilution violates the Fifteenth Amendment.”); Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146,
159 (1993) (“This Court has not decided whether the Fifteenth Amendment applies to vote-dilution
claims; in fact, we never have held any legislative apportionment inconsistent with the Fifteenth
Amendment. Nonetheless, we need not decide the precise scope of the Fifteenth Amendment’s
prohibition in this case.” (citation omitted)).
51 See 364 U.S. 339, 341, 347–48 (1960).
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not removing a single white voter or resident.” 52 In response to this egregious
gerrymander, the Court held that the plaintiffs had stated a claim that the law
violated the Fifteenth Amendment. 53
On the one hand, Gomillion resembles more recent vote-dilution cases.
Although Gomillion does not involve the archetypal vote-dilution scenario
where a jurisdiction packs or cracks minority voters in a redistricting plan,
Alabama effectively diluted the voting power of Tuskegee’s black residents
by redrawing the city’s boundaries. As Justice Souter later explained,
“Gomillion shows that the physical image evoked by the term ‘dilution’ does
not encompass all the ways in which participation in the political process can
be made unequal.” 54 According to Justice Souter, Gomillion fits comfortably
within the Court’s vote-dilution cases because “[c]hanging political
boundaries to affect minority voting power would be called dilution today.”55
On the other hand, the Gomillion Court focused on the near total denial
of Blacks’ right to vote in Tuskegee elections. 56 Furthermore, the Court
explicitly distinguished its result from Colegrove v. Green, where it had
declined to entertain a one-person, one-vote claim. 57 The Court
conceptualized Colegrove as a malapportionment case whereas Gomillion
was a racial vote-denial case. 58 And in subsequent decisions, the Court has
expressly declined to read Gomillion as a vote-dilution case. 59

52

Id. at 341.
See id. at 347–48.
54 Bossier Parish II, 528 U.S. at 360 n.11 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
55 Id.
56 See 364 U.S. at 341 (“The result of the Act is to deprive the Negro petitioners discriminatorily of
the benefits of residence in Tuskegee, including, inter alia, the right to vote in municipal elections.”).
57 See 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946) (plurality opinion) (stating that the Court would not “enter th[e]
political thicket”).
58 According to the Gomillion Court, the Colegrove and Gomillion plaintiffs alleged distinct forms
of discrimination: population-based and race-based, respectively. Compare Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 346
(“The complaint [in Colegrove] rested upon the disparity of population between the different districts
which rendered the effectiveness of each individual’s vote in some districts far less than in others.”), with
id. (“When a legislature thus singles out a readily isolated segment of a racial minority for special
discriminatory treatment, it violates the Fifteenth Amendment.”). The Court, moreover, explained that
the Colegrove plaintiffs “complained only of a dilution of the strength of their votes,” whereas the
Gomillion plaintiffs asserted that Alabama had “deprive[d] them of their votes and the consequent
advantages that the ballot affords.” Id.
59 See Bossier Parish II, 528 U.S. at 334 n.3 (rejecting Justice Souter’s interpretation of Gomillion
as a vote-dilution case); Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 142 n.14 (1976) (“There is no decision in
this Court holding a legislative apportionment or reapportionment violative of the Fifteenth Amendment.
The case closest to so holding is Gomillion v. Lightfoot, in which the Court found that allegations of
racially motivated gerrymandering of a municipality’s political boundaries stated a claim under that
Amendment.” (citations omitted)).
53
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3. Methods of Proof Under the Reconstruction Amendments
It is well established that a plaintiff must prove intentional
discrimination to state a claim under the Equal Protection Clause. 60 The
intent requirement stems from the Court’s 1976 decision in Washington v.
Davis, which rejected an equal protection challenge to the use of a written
personnel test that had a disparate racial impact on black police officers. 61 In
that decision, the Court openly engaged in results-oriented reasoning, stating
that a constitutional discriminatory-effects standard “would raise serious
questions about, and perhaps invalidate, a whole range of tax, welfare, public
service, regulatory, and licensing statutes.” 62 Although “[d]isproportionate
impact is not irrelevant” under Washington, it does not, “[s]tanding alone,”
trigger strict scrutiny. 63
The discriminatory intent requirement has profoundly impacted how
statutes are written and cases are litigated. After racial classifications became
subject to strict scrutiny, jurisdictions started enacting laws that used proxies
for race as a means of perpetuating Jim Crow. 64 Today, explicit racial
classifications are rare and largely relegated to affirmative action programs.65
In the absence of an explicit racial classification, proving discriminatory
intent often involves time- and resource-intensive discovery. 66 The
discriminatory intent requirement has thus made it more problematic to enact
race-conscious laws that are intended to benefit minorities. Moreover,
requiring a showing of discriminatory intent makes it far more difficult for
plaintiffs to trigger strict scrutiny in cases challenging facially neutral laws
that were motivated by discriminatory intent or have a disparate impact on
minorities.
60 See, e.g., Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977)
(“Proof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose is required to show a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause.”).
61 426 U.S. 229, 232 (1976).
62 Id. at 248; see also Aziz Z. Huq, What Is Discriminatory Intent?, 103 CORNELL L. REV. 1211,
1228 (2018) (“Washington explicitly rested on a concern about the destabilizing effects of a constitutional
effects rule.”).
63 426 U.S. at 242; see also id. (“[A]n invidious discriminatory purpose may often be inferred from
the totality of the relevant facts, including the fact, if it is true, that the law bears more heavily on one
race than another.”).
64 See Daniel R. Ortiz, The Myth of Intent in Equal Protection, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1105, 1117–18
(1989).
65 See, e.g., Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2207 (2016) (upholding a public
university’s use of race in college admissions).
66 See Pamela S. Karlan, Two Section Twos and Two Section Fives: Voting Rights and Remedies
After Flores, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 725, 735–36 (1998) [hereinafter Karlan, Two Section Twos]
(discussing the cost-, time-, and fact-intensive nature of proving intentional discrimination in a voting
rights case).
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Although the Court has plainly held that discriminatory intent is a
necessary ingredient of an equal protection claim, it has been far less clear
about whether the intent requirement applies to the Fifteenth Amendment.
Once again, Bolden is instructive. In the Court’s plurality decision, four
Justices concluded that discriminatory intent is necessary to establish a
violation under the Fifteenth Amendment. 67 Therefore, the Bolden plurality
is an extension of Washington v. Davis and its requirement that plaintiffs
prove discriminatory intent to trigger strict scrutiny. 68
The Court’s most recent discussion of the Fifteenth Amendment’s
substantive scope is its 2000 decision in Rice v. Cayetano. 69 There, the Court
invalidated a provision of the Hawaii Constitution that limited the right to
vote for trustees of the Office of Hawaiian Affairs to “Hawaiians,” i.e.,
“those persons who are descendants of people inhabiting the Hawaiian
Islands in 1778.” 70 Concluding that the Hawaii Constitution used ancestry as
a proxy for race, 71 the Court held that this “explicit, race-based voting
qualification” 72 was “a clear violation of the Fifteenth Amendment.” 73
Because the Hawaii Constitution included an explicit racial classification,
the Rice Court had no need to address the analytically distinct question of
whether and how a plaintiff could challenge a facially neutral law on
Fifteenth Amendment grounds.
Under current doctrine, Congress must rely on its enforcement authority
to justify Section 2 of the VRA’s discriminatory-effects test because both the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments prohibit only intentionally
discriminatory conduct. 74
4.

The Fourteenth Amendment’s Application to Non-Race Voting
Cases
In addition to prohibiting racial discrimination in voting, the Fourteenth
Amendment is now construed to protect voting rights in non-race situations.
67 City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 62 (1980) (plurality opinion) (“[R]acially discriminatory
motivation is a necessary ingredient of a Fifteenth Amendment violation.”).
68 See id. at 63 n.10 (citing Washington favorably).
69 528 U.S. 495 (2000).
70 Id. at 499.
71 See id. at 514 (“Ancestry can be a proxy for race. It is that proxy here.”).
72 Id. at 498.
73 Id. at 499; see also Davis v. Guam, 932 F.3d 822, 843 (9th Cir. 2019) (holding that “Guam’s
limitation on the right to vote in its political status plebiscite to ‘Native Inhabitants of Guam’ violates the
Fifteenth Amendment”).
74 See, e.g., Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Disparate Impact, Unified Law, 128 YALE L.J. 1566, 1593
(2019) (Section 2 “prohibits a broad swath of conduct that is constitutionally innocuous: government
activity that lacks a discriminatory purpose but produces a disparate impact”).
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Perhaps most famously, the Court has imposed a one-person, one-vote
requirement on state legislative districts.75 The Court has also relied on the
Equal Protection Clause to invalidate several laws and regulations—from
ballot-recount standards to the poll tax—on non-race-based grounds. 76 And
the Court has entertained challenges to numerous election laws on the
grounds that they infringe the fundamental right to vote under the Fourteenth
Amendment, even though it has frequently upheld those laws. 77 The Equal
Protection Clause was also at the heart of recent attempts to recognize
partisan gerrymandering as a justiciable question, though the Court
ultimately declined to wade into that political thicket.78 Because these cases
all involve non-race-based voting rights claims, they fall outside the
Fifteenth Amendment’s scope.
5. The Problem with Conflating the Reconstruction Amendments
As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, the Fourteenth Amendment
has eclipsed the Fifteenth Amendment in shaping modern election law
doctrine. These doctrinal developments have gone relatively unnoticed
because the Court expanded the Fourteenth Amendment’s ambit to prohibit
racial discrimination in voting while neglecting the Fifteenth Amendment.
In other words, the Fourteenth Amendment subsumed the types of cases that
could have been decided on Fifteenth Amendment grounds and eventually
became the one-size-fits-all constitutional prohibition on racial
discrimination—no matter the sphere of public life.
The VRA is another reason this doctrinal development has flown under
the radar. Specifically, Section 5 of the VRA blocked and deterred numerous
75 See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 583 (1964) (“[T]he Equal Protection Clause requires
that both houses of a state legislature be apportioned on a population basis . . . .”). Although the Court
relied on the Equal Protection Clause to impose an equi-population requirement on state legislative
districts, it invoked Article I, Section Two for the same requirement for congressional districts. See U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 2 (“The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen every second
Year by the People of the several States . . . .” (emphasis added)); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7–8
(1964) (construing this provision to mean that “one man’s vote in a congressional election is to be worth
as much as another’s”).
76 See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 109–10 (2000) (ballot-recount standards); Harper v. Va. State Bd.
of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666, 670 (1966) (poll tax); see also J. MORGAN KOUSSER, COLORBLIND
INJUSTICE: MINORITY VOTING RIGHTS AND THE UNDOING OF THE SECOND RECONSTRUCTION 35 (1999)
(discussing the racist origins of poll taxes in the South).
77 See, e.g., Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 204 (2008) (plurality opinion)
(upholding voter ID law); Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 441–42 (1992) (rejecting a challenge to a
ban on write-in candidates); Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 805–06 (1983) (invalidating an early
filing deadline for independent candidates).
78 See Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2491, 2506–07 (2019). Plaintiffs also cited the
First Amendment, the Elections Clause, and Section Two of Article I in their attempt to combat partisan
gerrymandering, but the Court similarly rejected those arguments. See id. at 2491.
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election law changes that would have violated the Fifteenth Amendment. 79
In 1982, Congress amended Section 2 to prohibit vote dilution and to
encompass a discriminatory-effects standard, overturning the Court’s
plurality decision in Bolden. 80 This revision allowed plaintiffs to bring
statutory rather than constitutional claims in most voting rights cases. In
particular, Section 2’s discriminatory-effects standard is broader than the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment standards and thus easier to prove in
litigation. 81
The primacy of both the Fourteenth Amendment and the VRA in
election law is so deeply engrained in our jurisprudence that it produces odd
ideological inconsistencies. Staunch originalists like Justice Thomas are
consistent defenders of Shaw’s interpretation of the Equal Protection
Clause, 82 even though the Fourteenth Amendment was originally understood
to not protect political rights. 83 And defenders of minority voting rights
frequently fail to ground their theories in the Fifteenth Amendment.84 But if
the Fourteenth Amendment and the VRA now protect against racial
discrimination in voting, the obvious question arises: does it matter that the
Fifteenth Amendment is now superfluous?
One response is that our Constitution should not be construed to render
an amendment redundant. In the statutory realm, it is well established that a
79 See Peyton McCrary, Christopher Seaman & Richard Valelly, The End of Preclearance as We
Knew It: How the Supreme Court Transformed Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 11 MICH. J. RACE &
L. 275, 278–79 (2006) (surveying objections and showing that federal oversight deters discriminatory
changes).
80 See Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, § 2(b)(4), 96 Stat. 131, 131;
Stephanopoulos, supra note 74, at 1576 (explaining that Congress “amended section 2 in 1982 to make
clear the provision could be violated even in the absence of discriminatory intent”).
81 See Karlan, Two Section Twos, supra note 66, at 735.
82 See, e.g., Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 137 S. Ct. 788, 803 (2017) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (“[The State] concede[s] that the legislature intentionally drew all 12 districts
as majority-black districts. That concession, in my view, mandates strict scrutiny as to each district.”
(citation omitted)); Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 1000 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment)
(stating that strict scrutiny applies to race-based redistricting).
83 See infra Part II.
84 See Heather K. Gerken, Second-Order Diversity, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1099, 1118–21 (2005)
(discussing the VRA); Gerken, Undiluted Vote, supra note 35, at 1671 & n.9 (discussing Section 2’s
standard for vote dilution); Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics as Markets: Partisan
Lockups of the Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643, 646 (1998) (drawing on insights from
economics to argue in favor of a pro-competition approach to election law); Michael S. Kang, Race and
Democratic Contestation, 117 YALE L.J. 734, 736–38 (2008) (discussing the concept of democratic
contestation in relation to the VRA rather than the Constitution); Franita Tolson, What Is Abridgment?:
A Critique of Two Section Twos, 67 ALA. L. REV. 433, 458 (2015) [hereinafter Tolson, Abridgment]
(arguing that Section Two of the Fourteenth Amendment is the touchstone for Congress’s authority over
voting rights).
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word, phrase, or provision should be interpreted to avoid superfluities. 85
Courts generally assume Congress selected multiple words “because it
intended each term to have a particular, nonsuperfluous meaning.” 86 In
addition, statutory amendments are read against background understandings
of the law’s ambit and interpreted to accomplish an objective in light of that
background. 87 These principles are equally applicable to constitutional
interpretation. The Court explained as early as Marbury v. Madison 88 that
“[i]t cannot be presumed that any clause in the constitution is intended to be
without effect.” 89
Furthermore, even assuming that the Fourteenth Amendment’s broad
terms encompass racial discrimination in voting, the Court’s voting rights
jurisprudence runs counter to the principle that “the specific governs the
general.” 90 If the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause adopts a
different doctrinal framework—namely, a colorblind approach—than the
Fifteenth Amendment, the latter should control over the former.
The conflation of the Reconstruction Amendments has resulted in
mechanical application of Fourteenth Amendment principles to what would
otherwise be considered Fifteenth Amendment cases. 91 While the Court
began interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment to cover racial discrimination
in voting in the early twentieth century, it has shown hostility to race-based
redistricting and the application of the VRA’s discriminatory-effects
standard in recent decades. In other words, even though the Court now
interprets the Fourteenth Amendment to prohibit racial discrimination in
voting, it has been steadily cutting back on those substantive protections.
These doctrinal shifts have already contributed to the invalidation of the
85 See, e.g., Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001) (“It is our duty ‘to give effect, if possible,
to every clause and word of a statute.’” (quoting United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538–39
(1955))).
86 Bailey v. United States, 51 U.S. 137, 146 (1995).
87 See, e.g., Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507,
2520 (2015) (“The [1988] amendments [to the Fair Housing Act] included three exemptions from liability
that assume the existence of disparate-impact claims. The most logical conclusion is that the three
amendments were deemed necessary because Congress presupposed disparate impact under the [Fair
Housing Act] as it had been enacted in 1968.”).
88 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
89 Id. at 174; see also United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 405 (2012) (“The text of the Fourth
Amendment reflects its close connection to property, since otherwise it would have referred simply to
‘the right of the people to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures’; the phrase ‘in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects’ would have been superfluous.”).
90 Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 384 (1992).
91 See Samuel Issacharoff, Polarized Voting and the Political Process: The Transformation of Voting
Rights Jurisprudence, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1833, 1845 (1992) (commenting that “[t]he Court recast voting
rights claims in the mold of Washington v. Davis”).
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VRA’s coverage formula and could also threaten the constitutionality of
Sections 2 and 3(c) of the VRA. 92
This failure to recognize the independent constitutional significance of
the Fifteenth Amendment is increasingly untenable. 93 Given that Shaw
portends a clash between the Equal Protection Clause and the VRA and that
the Court has repeatedly questioned discriminatory-effects standards, the
relevant distinctions between these two Amendments becomes more
important. So, too, does Congress’s enforcement authority under each
Amendment, to which this Article now turns.
B. Congress’s Reconstruction Amendment Enforcement Authority
Another salient reason to avoid conflating the Reconstruction
Amendments is that the governing standard for Congress’s enforcement
authority is more forgiving under the Fifteenth Amendment. This is no small
point. Much like strict scrutiny is “strict in theory, but fatal in fact,” 94 the
relevant standard for Congress’s enforcement authority is often outcome
determinative. 95 The level of deference given to Congress—whether framed
as a question of interpretive or remedial authority—will likely determine
whether Section 2 of the VRA’s discriminatory-effects standard survives the
inevitable constitutional attack. 96
To provide context for this argument and helpful background for the
Article V debate, this Section provides an overview of the Court’s decisions
on Congress’s Reconstruction Amendment enforcement authority. The
Reconstruction Amendments contain “virtually identical” 97 enforcement
clauses. Pursuant to Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment and Section
Two of the Fifteenth Amendment, Congress has the “power to enforce” “by
appropriate legislation” the rights guaranteed by that Amendment. 98 As such,
92 See Gerken, supra note 35, at 1696–98 (discussing Section 2); Crum, The Voting Rights Act’s
Secret Weapon, supra note 22, at 2027 (discussing Section 3(c)).
93 For how to resolve this problem, see infra Part IV.
94 Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment).
95 See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, Congressional Power to Renew the Preclearance Provisions of the
Voting Rights Act After Tennessee v. Lane, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 177, 196–202 (2005) (predicting that the
Boerne standard for Congress’s enforcement authority may be dispositive in litigation over Section 5’s
constitutionality).
96 See Gerken, Undiluted Vote, supra note 35, at 1696–98.
97 Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 373 n.8 (2001).
98 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 (“The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this article.”); id. amend. XV, § 2 (“The Congress shall have power to
enforce this article by appropriate legislation.”). The Thirteenth Amendment’s Enforcement Clause is
also similar. Id. amend. XIII, § 2 (“Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate
legislation.”).
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courts and commentators frequently treat Congress’s enforcement
authorities under the Reconstruction Amendments as coextensive, even if
they acknowledge that there might be arguments for differentiating between
the two. 99
From Reconstruction through the civil rights movement, the Court
applied a rationality standard to Congress’s Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendment enforcement authority. 100 But since the federalism revolution in
the 1990s, the Court has applied a congruence and proportionality test to
Congress’s Fourteenth Amendment enforcement authority. The Court has
never applied that standard in a case involving the Fifteenth Amendment—
or any case involving race or voting rights—and thus the deferential
rationality standard for Congress’s Fifteenth Amendment enforcement
authority remains good law. This Article argues that, even though Congress’s
enforcement authorities under the Reconstruction Amendments were
99 See, e.g., City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 207 n.1 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(“[T]he nature of the enforcement powers conferred by the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments has
always been treated as coextensive.”); Karlan, Two Section Twos, supra note 66, at 725 n.5 (explaining
that “because the two amendments are rough contemporaries and their enforcement power provisions are
articulated in similar terms, the [Boerne] analysis surely carries over”); Leah M. Litman, Inventing Equal
Sovereignty, 114 MICH. L. REV. 1207, 1258 n.329 (2016) (discussing “the Reconstruction Amendments
collectively” but recognizing that “[t]here may be reasons why Boerne’s congruence-and-proportionality
requirement would not apply to the Fifteenth Amendment”); Michael T. Morley, Prophylactic
Redistricting? Congress’s Section 5 Power and the New Equal Protection Right to Vote, 59 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 2053, 2078 (2018) [hereinafter Morley, Prophylactic] (“Boerne’s congruence-andproportionality test likely applies with equal force to Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment.”);
Stephanopoulos, supra note 74, at 1592–93, 1593 n.146 (discussing Boerne as the standard under the
Reconstruction Amendments but acknowledging that, “[s]trictly speaking, City of Boerne dealt only with
the Fourteenth Amendment, leaving the Fifteenth Amendment standard undetermined”). To be sure, some
courts and scholars have concluded that Katzenbach remains the appropriate standard under the Fifteenth
Amendment. See Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Mukasey, 573 F. Supp. 2d 221, 241–46 (D.D.C.
2008), rev’d on statutory grounds, Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 211
(2009); Akhil Reed Amar, The Lawfulness of Section 5—And Thus of Section 5, 126 HARV. L. REV. F.
109, 119–20 (2013) (arguing that a more expansive interpretation of Congress’s enforcement power under
the Fifteenth Amendment is preferable because that Amendment, unlike the Fourteenth, is limited to the
realm of voting); Evan H. Caminker, “Appropriate” Means-Ends Constraints on Section 5 Powers,
53 STAN. L. REV. 1127, 1190–91 (2001) (“Section 2 [of the Fifteenth Amendment] could not possibly
give rise to a legitimate fear that, if construed to require only McCulloch-style means-ends tailoring, it
would functionally award Congress a virtually plenary police power.”); Jeremy Amar-Dolan, Note, The
Voting Rights Act and the Fifteenth Amendment Standard of Review, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1477, 1497–
1501 (2014) (“[T]he Court should maintain separate standards for Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment
enforcement legislation.”); cf. Richard L. Hasen & Leah M. Litman, Thin and Thick Conceptions of the
Nineteenth Amendment Right to Vote and Congress’s Power to Enforce It, 108 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming
2020) (manuscript at 39), https://papers.ssrn.com/a=3501114 [https://perma.cc/68CC-SBQ4]
(distinguishing between Congress’s Fourteenth and Nineteenth Amendment enforcement authority).
100 See Christopher W. Schmidt, Section 5’s Forgotten Years: Congressional Power to Enforce the
Fourteenth Amendment Before Katzenbach v. Morgan, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 47, 82–83 (2018).
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originally intended to be coextensive, the Court has driven a doctrinal wedge
between them.
1. Katzenbach’s Rationality Standard
In two landmark 1966 decisions, the Court upheld key provisions of the
VRA and adopted a deferential standard for Congress’s enforcement
authority under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. 101
In South Carolina v. Katzenbach, the Court upheld the VRA’s coverage
formula and preclearance provision as permissible exercises of Congress’s
Fifteenth Amendment enforcement authority.102 The Court concluded that
the standard for Congress’s Fifteenth Amendment enforcement authority
was the same as the McCulloch standard. 103 In upholding the constitutionality
of the Second Bank of the United States in McCulloch, 104 Chief Justice John
Marshall famously established the test for Congress’s power under the
Necessary and Proper Clause: “Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the
scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are
plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the
letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional.” 105 According to the
Katzenbach Court, Congress’s use of the term “appropriate” in Section Two
of the Fifteenth Amendment was a clear adoption of the McCulloch
standard. 106
In endorsing the McCulloch standard, the Court gave Congress
significant leeway in crafting enforcement legislation. The Court found
Congress acted appropriately in “shift[ing] the advantage of time and inertia
from the perpetrators of the evil to its victims” 107 and putting election laws
on hold before their implementation. The Court also upheld the VRA’s
coverage formula, which confined the statute’s most stringent provisions to
those jurisdictions with egregious records of racial discrimination in
voting. 108 And in doing so, the Court expressly rejected South Carolina’s
invocation of “[t]he doctrine of the equality of States” on the grounds that

101

The Court subsequently endorsed the McCulloch standard for Congress’s Thirteenth Amendment
enforcement authority. See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 443–44 (1968).
102 383 U.S. 301, 329, 334–37 (1966). For an overview of the VRA’s coverage formula and
preclearance provision, see supra note 21.
103 See Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 326.
104 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
105 Id. at 421 (emphasis added).
106 See Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 325–26.
107 Id. at 328.
108 See id.
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the doctrine “applies only to the terms upon which States are admitted to the
Union.” 109
In addition to the VRA’s provisions targeting racial discrimination in
the South, Congress enacted Section 4(e), which provides that individuals
who have completed the sixth grade at an “American-flag school[]” cannot
be denied the right to vote based on their inability to understand English.110
This provision was enacted to protect the voting rights of Puerto Ricans
living in New York City, many of whom were disenfranchised by English
language requirements. 111 Unlike the VRA’s preclearance provisions,
Congress enacted Section 4(e) under its Fourteenth Amendment
enforcement authority because it protected a language minority rather than a
racial group per se. 112
In Katzenbach v. Morgan, the Court upheld Section 4(e) under
Congress’s Fourteenth Amendment enforcement authority. 113 By 1966, the
Court had already crossed the constitutional Rubicon of interpreting the
Fourteenth Amendment to encompass voting rights, so Congress’s reliance
on it was not unprecedented. 114 As in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, the
Morgan Court defined the McCulloch standard as synonymous with the
phrase “appropriate legislation.” 115
But whereas Katzenbach focuses on Congress’s enforcement authority
vis-à-vis the states, Morgan more directly addresses Congress’s authority to
interpret the Constitution. That is because New York argued that Section 4(e)
could not be “appropriate legislation to enforce the Equal Protection Clause
unless the judiciary decides . . . that the application of the English literacy
requirement . . . is forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause itself.” 116 The
Court rejected this claim because it would “confine the legislative power . . .
to the insignificant role of abrogating only those state laws that the judicial
branch was prepared to adjudge unconstitutional.” 117 The Court explained
109 Id. at 328–29. The equal sovereignty principle would rear its head again in the early twenty-first
century. See infra Section I.B.3.
110 52 U.S.C. § 10303(e) (2012).
111 See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 645 n.3 (1966).
112 See 52 U.S.C. § 10303(e)(1); infra note 533 (discussing Section 4(e)’s legislative history).
113 384 U.S. at 646.
114 See id. at 647 & n.6 (collecting cases).
115 See id. at 650–51.
116 Id. at 648.
117 Id. at 648–49. The Court had previously upheld the facial constitutionality of literacy tests. See
Lassiter v. Northampton Cty. Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 53–54 (1959); see also Guy-Uriel E. Charles
& Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, The Voting Rights Act in Winter: The Death of a Superstatute, 100 IOWA L.
REV. 1389, 1401 (2015) (discussing Morgan’s relationship to Lassiter). In a companion case to Morgan,
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that it would defer to Congress’s interpretation not only of the rights
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment but also the means adopted to
remedy and prevent those violations. 118
In response to Justice Harlan’s criticism that the Court “read[] § 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment as giving Congress the power to define the
substantive scope of the Amendment[,]” 119 the Court famously articulated
the one-way ratchet theory: although Congress is free to expand on rights
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, it cannot “restrict, abrogate, or
dilute these guarantees.” 120 In other words, the Court’s interpretation of the
Fourteenth Amendment sets a floor, which Congress may raise if it so
chooses.
The standard announced in Katzenbach and Morgan is a ringing
endorsement of McCulloch and a broad statement of congressional authority
in relation to both the powers of the states 121 and the Court. 122 To be sure, the
Katzenbach Court refined McCulloch to the issue at hand. The Court
explained that “[a]s against the reserved powers of the States, Congress may
use any rational means to effectuate the constitutional prohibition of racial
discrimination in voting.” 123 And the Court upheld “the coverage formula
[a]s rational in both practice and theory.” 124
For decades, the Court appropriately adhered to this doctrinal
framework and recognized Congress’s broad Reconstruction Amendment
enforcement authority. Indeed, the Court subsequently upheld numerous
the Court declined to decide whether New York’s English language requirement violated the Constitution
on the grounds that the plaintiff’s complaint failed to allege whether she completed the sixth grade and
therefore might be rendered moot by Morgan. See Cardona v. Power, 384 U.S. 672, 674 (1966).
118 See Morgan, 384 U.S. at 648 (“A construction of § 5 that would require a judicial determination
that the enforcement of the state law precluded by Congress violated the Amendment . . . would
depreciate both congressional resourcefulness and congressional responsibility for implementing the
Amendment.”).
119 Id. at 668 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
120 Id. at 651 n.10 (majority opinion); see also Jeffrey L. Yablon, Congressional Power Under
Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment, 25 STAN. L. REV. 885, 894 (1973) (“[T]he section five powers
of Congress operate like a ratchet: once the Court has found that an enactment or practice is violative of
the fourteenth amendment, Congress is powerless to turn the wheel backwards.”).
121 See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 325 (1966) (“The gist of the matter is that the
Fifteenth Amendment supersedes contrary exertions of state power.”).
122 See Morgan, 384 U.S. at 653 (“It was for Congress . . . to assess and weigh the various conflicting
considerations . . . . It is enough that we be able to perceive a basis upon which the Congress might resolve
the conflict as it did.”).
123 Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 324 (emphasis added).
124 Id. at 330 (emphasis added). The Katzenbach standard is often referred to as a “rationality” or
“rational means” standard even though those terms do not appear in McCulloch’s oft-quoted formulation.
See, e.g., Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 568–69 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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reauthorizations of the VRA under the Fifteenth Amendment and
Katzenbach’s rationality standard. 125 But the Court went rogue in 1997.
2. Boerne’s Congruence and Proportionality Test
The curtailment of Congress’s Fourteenth Amendment enforcement
authority began not with a decision involving racial discrimination but rather
with a First Amendment case. In Employment Division v. Smith, the Court
held that neutral, generally applicable laws do not violate the Free Exercise
Clause. 126 The Smith Court abandoned the so-called Sherbert test that applied
strict scrutiny to laws infringing free exercise rights. 127 Congress responded
by passing the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), 128 which
purported to overturn Smith by forcing courts to apply strict scrutiny in
adjudicating free exercise challenges to state and federal laws.129
In City of Boerne v. Flores, the Court held that Congress could not
impose RFRA on the states. 130 The Boerne Court established a new standard
for determining Congress’s Fourteenth Amendment enforcement authority.
Under Boerne’s three-part congruence and proportionality test, the Court
begins by “identify[ing] with some precision the scope of the constitutional
right at issue.” 131 The Court next “examine[s] whether Congress identified a
history and pattern of unconstitutional [conduct] by the States.” 132 The Court
concludes by determining whether there is “a congruence and proportionality
between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to
125

See Lopez v. Monterey County, 525 U.S. 266, 283–85 (1999) (upholding the 1982
reauthorization); City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 182–83 (1980) (upholding the 1975
reauthorization); Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526, 535 (1973) (upholding the 1970
reauthorization); see also Shelby County, 570 U.S. at 539 (“We upheld each of these reauthorizations
against constitutional challenge.”). When Congress reauthorized the VRA in 1975, it added protections
for language minorities to the coverage formula and relied on its Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment
enforcement authorities—a reliance that continued in the 1982 and 2006 reauthorizations. See Act of
Aug. 6, 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-73, § 203, 89 Stat. 400, 401; Nathaniel Persily, The Promise and Pitfalls of
the New Voting Rights Act, 117 YALE L.J. 174, 195–96 (2007) (discussing the coverage formula’s
evolution). The Court did not dwell on this point in affirming the VRA’s constitutionality under the
Fifteenth Amendment in Lopez and City of Rome. See Lopez, 525 U.S. at 284–85 (discussing only the
Fifteenth Amendment); City of Rome, 446 U.S. at 179–83 (discussing Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendment precedents interchangeably but upholding the VRA under the Fifteenth Amendment).
126 See 494 U.S. 872, 881 (1990).
127 See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 693 (2014) (discussing Smith’s analysis
as it relates to Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)).
128 Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2012)).
129 See Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 694–95.
130 See 521 U.S. 507, 511 (1997). RFRA still applies to the federal government because that
application does not raise federalism concerns. See Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 695.
131 Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 365 (2001).
132 Id. at 368.
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that end.” 133 Although the Court purported to follow precedent, 134 Boerne’s
congruence and proportionality test represents a decisive break with
McCulloch and Katzenbach. 135
The Boerne Court restricted both Congress’s interpretive and remedial
authorities. On the interpretive front, the Boerne Court arrogated to itself the
sole authority to interpret the Constitution. As the Court explained:
The design of the [Fourteenth] Amendment and the text of § 5 are inconsistent
with the suggestion that Congress has the power to decree the substance of the
Fourteenth Amendment’s restrictions on the States. Legislation which alters the
meaning of the Free Exercise Clause cannot be said to be enforcing the Clause.
Congress does not enforce a constitutional right by changing what the right is. 136

This language is facially inconsistent with Katzenbach’s rationality
standard, which treats Congress as a coequal interpreter of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s protections. Instead of following precedent and deferring to
Congress’s interpretation, the Boerne Court viewed RFRA as improperly
“alter[ing] the meaning of the Free Exercise Clause.” 137
To be sure, the Boerne Court was confronted with a direct challenge to
its interpretive authority. But under Morgan’s one-way ratchet, 138 Congress
would have been well within its Fourteenth Amendment enforcement
authority to enact RFRA. Congress disagreed with the floor set in Smith—
namely, that neutral, generally applicable laws do not violate the Free
Exercise Clause—and responded by raising the relevant standard of review
to strict scrutiny.
Recognizing this doctrinal inconsistency, the Boerne Court
reconceptualized—and arguably, implicitly overruled—Morgan’s one-way
ratchet. 139 According to the Boerne Court, Morgan contains language that
“could be interpreted as acknowledging a power in Congress to enact
legislation that expands the rights contained in § 1 of the Fourteenth
133

Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520.
See id. at 532–33 (contrasting RFRA unfavorably to the VRA); Ellen D. Katz, Reinforcing
Representation: Congressional Power to Enforce the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments in the
Rehnquist and Waite Courts, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2341, 2345 (2003) (“All the Boerne cases . . . selfconsciously preserve precedent upholding provisions of the Voting Rights Act . . . against constitutional
challenge.”).
135 See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, The Reconstruction Power, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1801, 1815 (2010); Katz,
supra note 134, at 2395.
136 Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519; see also id. at 527 (“Any suggestion that Congress has a substantive,
non-remedial power under the Fourteenth Amendment is not supported by our case law.”).
137 Id. at 519 (emphasis added).
138 See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 n.10 (1966).
139 See, e.g., Katz, supra note 134, at 2395.
134
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Amendment.” 140 This interpretation, as the Boerne Court saw it, was neither
“necessary . . . [n]or even the best one.” 141 The Boerne Court then reimagined
Morgan as a case where Congress was solely remedying unconstitutional
conduct, 142 even though Morgan was agnostic on the underlying
constitutional question. 143 In rejecting the one-way ratchet, the Boerne Court
worried that granting Congress any interpretive authority lacked a limiting
principle and would risk the Constitution’s status as “superior, paramount
law.” 144
The Boerne Court not only restricted Congress’s interpretive authority
but also significantly hindered Congress’s ability to craft remedial
legislation. The Boerne Court’s requirement of a lengthy legislative record
of unconstitutional conduct treats Congress more like an administrative
agency than a coequal branch of government. 145 At the final step of the
analysis, the Boerne Court remarked that “termination dates, geographic
restrictions, [and] egregious predicates” 146 are hallmarks of congruent and
proportional legislation. Boerne thus requires a closer fit between the
constitutional wrong and the legislative remedy than the Katzenbach
standard demanded. 147
Boerne has been roundly criticized from both sides of the aisle. 148
Nevertheless, the Court has applied the congruence and proportionality test
in several cases concerning Congress’s Fourteenth Amendment enforcement
140

Boerne, 521 U.S. at 527–28.
Id. at 528
142 See id. (“Both rationales for upholding § 4(e) rested on unconstitutional discrimination by New
York and Congress’ reasonable attempt to combat it.”).
143 See supra note 117 (discussing Morgan and Cardona).
144 521 U.S. at 529 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)).
145 See Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 376 (2001) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(criticizing the Court for “[r]eviewing the congressional record as if it were an administrative agency
record”).
146 521 U.S. at 533.
147 See Katz, supra note 134, at 2362–68. To be clear, even under Boerne, “Congress [has] even
greater latitude to craft remedial legislation in areas of traditional equal protection strict scrutiny.” Samuel
Issacharoff, Is Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act a Victim of Its Own Success?, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1710,
1715 (2004).
148 See, e.g., Balkin, supra note 135, at 1815 (“Nothing in the text of the Fourteenth Amendment
justifies the Boerne standard or its departure from the test of appropriateness announced in McCulloch v.
Maryland . . . . [T]he language of McCulloch is actually embedded in the text of Section 5 . . . .”); Michael
W. McConnell, Institutions and Interpretation: A Critique of City of Boerne v. Flores, 111 HARV. L. REV.
153, 194 (1997) [hereinafter McConnell, Institutions] (“The historical record shows that the framers of
the [Fourteenth] Amendment expected Congress, not the Court, to be the primary agent of its
enforcement, and that Congress would not necessarily consider itself bound by Court precedents in
executing that function.”). Indeed, Justice Scalia renounced the congruence and proportionality test in a
2004 dissent. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 556–58 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
141
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authority. 149 Nearly all of these cases implicated Congress’s power to
abrogate state sovereign immunity. 150 None involved race, voting, the
Fifteenth Amendment, or Congress’s authority to remedy racial
discrimination in voting.
3. Shelby County’s Equal Sovereignty Principle
The foregoing overview of Katzenbach and Boerne frames the
discussion about the Article V debate and its modern doctrinal significance.
The Court’s decision in Shelby County v. Holder, which invalidated the 2006
reauthorization of the VRA’s coverage formula, 151 adds another wrinkle to
this analysis. Although some scholars have accused the Court of changing
the standard of review for Congress’s Reconstruction Amendment
enforcement authority, 152 I argue that Shelby County’s equal sovereignty
principle is an example of “freestanding federalism” 153 and is thus limited to
149

See Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Md., 566 U.S. 30, 43–44 (2012) (plurality opinion) (holding
that Congress did not validly abrogate state sovereign immunity in enacting the FMLA’s self-care
provisions); Lane, 541 U.S. at 533–34 (upholding Title II of the ADA’s abrogation of state sovereign
immunity for “the class of cases implicating the fundamental right of access to the courts”); Nev. Dep’t
of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 734–35 (2003) (upholding the FMLA’s family-care provision’s
abrogation of state sovereign immunity); Garrett, 531 U.S. at 374 (invalidating Title I of the ADA’s
abrogation of state sovereign immunity); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 91 (2000) (striking
down the ADEA’s abrogation of state sovereign immunity); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598,
627 (2000) (holding that Congress’s Fourteenth Amendment enforcement authority “does not extend” to
VAWA’s civil remedies provision); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank,
527 U.S. 627, 647 (1999) (holding that Congress did not validly abrogate state sovereign immunity in the
Patent and Plant Variety Protection Act).
150 See Coleman, 566 U.S. at 43–44; Lane, 541 U.S. at 533–34; Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 734–35; Kimel,
528 U.S. at 91; Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 647.
151 See 570 U.S. 529, 557 (2013).
152 See Reva B. Siegel, Equality Divided, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1, 70 (2013) (accusing the Shelby
County Court of “chang[ing] both the framework of review and the principle on which it is exercised”);
cf. Richard L. Hasen, Shelby County and the Illusion of Minimalism, 22 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 713,
730–31 (2014) [hereinafter Hasen, Minimalism] (expressing concern that the Court will use Shelby
County to “bootstrap[]” Boerne to the Fifteenth Amendment).
153 John F. Manning, Federalism and the Generality Problem in Constitutional Interpretation,
122 HARV. L. REV. 2003, 2029 (2009). According to Professor Manning, the Court’s freestanding
federalism cases have “restricted or displaced Acts of Congress without purporting to ground [those]
decisions in any particular provision of the constitutional text.” Id. at 2005. Put simply, freestanding
federalism is a structural argument that the Constitution “as a whole . . . preserve[s] a significant element
of state sovereignty.” Id. at 2006.
Published the same month as Northwest Austin, Professor Manning’s article does not mention the
equal sovereignty principle, though he identifies the clear statement rule and the anticommandeering
doctrine as examples of freestanding federalism. See id. at 2029. Other scholars, however, have argued
that the equal sovereignty principle is an example of freestanding federalism. See Thomas B. Colby, In
Defense of the Equal Sovereignty Principle, 65 DUKE L.J. 1087, 1132–33 (2016) (“It is true that there is
no clause in the Constitution that explicitly articulates an equal sovereignty principle . . . . When it comes
to fundamental principles of constitutional federalism, a lack of specific textual support is actually par
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laws that differentiate between the states. In other words, Shelby County is
inapplicable to nationwide statutes like Sections 2 and 3(c) of the VRA.
Although Shelby County had a dramatic real-world impact, 154 its future
doctrinal importance is likely minimal.155 That is because the Court did not
decide whether Katzenbach or Boerne supplied the relevant standard of
review. Instead, the Court relied on its decision in Northwest Austin
Municipal Utility District Number One v. Holder,156 which resolved a
previous constitutional challenge to the VRA on constitutional avoidance
grounds. 157
The Shelby County Court looked to two “basic principles” from
Northwest Austin for guidance. 158 The first principle was the Court’s
statement that “the [VRA] imposes current burdens and must be justified by
current needs.” 159 The second principle was Northwest Austin’s
“conclu[sion] that ‘a departure from the fundamental principle of equal
sovereignty requires a showing that a statute’s disparate geographic coverage
is sufficiently related to the problem that it targets.’” 160 In a key passage, the
Court melded these two principles into one standard: “Congress—if it is to
divide the States—must identify those jurisdictions to be singled out on a
basis that makes sense in light of current conditions.” 161 Indeed, the opinion
proceeds by first discussing how the coverage formula differentiates between
for the course.”); Litman, supra note 99, at 1259 (“Shelby County described equal sovereignty as a
freestanding and fundamental principle not specifically tied to any particular congressional power.”).
154 See generally THE THURGOOD MARSHALL INST., NAACP LEGAL DEF. & EDUC. FUND, INC.,
DEMOCRACY DIMINISHED: STATE AND LOCAL THREATS TO VOTING POST-SHELBY COUNTY, ALABAMA V.
HOLDER (2016), https://www.naacpldf.org/wp-content/uploads/Democracy-Diminished-State-andLocal-Threats-to-Voting-Post-Shelby-County-Alabama-v.-Holder.pdf [https://perma.cc/3NJW-MVAY]
(cataloging racially discriminatory election laws passed after Shelby County).
155 Shelby County would apply to any future coverage formula that Congress enacts. See 570 U.S. at
557 (“Congress may draft another formula based on current conditions.”); see also Voting Rights
Advancement Act of 2019, H.R. 4, 116th Cong. (2019) (proposed coverage formula). Shelby County also
applies to Section 203 of the VRA, a less-famous coverage formula that requires covered jurisdictions to
provide bilingual election materials. 52 U.S.C. § 10503 (2012); see also Matthew Higgins, Note,
Language Accommodations and Section 203 of the Voting Rights Act: Reporting Requirements as a
Potential Solution to the Compliance Gap, 67 STAN. L. REV. 917, 920–21 (2015) (providing an overview
of Section 203).
156 557 U.S. 193 (2009); see also Shelby County, 570 U.S. at 536.
157 See 557 U.S. at 211. For persuasive critiques of Northwest Austin’s constitutional avoidance
holding, see Eric S. Fish, Constitutional Avoidance as Interpretation and as Remedy, 114 MICH. L. REV.
1275, 1277 (2016), and Neal Kumar Katyal & Thomas P. Schmidt, Active Avoidance: The Modern
Supreme Court and Legal Change, 128 HARV. L. REV. 2109, 2129–33 (2015).
158 Shelby County, 570 U.S. at 542.
159 Id. (quoting Northwest Austin, 557 U.S. at 203).
160 Id. (quoting Northwest Austin, 557 U.S. at 203).
161 Id. at 553.
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the states, and then analyzes whether its burdens are justified in light of
current conditions. 162 The Shelby County Court thus interpreted Northwest
Austin’s current burden requirement as contingent on a violation of the equal
sovereignty principle.
To be clear, the Shelby County Court still relied on Katzenbach. The
Court harkened back to McCulloch’s famous passage 163 and Katzenbach’s
conclusion that the original coverage formula was “rational in both practice
and theory.” 164 And in responding to the dissent, the Court stated that:
If Congress had started from scratch in 2006, it plainly could not have enacted
the present coverage formula. It would have been irrational for Congress to
distinguish between States in such a fundamental way based on 40-year-old
data, when today’s statistics tell an entirely different story. And it would have
been irrational to base coverage on the use of voting tests 40 years ago, when
such tests have been illegal since that time. But that is exactly what Congress
has done. 165

This language gestures toward the Katzenbach standard. Justice
Ginsburg’s dissenting opinion—which expressly relied on Katzenbach’s
rationality standard—picked up on this point. She noted that the Court “d[id]
not purport to alter settled precedent establishing that the dispositive question
is whether Congress has employed rational means.” 166
By contrast, the Court’s majority opinion in Shelby County does not
even cite Boerne—not for the standard of review, not for its application, and
not for its praise of previous versions of the VRA. 167 The words “congruent”
and “proportional” do not appear either. 168 Thus, Shelby County lacks
language holding that Boerne applies to the Fifteenth Amendment.
To be sure, the Court commented in a footnote that “[b]oth the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments were at issue in Northwest Austin”

162 See id. at 550 (“The provisions of § 5 apply only to those jurisdictions singled out by § 4. We
now consider whether that coverage formula is constitutional in light of current conditions.”).
163 See id. at 555 (discussing McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819)).
164 Id. at 550 (quoting South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 330 (1966)).
165 Id. at 556 (emphasis added).
166 Id. at 569 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted).
167 Others have noticed this glaring omission. See Hasen, Minimalism, supra note 152, at 723;
Litman, supra note 99, at 1259.
168 One explanation for Boerne’s absence is Justice Scalia. He renounced Boerne in a 2004 dissent,
see supra note 148 for a discussion of Lane, and he adhered to that position in a separate concurrence in
2012. See Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Md., 566 U.S. 30, 44–45 (2012) (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment). Indeed, Scalia’s refusal to join an opinion relying on Boerne resulted in a plurality opinion in
Coleman. Id. at 33 (plurality opinion).
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and that decision “guides our review under both Amendments in this case.”169
Although there is certainly some risk that a future Court could cite this
language to “bootstrap[]” Boerne into the Fifteenth Amendment, 170 that
result is not required. The Shelby County Court focused on the coverage
formula’s differentiation between the states, i.e., the issue “in th[e] case.” 171
If the equal sovereignty principle is an example of freestanding federalism,
then it would apply to statutes enacted under “both Amendments,” 172 just as
it would apply to statutes enacted under any other constitutional provision.
The Court’s self-imposed limits on its holding elucidate this point. The
Court made clear that its holding applied “only [to] the coverage formula[,]”
not to “§ 5 itself.” 173 The Court also stated that its “decision in no way affects
the permanent, nationwide ban on racial discrimination in voting found in
§ 2.” 174 If Shelby County changed the standard of review for all statutes
enacted under the Reconstruction Amendments, then these statements cannot
be taken at face value. A more stringent constitutional standard obviously
“affects” a neighboring statutory provision. Moreover, the Court’s
description of Section 2 as both permanent and nationwide strongly indicates
that these are distinguishing criteria and, therefore, Shelby County’s current
burden requirement applies only to statutes that differentiate between the
states. 175

169

Shelby County, 570 U.S. at 542 n.* (emphasis added).
Hasen, Minimalism, supra note 152, at 730–31.
171 570 U.S. at 542 n.*.
172 Id.
173 Id. at 557. This aspect of the Court’s decision was underscored by Justice Thomas’s concurring
opinion, which argued that the Court should have also invalidated Section 5. See id. (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
174 Id. (majority opinion) (emphasis added).
175 Other scholars have thoroughly critiqued the equal sovereignty principle. See Litman, supra note
99, at 1211 (“Shelby County broadened the equal sovereignty principle beyond how it had been used in
prior cases.”); Zachary S. Price, NAMUDNO’s Non-Existent Principle of State Equality, 88 N.Y.U. L.
REV. ONLINE 24, 30–39 (2013) (criticizing Northwest Austin’s invocation of the equal sovereignty
principle). But see Colby, supra note 153, at 1168 (defending the equal sovereignty principle but arguing
that Congress should be given more leeway to enact statutes under the Reconstruction Amendments).
As this Article went to print, the Supreme Court issued its first post-Shelby County decision
interpreting Congress’s Reconstruction Amendment enforcement authority. See Allen v. Cooper, 140 S.
Ct. 994 (2020). In striking down a nationwide statute that abrogated state sovereign immunity, the Court
relied exclusively on Boerne’s congruence and proportionality test and did not even cite Shelby County.
See id. at 1004–05. This glaring omission further reinforces the point that the equal sovereignty principle
is an example of freestanding federalism. See Travis Crum, The Curious Disappearance of Shelby
County, ELECTION L. BLOG (Mar. 27, 2020, 7:03 AM), https://electionlawblog.org/?p=110263
[https://perma.cc/P2ZZ-M33Z].
170
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II. THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND VOTING
RIGHTS DURING RECONSTRUCTION
This Part focuses on two distinct questions concerning the Fourteenth
Amendment: one of substantive scope and one of enforcement authority.
Regarding substantive scope, this Part addresses whether the Fourteenth
Amendment was understood during Reconstruction to encompass political
rights. As this Part will show, the Fourteenth Amendment was originally
understood not to mandate suffrage for the freedmen. Regarding Congress’s
enforcement authority, this Part will demonstrate that the Fourteenth
Amendment was originally understood to endorse McCulloch’s deferential
standard.
A. The Reconstruction-Era Hierarchy of Rights
To understand how the Reconstruction generation viewed the
Fourteenth Amendment, one must first examine the language employed
during that period. The Reconstruction generation conceptualized rights as
distinct spheres, and the Reconstruction debates were “based on a tripartite
division of rights . . . between civil rights, political rights, and social
rights.” 176 This nuance is especially important to flag for the contemporary
reader, as the twentieth century civil rights movement collapsed the
rhetorical and intellectual distinctions employed during Reconstruction. 177
Indeed, the Reconstruction Framers’ “categorization of rights plays no part
in current interpretations of the Fourteenth Amendment.” 178
In the 1860s, “civil rights” represented a far narrower category than that
term connotes today. 179 The Civil Rights Act of 1866, for example, identified
“the rights to make and enforce contracts; to buy, lease, inherit, hold and
convey property; to sue and be sued and to give evidence in court; to legal
protections for the security of person and property; and to equal treatment
176 Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV. 947, 1016
(1995) [hereinafter McConnell, Desegregation]; see also PAMELA BRANDWEIN, RETHINKING THE
JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF RECONSTRUCTION 70–71 (2011) (discussing this framework); FONER, supra
note 8, at 230–31 (same). To be sure, even at the dawn of Reconstruction, some Radicals believed that
Blacks were entitled to civil and political rights. See WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE 127 (1988) (explaining that some
Radicals refused to distinguish between civil and political rights); see also infra Section III.D.
177 See AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION, supra note 16, at 445 n.*.
178 McConnell, Desegregation, supra note 176, at 1025; cf. BRANDWEIN, supra note 176, at 71
(“After the passage of the Fifteenth Amendment, the right to vote began a slow and uneven migration
into the category of civil rights.”).
179 See HAROLD M. HYMAN & WILLIAM M. WIECEK, EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW:
CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT, 1835–1875, at 395 (1982).
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under the criminal law.” 180 Other civil rights included the rights to freedom
of movement and to be free from private violence. 181 During Reconstruction,
the concept of civil rights was employed to demand equal treatment by
government in civil and criminal matters.
By contrast, political rights were defined as the rights to vote, to hold
office, and to sit on juries. 182 The Reconstruction vision of citizenship
intersected with this hierarchy of rights. Although civil rights were inherent
in citizenship, the right to vote “lay outside the domain of mere
citizenship.” 183 Suffrage was often labeled a privilege, reinforcing the
distinction between citizenship and political rights. 184 Throughout
Reconstruction, white women were often cited—by both sides of the
debate—as the quintessential example of second-class citizens who were
entitled to own property but could not vote.185 White women were thus
permitted to exercise civil rights but not political rights.
By far the most nebulous category, social rights concerned
“participation in social life.” 186 This broad category included not only rights
to use public transportation, accommodations, and education, but also the
right to choose one’s personal associations. 187 Given its conceptual breadth,
social rights are oftentimes divided into “public” and “private”
subcategories. 188
But even with the public/private distinction in mind, the definition of
social rights is still blurry for—at least—two reasons. First, “public
conveyances, inns, and the like were viewed as a kind of hybrid—privately
owned but possessing public attributes.” 189 Second, and relatedly, public
social rights were sometimes categorized as civil rights because they

180

McConnell, Desegregation, supra note 176, at 1027 (discussing the Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch.
31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27).
181 See HYMAN & WIECEK, supra note 179, at 395–96.
182 See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 48 (1998)
[hereinafter AMAR, BILL OF RIGHTS].
183 AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION, supra note 16, at 382 (emphasis added).
184 See HYMAN & WIECEK, supra note 179, at 394–95.
185 See AMAR, BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 182, at 260 & n.*.
186 Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Unrelenting Libertarian Challenge to Public Accommodations Law,
66 STAN. L. REV. 1205, 1210 (2014).
187 See HYMAN & WIECEK, supra note 179, at 396; Bagenstos, supra note 186, at 1210.
188 See McConnell, Desegregation, supra note 176, at 1022 (“The individual’s social rights included
his own choice of associates, but did not include a right to expect that other persons whom he found
undesirable . . . would be denied access to common carriers or public accommodations . . . .”).
189 MALTZ, supra note 12, at 71.
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involved the provision of government services or licenses. 190 Construed as
such, social rights were merely a claim for social equality. 191 Under this view,
the government must issue a marriage license to an interracial couple (a civil
right) but cannot mandate that interracial couples be perceived as societal
equals (a social right). 192
Further complicating matters, the boundaries between civil, political,
and social rights were malleable and shifted over time.193 So, too, were public
views on these rights. Over the course of Reconstruction, the political center
of the Republican Party shifted to support black suffrage and the
enforcement of social rights, as evidenced by the Fifteenth Amendment and
the Civil Rights Act of 1875, respectively. 194 But at the beginning of
Reconstruction, “only ‘radicals’ merged civil and political rights.”195 For
purposes of this Article, the category that matters is political rights—and the
right to vote was not considered a civil or social right, nor was it viewed as
inherent in citizenship.
B. Constitutional Two-Steps
During the Civil War and Reconstruction, Radical Republicans pushed
an abolitionist agenda, which culminated in the enfranchisement of the
freedmen. Along the way, the Radicals’ victories followed a two-step
pattern: an initial subconstitutional rule would later be expanded upon and
entrenched via a constitutional amendment.
The initial constitutional two-step was the abolition of slavery. The first
move was President Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation in January 1863.

190 See Bagenstos, supra note 186, at 1211 (discussing the Civil Rights Act of 1875, which relied on
a broad understanding of civil rights in prohibiting racial discrimination in public accommodations);
McConnell, Desegregation, supra note 176, at 1022–23 (“The effect of the Fourteenth Amendment was
not to alter the boundary between civil and social rights, but to make race an unreasonable basis for
discrimination within the civil sphere.”).
191 See Rebecca J. Scott, Public Rights, Social Equality, and the Conceptual Roots of the Plessy
Challenge, 106 MICH. L. REV. 777, 786–87 (2008).
192 See McConnell, Desegregation, supra note 176, at 1018–20; see also MALTZ, supra note 12, at
72 (“Given the special nature of public accommodations, the drafters [of the Fourteenth Amendment]
might well have envisioned a regime in which racial discrimination in such facilities was
prohibited . . . .”).
193 See AMAR, BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 182, at 258–59 (discussing the transformation of the right
to keep and bear arms from a political right to a civil right).
194 See HYMAN & WIECEK, supra note 179, at 397–98.
195 Id. at 394. For example, Senator Charles Sumner, one of the most Radical Republicans,
“introduced a series of resolutions calling for civil and political equality” during the Thirty-Ninth
Congress. FONER, supra note 8, at 240; see also infra Section III.B.2 (discussing Sumner’s proposals in
the Fortieth Congress).
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But that decree applied only to the Confederate States. 196 The second step
occurred in December 1865—nearly eight months after Appomattox—when
the Thirteenth Amendment abolished slavery in two of the loyal Border
States and ensured that it would not return in the former Confederacy. 197 The
Thirteenth Amendment thus expanded the states covered by the
Emancipation Proclamation’s abolition of slavery and entrenched that
decision against any post-war backsliding.
Unfortunately, emancipation did not result in freedom in the South. The
ex-Confederate States quickly enacted the notorious Black Codes, which
severely curtailed the liberty of the newly freed slaves by limiting their right
to contract and their freedom of movement. 198 Moreover, “violence against
blacks reached staggering proportions in the immediate aftermath of the
war.” 199 It soon became apparent that the Southern States sought to
reestablish a de facto system of slavery.
In order to eradicate the Black Codes, 200 Congress enacted the Civil
Rights Act of 1866 pursuant to its Thirteenth Amendment enforcement
authority. 201 True to its name, the Civil Rights Act protected civil rights—
such as the rights to own property and sign a contract—but not political
rights. 202 Indeed, Republicans disclaimed that political rights were implicated
by the Civil Rights Act. 203 The goal was to protect the civil rights of the
freedmen, not extend the franchise.
As the first major legislation passed over a presidential veto,204 the
constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act was contested at the time. Although
the Emancipation Proclamation had been justified as an exercise of the
196 See David A. Strauss, The Irrelevance of Constitutional Amendments, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1457,
1480 (2001).
197 See AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION, supra note 16, at 359 (noting that Delaware and Kentucky
“were the Union’s only remaining slave states”).
198 See FONER, supra note 8, at 198–201.
199 Id. at 119.
200 See id. at 244.
201 See AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION, supra note 16, at 362 (“Reconstructors insisted that the
Abolition Amendment’s ‘appropriate’ clause allowed Congress to legislate not merely against slavery
itself, but against all the ‘badges’ and relics of a slave system.”); Steven A. Engel, Note, The McCulloch
Theory of the Fourteenth Amendment: City of Boerne v. Flores and the Original Understanding of Section
5, 109 YALE L.J. 115, 119 (1999) (“The substance of the [Thirteenth A]mendment prohibited slavery, yet
under the Enforcement Clause the Republicans claimed the authority to enact the Civil Rights Act, which
protected against state infringement a range of civil liberties, such as the rights of contract and property
and the right to sue in court.”).
202 See RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT 30–31 (2d ed. 1997); McConnell, Desegregation, supra note 176, at 1027.
203 See David P. Currie, The Reconstruction Congress, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 383, 398 & n.95 (2008).
204 See FONER, supra note 8, at 250–51.

1582

114:1549 (2020)

The Superfluous Fifteenth Amendment?

President’s war powers, the same font of authority was more questionable
over a year after hostilities had ceased. Accordingly, leading Republicans
recommended waiting until the Thirteenth Amendment’s ratification to enact
the Civil Rights Act. 205 Even then, a handful of Republicans—perhaps most
prominently Representative John Bingham of Ohio—expressed reservations
about the Act’s constitutionality. 206 And, of course, Democrats and President
Johnson repeatedly questioned the Act’s constitutionality. 207
The Thirty-Ninth Congress ultimately chose the Article V route to
“provide an incontrovertible constitutional foundation for the act.” 208 The
Civil Rights Act of 1866 thus served as a basis for and was constitutionalized
by the Fourteenth Amendment. Given this relationship, the Civil Rights Act
provides strong initial evidence that the Fourteenth Amendment
encompasses civil rights. 209
C. The Substantive Scope of the Fourteenth Amendment
Throughout the Fourteenth Amendment debates, Republicans in
Congress distinguished between civil and political rights. 210 While
introducing the Fourteenth Amendment, Senator Jacob Howard (R-MI)
remarked that the Privileges or Immunities Clause protected “the personal
rights guarant[eed] and secured by the first eight amendments of the
Constitution.” 211 Senator Howard made clear that the Radical Republicans’
205

See Currie, supra note 203, at 394–95.
See GERARD N. MAGLIOCCA, AMERICAN FOUNDING SON: JOHN BINGHAM AND THE INVENTION
OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 120 (2013); Engel, supra note 201, at 133. Some scholars concur with
Bingham’s assessment. See Currie, supra note 203, at 396 (“The Thirteenth Amendment forbade slavery,
not racial discrimination; it did not authorize Congress to legislate equal civil rights.”); Jonathan F.
Mitchell, Textualism and the Fourteenth Amendment, 69 STAN. L. REV. 1237, 1260 (2017)
(“Congressional supporters claimed that the Thirteenth Amendment authorized [the Civil Rights Act of
1866], but the Thirteenth Amendment gets them only part of the way there.” (footnote omitted)).
207 See AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION, supra note 16, at 362.
208 Id.
209 See, e.g., McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 775 (2010) (“Today, it is generally
accepted that the Fourteenth Amendment was understood to provide a constitutional basis for protecting
the rights set out in the Civil Rights Act of 1866.”); BERGER, supra note 202, at 23 (“[T]he [Fourteenth]
Amendment was designed to ‘constitutionalize’ the [Civil Rights] Act . . . so as to remove doubt as to its
constitutionality and to place it beyond the power of a later Congress to repeal.”). Congress reenacted the
Civil Rights Act of 1866 after the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification to resolve any doubt about its
constitutionality. See Civil Rights Act of 1870, ch. 114, § 18, 16 Stat. 140, 144; see also Jennifer Mason
McAward, The Scope of Congress’s Thirteenth Amendment Enforcement Power After City of Boerne v.
Flores, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 77, 115–16 (2010) (discussing this history and its relationship to Congress’s
Thirteenth Amendment enforcement authority).
210 See AMAR, BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 182, at 216–18, 217 n.* (citing dozens of statements by
members of Congress).
211 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2765 (1866) (statement of Sen. Howard).
206
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goal was to overturn Barron v. Baltimore 212 and incorporate the Bill of Rights
against the states. 213 Of course, those rights did not include the ballot. As
Senator Howard explained:
[T]he first section of the proposed amendment does not give to either of these
classes [Whites or Blacks] the right of voting. The right of suffrage is not, in
law, one of the privileges or immunities thus secured by the Constitution. It is
merely the creature of law. It has always been regarded in this country as the
result of positive local law, not regarded as one of those fundamental rights
lying at the basis of all society and without which a people cannot exist except
as slaves, subject to a despotism. 214

Representative John Bingham—the “Madison” 215 of the Fourteenth
Amendment—agreed with this interpretation, stating that the Joint
Committee on Reconstruction believed that “the exercise of the elective
franchise . . . is exclusively under the control of the States.” 216 Other
Republicans concurred in this construction of the Fourteenth Amendment. 217
Furthermore, moderate Republicans were not “enthusiastic about the
prospect of black suffrage, either in the North, where it represented a political
liability, or the South, where it seemed less likely to provide a stable basis
for a new Republican party than a political alliance with forward-looking
white Southerners.” 218 And throughout the 1866 campaign and the
ratification battle, Republicans emphasized that the Fourteenth Amendment
did not encompass voting rights. 219 This limitation was no minor point:
Democrats attempted to exploit fears of black suffrage in arguing against the
Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification, thus forcing Republicans to reject
those claims. 220
212

32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
See AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION, supra note 16, at 386–87.
214 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2766 (1866) (statement of Sen. Howard).
215 Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 74 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting).
216 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2542 (1866) (statement of Rep. Bingham); see also id. at
431 (“[W]hy not go for a constitutional amendment which will declare, once for all, that no State . . . shall
make any distinction in the right of voting between male citizens of the United States . . . ? I will answer
with all my heart that I am ready to go for that. But a majority of those with whom I am associated think
that this is all that is needed at present . . . . I am content with that.”).
217 See, e.g., id. at 1159 (statement of Rep. Windom (R-MN)) (commenting that the Fourteenth
Amendment “does not . . . confer the privilege of voting, for that is a political right”).
218 FONER, supra note 8, at 241.
219 See id. at 260.
220 See, e.g., MALTZ, supra note 12, at 118 (“Both in and out of Congress, opponents of the [the
Fourteenth Amendment] charged again and again that it was meant to allow Congress to mandate black
suffrage. Supporters, however, emphatically denied the allegation.” (footnote omitted)); George C.
Thomas III, Newspapers and the Fourteenth Amendment: What Did the American Public Know About
213
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Both the Republicans’ and Democrats’ strategies are unsurprising given
the continued unpopularity of black suffrage in the North and the defeat of
five suffrage referenda in 1865. 221 Indeed, it is difficult to overstate the
vehemence of Northern racism. 222 As recently as 1853, Illinois adopted a
criminal statute prohibiting Blacks from residing in the state. 223 The desire to
avoid the black suffrage issue was so strong that “no speaker during the
debates on the Fourteenth Amendment pursued the contention that § 1 would
be construed to include the franchise.” 224
Even Radical Republican supporters of black suffrage openly lamented
that the Fourteenth Amendment lacked protections for political rights,225 and
Republican newspapers commented that the Radicals failed to secure black
suffrage. 226 Perhaps most telling, Radical Republicans pledged to continue
fighting for black suffrage on the 1866 campaign trial. 227 Representative
George Boutwell (R-MA) and Senator Charles Sumner (R-MA)—who
would later lead the Radicals in their attempt to pass a nationwide black
suffrage statute pursuant to Congress’s Fourteenth Amendment enforcement
authority 228—admitted in 1866 that the Amendment did not mandate black
suffrage. Congressman Boutwell, who was also a member of the Joint
Committee on Reconstruction, 229 conceded that “[t]he proposition in the
matter of suffrage falls short of what I desire, but so far as it goes it tends to
Section 1?, 18 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 323, 347 (2009) (discussing Democratic newspapers’ assertion
that the Fourteenth Amendment granted nationwide black suffrage).
221 See GILLETTE, supra note 11, at 25–26; see also infra Section III.A (discussing suffrage
referenda).
222 See LAURA F. EDWARDS, A LEGAL HISTORY OF THE CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION 83
(2015) (listing restrictions on the civil and political rights of Blacks in several Northern and Midwestern
States).
223 See MALTZ, supra note 12, at 2. That statute was repealed near the end of the Civil War. See id.
at 6.
224 Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 163 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part); see also GARRETT EPPS, DEMOCRACY REBORN: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE FIGHT
FOR EQUAL RIGHTS IN POST-CIVIL WAR AMERICA 104 (2006) (“[T]he majority of Republicans . . . were
still mired in the old view of the vote as a political privilege granted to a few citizens rather than as a right
belonging to all.”); JOHN MABRY MATHEWS, LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL HISTORY OF THE FIFTEENTH
AMENDMENT 12 (1909) (“There was a feeling too widespread to be safely antagonized that the regulation
of the suffrage was a matter properly belonging to the state governments.”).
225 See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2469 (1866) (statement of Rep. Kelley (R-PA)) (stating
that the Fourteenth Amendment “d[id] not go far enough[,] and propos[ing] to at once enfranchise every
loyal man in the country”); MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME
COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 28 (2004).
226 See FONER, supra note 8, at 256.
227 See JOSEPH B. JAMES, THE FRAMING OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 178 (1956).
228 See infra Section III.D.
229 See MAGLIOCCA, supra note 206, at 111.
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the equalization of the inequality at present existing.” 230 And in 1866
campaign speeches, Senator Sumner “openly declared that the [Fourteenth
A]mendment was not enough, that impartial suffrage must come.” 231
1. Section One
In addition to the Reconstruction Framers’ intent and the original public
understanding of the Amendment at the time, Section One of the Fourteenth
Amendment provides further textual evidence of the exclusion of political
rights. Indeed, Section One’s capacious language does not expressly
reference political rights at all. Nor does the language employed indicate that
it would have been understood to encompass the right to vote.
Section One’s first sentence—the Citizenship Clause—overturned
Dred Scott and conferred citizenship on the freedmen. 232 But as
conceptualized in the eighteenth century, citizenship was not coextensive
with the right to vote. As noted previously, women were the paradigmatic
example of nonvoting citizens during Reconstruction. 233
Moving on to the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 234 the
Reconstruction Framers borrowed from Article IV’s protections for out-ofstate citizens. Article IV, however, had never been read to compel New
Hampshire to grant a Virginian the right to vote. Article IV therefore
protected civil rights, not political rights. 235 Whatever the metes and bounds
of “privileges or immunities,” those terms did not encompass political rights
during Reconstruction. 236 Indeed, toward the end of Reconstruction, the
Court held that women were not entitled to the right to vote under the
Privileges or Immunities Clause. 237

230

CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2508 (1866) (statement of Rep. Boutwell); see also id. (“I
demand and shall continue to demand the franchise for all loyal male citizens of this country . . . .”).
231 JAMES, supra note 227, at 173. Although these comments occurred after the Fourteenth
Amendment passed Congress, they were made during the ratification debate.
232 See AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION, supra note 16, at 380–81.
233 See supra Section II.A.
234 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States . . . .”).
235 See AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION, supra note 16, at 391–92.
236 See BERGER, supra note 202, at 31–32.
237 Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162, 178 (1875). The Minor Court noted that the Fifteenth
Amendment provided a compelling reason not to confer suffrage rights via the Fourteenth Amendment,
pointing out that “[i]f suffrage was one of the[] [Fourteenth Amendment’s] privileges or immunities, why
amend the Constitution to prevent its being denied on account of race?” Id. at 175.
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The Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses further reinforce the
civil–political rights dichotomy.238 Because both clauses apply to
“person[s]” 239—not merely citizens—they cover a broader class of
individuals than the Privileges or Immunities Clause or the Fifteenth
Amendment. This distinction is best illustrated by the fact that the
Constitution permits the disenfranchisement of aliens. 240 The Due Process
and Equal Protection Clauses’ use of the word “person” cuts against the
Court’s voting rights jurisprudence. 241
2. The Apportionment Clause
Given the close relationship between the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and
the Fourteenth Amendment, Section One “inspired relatively little
discussion.” 242 By contrast, Section Two’s Apportionment Clause sparked
real debate. 243 “[L]ess familiar” 244 than its sectional sibling, Section Two
provides for a reduction in House seats if a state “denied” or “abridged” the
“right to vote” of its adult “male” “citizens.” 245
Section Two was crafted as a response to an unintended consequence
of the Thirteenth Amendment: the Southern States that had previously
received three-fifths representation in the House for every slave would now
be entitled to five-fifths for every disenfranchised freedmen. 246 At the time,

238 See John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 101 YALE L.J. 1385,
1438–40 (1992) (observing that several of the Reconstruction Framers believed that the Equal Protection
Clause did not apply to voting rights).
239 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
240 See Vikram David Amar, Jury Service as Political Participation Akin to Voting, 80 CORNELL L.
REV. 203, 227 (1995). But see Jamin B. Raskin, Legal Aliens, Local Citizens: The Historical,
Constitutional and Theoretical Meanings of Alien Suffrage, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1391, 1397 (1993) (noting
that white male aliens “exercised the right to vote in at least twenty-two states or territories during the
nineteenth century”).
241 As noted above, the Court has applied the Fourteenth Amendment to non-race voting rights claims
in a series of equal protection decisions as well as cases treating the right to vote as a fundamental right.
See supra Section I.A.4.
242 FONER, supra note 8, at 257.
243 See id.
244 Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 42 (1974).
245 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2. Section Two’s apportionment penalty has never been enforced.
See, e.g., Gerard N. Magliocca, Our Unconstitutional Reapportionment Process, 86 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
774, 783 (2018).
246 See Pamela S. Karlan, Reapportionment, Nonapportionment, and Recovering Some Lost History
of One Person, One Vote, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1921, 1931–32 (2018); Franita Tolson, The
Constitutional Structure of Voting Rights Enforcement, 89 WASH. L. REV. 379, 405 (2014) [hereinafter
Tolson, Structure].
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it was estimated that this would give the South an additional fifteen House
seats. 247
Even though the Reconstruction Framers attempted to rectify the
malapportionment wrought by the disenfranchisement of the freedmen,
Section Two addressed the five-fifths problem without enfranchising Blacks
nationwide. As a compromise provision, Section Two evidenced a political
calculation: “[I]t protected the North against an increase in Southern white
political power and punished the South for withholding suffrage from Blacks
but allowed Northern states to do so with impunity, since their black
population was too small to make a difference in representation.” 248 The
solution to the five-fifths problem did not require the extension of voting
rights to black men but merely provided a “strong inducement” 249 to do so.
Indeed, Section Two’s specific remedy—a reduction in House seats—
undermines the argument that Section One banned racial discrimination in
voting. 250
Despite the inclusion of the Apportionment Clause, the congressional
consensus was uniform in viewing the entire Fourteenth Amendment as a
civil rights provision. Representative Bingham stated that “[t]he amendment
does not give, as the second section shows, the power to Congress of
regulating suffrage in the several states. The second section excludes the
247

See GILLETTE, supra note 11, at 25; see also Michael T. Morley, Remedial Equilibration and the
Right to Vote Under Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 2015 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 279, 306 [hereinafter
Morley, Equilibration] (“[I]f Representatives were allocated based on total population, then 127,000
white people in New York would be entitled to a single representative, while an equal number of whites
in Mississippi would have three representatives, due to the large number of disenfranchised blacks
there.”). For context, the Thirty-Ninth Congress had 193 representatives. See Congress Profiles, U.S.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES: HISTORY, ART & ARCHIVES, https://history.house.gov/CongressionalOverview/Profiles/39th/ [https://perma.cc/3298-KEP5].
248 Xi Wang, Black Suffrage and the Redefinition of American Freedom, 1860–1870, 17 CARDOZO
L. REV. 2153, 2194–95 (1996).
249 KLARMAN, supra note 225, at 28; see also 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE:
TRANSFORMATIONS 107 (1998) [hereinafter ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS] (describing the
Apportionment Clause as providing “a serious penalty” but also “transparently presuppos[ing] the
continued constitutional legitimacy of such exclusionary practices”).
250 See Morley, Prophylactic, supra note 99, at 2093 (“It would have made little sense for Congress
to leave states discretion under Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment to refuse to extend voting rights
to former slaves or other minorities if Section 1 of that same Amendment compelled them to do so . . . .”);
Strauss, Constitution, supra note 29, at 39 (“Section 2 refers explicitly to voting, and it provides both a
detailed right . . . and a specific remedy. Section 1 does not refer to voting at all . . . . Read naturally, the
amendment does not seem to provide dual remedies.” (footnotes omitted)). But see Tolson, Abridgment,
supra note 84, at 458 (arguing that, when combined with Section Five, the Apportionment Clause “was
the Reconstruction Congress’s attempt to constitutionalize a mechanism that would allow Congress to all
but legislate universal suffrage”). See infra notes 479–481 and accompanying text for an argument against
Professor Tolson’s position.
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conclusion that by the first section suffrage is subjected to congressional
law . . . .” 251 Similarly, Senator Jacob Howard commented that “[t]he second
section leaves the right to regulate the elective franchise still with the States,
and does not meddle with that right.” 252
Furthermore, the Thirty-Ninth Congress specifically rejected attempts
to include a right to vote in Section Two. Activist Robert Dale Owen
submitted a proposal that would have established black suffrage on July 4,
1876. 253 Even though this proposal would have delayed black suffrage for a
decade, it was deemed too radical and created a stalemate in the Joint
Committee on Reconstruction that was only broken when Congressman
Thaddeus Stevens (R-PA) abandoned his support for including black
suffrage in the Amendment’s scope. 254 Other proposals endorsing black
suffrage were also voted down. 255 The Reconstruction Framers, therefore, did
not view Section Two as transforming the substance of Section One.
Section Two’s treatment of gender further demonstrates the
Reconstruction-era distinction between citizenship and political rights.
Section Two introduced a new word to the Constitution: male.256 The
rationale for this inclusion is deceptively straightforward given
contemporary demographics. Due to Western migration, the Eastern States
had far greater proportions of women—none of whom could vote. 257 If
Section Two had penalized states for disenfranchising all citizens, the burden
would have fallen on the Eastern States. A gender-neutral Section Two
would have thereby created incentives for enfranchising women,258 adding
further controversy to the ratification battle. 259 A provision thus designed to

251 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2542 (1866) (statement of Rep. Bingham); see also id. at
431 (describing an early draft of Section Two as “nothing but a penalty”).
252 Id. at 2766 (statement of Sen. Jacob Howard); see also Tolson, Structure, supra note 246, at 406
(“But there is little doubt that few in the thirty-ninth Congress intended to explicitly grant the right to vote
through the Fourteenth Amendment’s provisions . . . .”).
253 See Wang, supra note 248, at 2192 & n.156.
254 See GILLETTE, supra note 11, at 24.
255 See ALLAN J. LICHTMAN, THE EMBATTLED VOTE IN AMERICA: FROM THE FOUNDING TO THE
PRESENT 77 (2018) (“By a wide margin, the Joint Committee on Reconstruction rejected drafts of section
1 designed to assure political equality for citizens of color.”); MATHEWS, supra note 224, at 12 (noting
that Senator Henderson’s black suffrage proposal lost by a vote of 10–37); Morley, Equilibration, supra
note 247, at 300–04 (surveying various drafts of Section Two).
256 See AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION, supra note 16, at 393–94.
257 See id. at 393.
258 See id.
259 See Siegel, supra note 27, at 968–76 (describing the women’s suffrage movement’s battles over
Section Two).
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address racial discrimination expressly injected gender into the Constitution
in order to retain the distinction between citizenship and political rights.
Overall, the Thirty-Ninth Congress deliberately structured the
Fourteenth Amendment to protect civil and political rights in distinct
sections. Section One protects civil rights whereas Section Two provides a
penalty for disenfranchisement. This sectional separation provides strong
evidence that Section One was not a general grant of suffrage.260
D. Congress’s Fourteenth Amendment Enforcement Authority
Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that “Congress
shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this
article.” 261 The key term here is “appropriate,” which the Reconstruction
Framers first included in the Thirteenth Amendment’s Enforcement Clause
and used again in the Fifteenth Amendment’s Enforcement Clause. 262
During Reconstruction, the term “appropriate” was understood to
embody the deferential approach to congressional authority articulated in
McCulloch v. Maryland. 263 It is well established that the Reconstruction
Framers’ selection of the term “appropriate” was a deliberate adoption of
260 See AMAR, BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 182, at 217–18 (commenting that the “overall architecture
of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . [has] civil rights at the core of section 1 and political rights featured
separately in section 2”).
Section Two is not the only provision of the Fourteenth Amendment that implicates political rights.
Section Three prohibited rebels who had previously sworn an oath to defend the Constitution from
holding federal or state office—a paradigmatic political right—absent a two-thirds congressional
amnesty. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 3. The impact was intentionally decapitating: “[T]he Amendment
made virtually the entire political leadership of the South ineligible for office.” FONER, supra note 8, at
259.
In many ways, the disqualification of ex-rebels by Section Three is an early example of “militant
democracy.” As Professor Karl Loewenstein argued while fascist and communist governments gained
power in Europe in the l930s, liberal democracies must sometimes take steps to protect themselves from
antidemocratic forces that participate in the political process. See Karl Loewenstein, Militant Democracy
and Fundamental Rights, I, 31 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 417, 422–23 (1937); Karl Loewenstein, Militant
Democracy and Fundamental Rights, II, 31 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 638, 656–58 (1937); see also Gregory H.
Fox & Georg Nolte, Intolerant Democracies, 36 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 59 (1995) (arguing that a democracy
“may defend itself against anti-democratic actors”); Samuel Issacharoff, Fragile Democracies,
120 HARV. L. REV. 1405, 1467 (2007) (“Virtually all democratic societies define some extremist elements
as beyond the bounds of democratic tolerance.”). Indeed, the United States would use similar tactics in
its de-Nazification and de-Baathification campaigns in Germany and Iraq. See, e.g., FREDERICK TAYLOR,
EXORCISING HITLER: THE OCCUPATION AND DENAZIFICATION OF GERMANY 253–54 (2011); Shane
Harris, The Re-Baathification of Iraq, FOREIGN POL’Y (Aug. 21, 2014, 11:51 PM),
https://foreignpolicy.com/2014/08/21/the-re-baathification-of-iraq/ [https://perma.cc/X7JJ-BBTM].
261 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 (emphasis added).
262 Id. amend. XIII, § 2; id. amend. XV, § 2.
263 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
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McCulloch’s broad conception of congressional authority. 264 The
Reconstruction Framers’ borrowing of the McCulloch standard may be the
most significant example of the old adage that “if a word is obviously
transplanted from another legal source . . . it brings the old soil with it.” 265
In addition to the acknowledged legal significance of the word
“appropriate,” the Reconstruction Framers’ selection of the term “enforce”
signals a broad delegation of power to Congress. “To ‘enforce’ a provision
meant the same thing in 1868 as it does today: to ensure compliance with the
provision and make it effective.” 266 Enforcement entails both a remedy for
prior bad acts and a prophylaxis for preventing and deterring future
unconstitutional conduct. 267
The Reconstruction Framers’ choice of words reveals Section Five’s
underlying purpose: to empower Congress vis-à-vis the states and the
Supreme Court. In passing the Fourteenth Amendment, the Reconstruction
Framers sought to upend the Founding’s federalism balance. The
Reconstruction Framers were concerned that the ex-Confederate States were
trampling on the rights of the newly freed slaves by enacting the notorious
Black Codes. 268 Under antebellum jurisprudence, states were not bound by
the Bill of Rights. 269 By granting citizenship to newly freed slaves and
protecting their civil rights, the Fourteenth Amendment imposed substantial

264 See, e.g., Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 650 (1966) (“By including § 5 the draftsmen
sought to grant to Congress, by a specific provision applicable to the Fourteenth Amendment, the same
broad powers expressed in the Necessary and Proper Clause. The classic formulation of the reach of those
powers was established by Chief Justice Marshall in McCulloch v. Maryland . . . .” (footnote omitted));
AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION, supra note 16, at 362 (“McCulloch was read in the nineteenth century
as providing a generous understanding of congressional power.”); Balkin, supra note 135, at 1810 (“The
framers of the Reconstruction Amendments assumed that the McCulloch test would apply to Congress’s
new Reconstruction Powers, and the use of the term ‘appropriate’ in the text of all three enforcement
clauses reflects this assumption.”); McConnell, Institutions, supra note 148, at 188 (noting that the term
“appropriate” “has its origins in the latitudinarian construction of congressional power in McCulloch”);
Engel, supra note 201, at 118 (“In drafting Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Republicans
borrowed explicitly from McCulloch in granting Congress the power to enforce the provisions of the
amendment by appropriate legislation.”).
265 Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527, 537
(1947).
266 Balkin, supra note 135, at 1815.
267 See Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747, 823 (1999) (arguing that the
Reconstruction Congress believed that its enforcement authority went beyond “mere remedial
legislation”); Balkin, supra note 135, at 1815 (defining enforcement to mean that Congress can “remedy
past violations and prevent future ones”).
268 See supra Section II.B.
269 Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 249–51 (1833).
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new obligations on the states. 270 And Section Five ensured that these
obligations would not only be imposed by the Constitution but also enforced
by federal statutes.
The Reconstruction Framers were also deeply skeptical of the Supreme
Court, which had accelerated the nation’s descent into civil war with its
decision in Dred Scott v. Sanford. Section Five responded to the legitimate
and prevailing “fear that the judiciary would frustrate Reconstruction by a
narrow interpretation of congressional power.” 271 Given this, Section Five
embodies the Reconstruction Framers’ desire to give Congress—not the
Supreme Court—primary authority in enforcing the Fourteenth
Amendment. 272
III. THE PATH TO THE FIFTEENTH AMENDMENT
In this Part, I chart the advancement of black suffrage at the state level
and through congressional action, culminating in the Fifteenth Amendment.
In the early years of Reconstruction, black suffrage expanded from New
England to the District of Columbia, the federal territories, the Reconstructed
South, and parts of the Midwest. As with the abolition of slavery and the
protection of civil rights, 273 progress on black suffrage was incremental. It
was not until after the 1868 election that nationwide black suffrage became
a realistic possibility. Although moderate Republicans ultimately agreed
with their Radical colleagues that Blacks should be enfranchised nationwide,
the Republican Party was split as to the best means of achieving that goal.
This Part concludes by excavating the Article V debate and the
Reconstruction Framers’ reasons for rejecting a black suffrage statute and
opting only for a constitutional amendment. Because the Article V debate
was the first sustained post-ratification discussion of the Fourteenth
Amendment, this history sheds new light on the original understanding of
both the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.

270

See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 524 (1997) (“As enacted, the Fourteenth Amendment
confers substantive rights against the States which . . . are self-executing.”).
271 McConnell, Institutions, supra note 148, at 182. Congress’s concern about the Court also proved
prescient. See Balkin, supra note 135, at 1850 & n.186 (discussing Reconstruction-era legislation
invalidated or narrowed by the Supreme Court).
272 See Balkin, supra note 135, at 1805 (“Congress gave itself these powers because it believed it
could not trust the Supreme Court to protect the rights of the freedmen . . . .” (emphasis added)).
273 See supra Section II.B.
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A. Limited Progress at the Northern Polls
At the end of the Civil War, only five New England states—Maine,
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Vermont—enfranchised
black voters. 274 New York technically permitted Blacks to vote, but it
imposed racially discriminatory property and residency qualifications that
left virtually all Blacks disenfranchised. 275 Around that time, “blacks
comprised less than 2 percent of the North’s population,” 276 but in Border
States like Maryland and Delaware, they were approximately one-fifth of the
population. 277 Thus, the potential political power of Blacks varied across the
Northern and Border States.
Republican attempts to enfranchise Blacks in statewide referenda met
with limited success in the North and Midwest. First held in 1865, black
suffrage referenda were defeated by substantial majorities in five
jurisdictions: Colorado, Connecticut, Wisconsin, Minnesota, and
Washington, D.C. 278 In 1866, Nebraska voters rejected black suffrage. 279 And
in 1867, black suffrage referenda met the same fate in Ohio, Kansas, and
Minnesota. 280 It was not until 1868 that the Radical Republican
enfranchisement agenda won at the polls, when Iowa and Minnesota
endorsed black suffrage. 281 That same year, however, Missouri voters
rejected black suffrage in a referendum. 282
Racism toward Blacks, therefore, remained a pervasive feature of
Northern politics. Indeed, “[b]y the end of 1868, . . . no northern state with a
relatively large Negro population had voluntarily accepted full Negro
suffrage.” 283 Minnesota’s experience underscores the persistence of Northern
racism: in 1870, the state had a miniscule black population—759 out of

274

See AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION, supra note 16, at 393, 610 n.88.
See id.; CHRISTOPHER MALONE, BETWEEN FREEDOM AND BONDAGE: RACE, PARTY, AND
VOTING RIGHTS IN THE ANTEBELLUM NORTH 54–55 (2008).
276 FONER, supra note 8, at 25.
277 See GILLETTE, supra note 11, at 82 tbl.1.
278 See id. at 25–26; see also infra note 294 and accompanying text (discussing Washington, D.C.
suffrage legislation passed in 1867).
279 GILLETTE, supra note 11, at 26.
280 Id.
281 Id.
282 Id. In addition, Michigan voters rejected a new state constitution that would have enfranchised
Blacks. Id.
283 Id. at 27. In 1866, the Wisconsin Supreme Court issued a decision enfranchising Blacks under
state law. See id.; see also Gillespie v. Palmer, 20 Wis. 544 (1866).
275

1593

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

446,056 people—but only adopted black suffrage in its third referendum. 284
One explanation for this reluctance is the bigoted fear among Northern voters
that enfranchising Blacks would “induce a massive influx of new blacks into
the state.” 285 This collective action problem militated in favor of a nationwide
solution to Northern racism.
B. Expanding Black Suffrage Through Federal Legislation
Before the 1866 midterm election, the push for black suffrage in
Congress was met with no success. In 1865, a bill to enfranchise Blacks in
Washington, D.C. passed the House but languished in the Senate. 286 A similar
bill to enfranchise Blacks in the territories failed in early 1866. 287 The
situation, however, changed dramatically after the 1866 election.
Running on a platform to ratify the Fourteenth Amendment,288
Republicans won the 1866 election in a landslide. 289 The resounding victory
“strengthened the position of the radical wing of the party,” 290 and the
Fourteenth Amendment was ratified in July 1868. 291 But in the interim, the
lame-duck Thirty-Ninth Congress pushed through several black suffrage
laws in early 1867. 292 However, subsequent efforts to expand black suffrage
nationwide stalled in the first and second sessions of the Fortieth Congress.
1. Victories in the Thirty-Ninth Congress
Energized by their recent electoral success, the Radicals in the lameduck Thirty-Ninth Congress first turned to federal domains, where

284 FRANCIS A. WALKER, A COMPENDIUM OF THE NINTH CENSUS (JUNE 1, 1870): COMPILED
PURSUANT TO A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION OF CONGRESS, AND UNDER THE DIRECTION OF THE
SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR 20 (1872).
285 AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION, supra note 16, at 399; see also ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE
RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 89 (2000)
(attributing the referenda defeats to the deeply rooted Northern fear of black migration).
286 FONER, supra note 8, at 240. Around the same time, a Washington, D.C. suffrage referendum lost
by a margin of 35 to 6951. Id.
287 See GILLETTE, supra note 11, at 30.
288 See, e.g., Balkin, supra note 135, at 1847.
289 See, e.g., ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 249, at 178–82.
290 MALTZ, supra note 12, at 123.
291 See ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 249, at 211; see also id. at 182 (noting that
Republicans controlled every state legislature in the North after the 1866 election).
292 Prior to the ratification of the Twentieth Amendment, presidents and Congresses ended their
terms in March, as opposed to January. See U.S. CONST. amend. XX, § 1; BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE
FAILURE OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS: JEFFERSON, MARSHALL, AND THE RISE OF PRESIDENTIAL
DEMOCRACY 116–19 (2005).
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Congress’s power was at its zenith. 293 In January 1867, Congress overcame
President Johnson’s veto and mandated black suffrage in Washington,
D.C. 294 That same month, Congress also enfranchised Blacks in the
territories. 295 In addition, Congress overrode President Johnson’s veto when
it required Nebraska to abolish its racially discriminatory suffrage
requirements as a condition of statehood. 296 This tactic was the first of the
so-called “fundamental conditions” that Congress would impose related to
black suffrage and the admission—and readmission—of states to the
Union. 297 The constitutionality of these fundamental conditions, however,
was controversial, including within the Republican Party. 298
Congress then turned its attention to the South. 299 The First
Reconstruction Act of 1867 imposed black suffrage on the ex-Confederate
States, with the exception of Tennessee.300 Congress also compelled the
Southern States to ratify the Fourteenth Amendment as a fundamental

293 Congress may “exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever” in the “Seat of the
Government of the United States.” U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 17. And under the Territory Clause, Congress
has the “Power to . . . make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territor[ies] . . . [of] the
United States.” Id. art. IV, § 3.
294 See An Act to Regulate the Elective Franchise in the District of Columbia, ch. 6, 14 Stat. 375
(1867); Wang, supra note 248, at 2200.
295 See An Act to Regulate the Elective Franchise in the Territories of the United States, ch. 15,
14 Stat. 379 (1867). Compliance with this statute varied depending on which party controlled the
territorial government. Republican-controlled Colorado and Dakota allowed Blacks to vote, but
Democratic-controlled Washington continued to discriminate based on race. See GILLETTE, supra note
11, at 30 n.13.
296 See An Act for the Admission of the State of Nebraska into the Union, ch. 36, § 3, 14 Stat. 391,
392 (1867); Wang, supra note 248, at 2204–05 (discussing veto override). A companion bill would have
imposed the same condition on the Colorado territory, but the Senate failed to overcome President
Johnson’s veto. See id. at 2205.
297 See MALTZ, supra note 12, at 127 (discussing Nebraska); id. at 140 (noting the use of
“fundamental conditions” on the readmission of seven ex-Confederate States in 1868).
298 For example, Senator Jacob Howard—who introduced the Fourteenth Amendment in the
Senate—“was also one of the most persistent critics of the idea that Congress could set suffrage-related
conditions for admission to statehood that would bind erstwhile territories after the admission process
was completed.” Id. at 127; see also Colby, supra note 153, at 1162–64 (discussing doubts about the
validity of these fundamental conditions to statehood and their role in the passage of the Fifteenth
Amendment).
299 For a discussion of Congress’s motives in passing the Reconstruction Acts, see Gabriel J. Chin,
The “Voting Rights Act of 1867”: The Constitutionality of Federal Regulation of Suffrage During
Reconstruction, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1581, 1589–90 (2004).
300 See First Reconstruction Act, ch. 153, § 5, 14 Stat. 428, 429 (1867). Tennessee enacted legislation
enfranchising Blacks in February 1867 after its readmission to the Union. See W.E. BURGHARDT DUBOIS,
BLACK RECONSTRUCTION IN AMERICA: AN ESSAY TOWARD A HISTORY OF THE PART WHICH BLACK
FOLK PLAYED IN THE ATTEMPT TO RECONSTRUCT DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, 1860–1880, at 575 (2d ed.
1962).
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condition for readmission. 301 The Republicans’ logic was straightforward:
enfranchising Blacks would provide a new voter base to govern and
transform the South. 302 Reforming the South would prove difficult, and
Congress needed help getting the Fourteenth Amendment ratified. 303
In passing these black suffrage statutes, the Thirty-Ninth Congress
differentiated between its sources of authority. Congress relied on the
District of Columbia’s and the territories’ status as federal domains to justify
its first extension of suffrage. 304 And when acting in the former Confederacy,
the Radicals invoked the Guarantee Clause 305—the “sleeping giant in the
Constitution” 306—as their font of authority on the grounds that those states’
substantial black populations mandated black suffrage. 307 Congress,
however, declined to apply its Guarantee Clause authority to the loyal states,
all of which had smaller black populations. 308 The Thirty-Ninth Congress
adhered to this limiting principle as it extended suffrage in 1867, setting a
precedent that would remain relevant in the Fortieth Congress even after the
Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification.
2. The First and Second Sessions of the Fortieth Congress
When the Fortieth Congress convened in March 1867, Republicans
outnumbered Democrats three-to-one in the House and were well above the
two-thirds veto threshold in the Senate. 309 The Fortieth Congress would
eventually pass the Fifteenth Amendment during its lame-duck session in
February 1869. But before that—and even prior to the Fourteenth
Amendment’s ratification in July 1868—there were repeated calls by

301 See First Reconstruction Act § 5; see also FONER, supra note 8, at 276 (“A precedent existed for
requiring a state to ratify an amendment to gain representation in Congress, for Johnson had done
precisely the same thing with regard to the Thirteenth.”); supra notes 296–298 and accompanying text.
302 See Vikram David Amar & Alan Brownstein, The Hybrid Nature of Political Rights, 50 STAN. L.
REV. 915, 919 (1998).
303 See ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 249, at 196–98.
304 See Wang, supra note 248, at 2201–02; see also supra notes 293–295 and accompanying text
(discussing Congress’s power in federal domains).
305 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. The Guarantee Clause is also referred to as the Republican Form of
Government Clause.
306 CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 1st Sess. 614 (1867) (statement of Sen. Sumner).
307 See Akhil Reed Amar, The Central Meaning of Republican Government: Popular Sovereignty,
Majority Rule, and the Denominator Problem, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 749, 780–81 (1994) [hereinafter
Amar, Central Meaning].
308 See AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION, supra note 16, at 373–76; Amar, Central Meaning, supra
note 307, at 780–81.
309 See ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 249, at 182 (House); FONER, supra note 8, at
267 (Senate).
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Radical Republicans to pass a nationwide black suffrage statute.310 None of
these attempts were met with any success, nor was the debate on these
proposals as sophisticated or lengthy as the Article V debate in the lameduck Fortieth Congress. 311
In March 1867, Senator Henry Wilson (R-MA) introduced a bill that,
upon the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification, would have prohibited the
“denial of the elective franchise to any male citizen of the United States by
any State on account of color or race or previous condition.” 312 Senator
Sumner was another vocal advocate for nationwide black suffrage both in
and out of Congress. 313 Sumner also introduced a nationwide black suffrage
bill in March 1867, though his proposal relied on Congress’s authority under
the Guarantee Clause, the Thirteenth Amendment, and the not-yet-ratified
Fourteenth Amendment. 314 Sumner waited until July 1867 to attempt to bring
his bill to the floor, but he lost a procedural vote 12–22, with fifteen
Republicans joining the Democrats in defeating the motion. 315 That same
month, Representative John Broomall (R-PA) also introduced a nationwide
black suffrage bill premised solely on the Guarantee Clause. 316 Broomall
later gave a speech in March 1868 expounding on the Radicals’ theory
concerning that clause, 317 but the bill never came to a vote. 318
C. Embracing Nationwide Black Suffrage
Several factors coalesced in 1869 to convince the Reconstruction
Framers to support nationwide black suffrage. These factors can be grouped
into three broad categories: ideological, partisan, and pragmatic. 319
On the ideological front, Radicals had long advocated for black
suffrage, viewing the right to vote “as a triumphant conclusion to four

310

See MALTZ, supra note 12, at 131–36.
See infra Section III.D.
312 S. 111, 40th Cong. (1867); see also CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 1st Sess. 292 (1867) (statement
of Sen. Wilson) (introducing bill); MALTZ, supra note 12, at 132 (noting Wilson’s introduction of the
bill).
313 See JAMES, supra note 227, at 173 (in Boston); Wang, supra note 248, at 2211 (in Congress).
314 See S. 115, 40th Cong. (1867); see also CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 1st Sess. 345 (1867)
(statement of Sen. Sumner) (introducing bill); MALTZ, supra note 12, at 132 (noting Sumner’s
introduction of the bill).
315 See CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 1st Sess. 615 (1867); MALTZ, supra note 12, at 134.
316 H.R. 126, 40th Cong. (1867).
317 See CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 1955–60 (1868) (statement of Rep. Broomall).
318 MALTZ, supra note 12, at 136.
319 Historians have debated which of these motivations was predominant, see Amar & Brownstein,
supra note 302, at 955 & n.104, but this Article need not pick sides in that debate.
311
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decades of agitation on behalf of the slave.” 320 After all, numerous
Radicals—including Boutwell and Sumner—had tried to extend the
franchise to Blacks during the Fourteenth Amendment’s drafting process.321
Radical Republican ideology, therefore, was a powerful influence in the push
for nationwide black suffrage.
The role of black soldiers in fighting the Civil War was also a major
motivating factor. Black soldiers accounted for 10% of the Union army, 322
and their bravery and sacrifice eventually convinced many moderate
Republicans to support their right to vote. 323 In a related vein, the safety of
southern black voters was another significant concern. Throughout
Reconstruction, terrorism against black voters was rampant and severe,
particularly during the 1868 election. 324 And this violence occurred despite
the Union Army’s role in registering voters and overseeing elections. 325 The
army, moreover, was a temporary solution; it was politically impossible for
it to remain in the South for a generation—or more—to advance racial
equality. As the means to securing political power, black suffrage was seen
as the best non-military means of achieving racial equality and preventing
violence in the South. 326
Turning to partisan self-interest, the 1868 election results provided a
strong impetus for enfranchising Blacks in the Northern and Border States.
Although President Grant decisively defeated Democratic candidate Horatio
Seymour in the Electoral College, 327 his popular-vote victory was slim: only
300,000 out of 5.7 million votes. 328 This narrow margin proved particularly
worrisome for future Republican success: “Since more than a half-million
black Americans voted under the terms of the Reconstruction Acts, this
meant that most whites voted for Democrats Horatio Seymour and Frank
320

FONER, supra note 8, at 448.
See supra Section II.C.
322 See MICHAEL WALDMAN, THE FIGHT TO VOTE 61 (2016).
323 See Amar & Brownstein, supra note 302, at 933 & n.50.
324 See RON CHERNOW, GRANT 623 (2017) (discussing violence in Georgia and Louisiana); Grant,
Reconstruction
and
the
KKK,
PBS: AM. EXPERIENCE, https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/
americanexperience/features/grant-kkk/ [https://perma.cc/SR5M-6CHF] (“In Arkansas, over 2,000
murders were committed in connection with the election. In Georgia, the number of threats and beatings
was even higher. And in Louisiana, 1000 blacks were killed as the election neared. In those three states,
Democrats won decisive victories at the polls.”).
325 See ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 249, at 202.
326 See RICHARD M. VALELLY, THE TWO RECONSTRUCTIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR BLACK
ENFRANCHISEMENT 32 (2004).
327 See CHERNOW, supra note 324, at 623 (noting that Grant won “all but eight states and trounced
Seymour in an electoral landslide of 214 to 80”).
328 See Wang, supra note 248, at 2214–15.
321
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Blair.” 329 The results in Congress were also concerning: Republicans lost
eleven seats in the House but gained two Senators. 330
Radical Republicans recognized that unlocking the black vote
nationwide could swing future elections. 331 Indeed, the black electorate voted
almost uniformly for the Republican Party and helped Grant win every
readmitted, ex-Confederate State except “Georgia and Louisiana, where
Klan violence was rife.” 332 During the Article V debate, Boutwell estimated
that 150,000 Blacks would be enfranchised by a nationwide suffrage
statute. 333 Republicans believed that enfranchisement of Blacks in the Border
States in particular would provide a new voter base and potentially forestall
the gains made by the Democrats in the 1868 election. 334
In the South, the goal was entrenching the tremendous impact of the
First Reconstruction Act of 1867. In December 1866, only 0.5% of the
nation’s black male population could vote. A year later, 80.5% of black
males were eligible to vote. 335 With the assistance of the Union army, black
voter registration in 1867 was over 85% in nine of the eleven ex-Confederate
States and over 95% in Alabama, Louisiana, Texas, and Virginia. 336 Black
turnout was also exceptionally high in several Southern States
notwithstanding violence aimed at suppressing the vote. 337
Because Blacks represented majorities or sizable minorities in the
South, they quickly became a formidable electorate. Three Southern States
had black majorities: Louisiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina. Blacks
were just shy of a majority in three others—Alabama, Florida, and
Georgia—and about 40% of the population in North Carolina and Virginia.
And Blacks were approximately one-quarter of the population in Arkansas,
Tennessee, and Texas. 338 Across the South as a whole, black registration
outpaced white registration. 339 Given these demographic realities, the
329

ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 249, at 236.
See Wang, supra note 248, at 2214.
331 See id. at 2215.
332 CHERNOW, supra note 324, at 623; see also Amar & Brownstein, supra note 302, at 943–46.
333 See CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 561 (1869) (statement of Rep. Boutwell).
334 See id. (providing specific numbers of black voters in Border States); Amar & Brownstein, supra
note 302, at 943–46.
335 VALELLY, supra note 326, at 24.
336 Id. at 33 & tbl.2.1.
337 See CHERNOW, supra note 324, at 601 (noting that in 1867, black turnout was 70% in Georgia
and nearly 90% in Virginia and that black voters outnumbered white voters in Alabama).
338 See FONER, supra note 8, at 294.
339 See, e.g., Wang, supra note 248, at 2213 (estimating a black-to-white registration gap of 735,000
to 635,000).
330
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Southern black voting bloc elected just over 250 black legislators in 1868, 340
and Blacks held statewide offices in Florida, Louisiana, and South
Carolina. 341 Republicans thus viewed Southern Blacks as a “loyal
counterweight to the potential political power of the rebellious whites.” 342
Notwithstanding the impact of the First Reconstruction Act, Congress
did not “trust the existing [or] future legislatures of Southern States.”343
Indeed, as the price of readmission to the Union, Congress had imposed the
fundamental condition that the constitutions of the Southern States not be
amended to deny Blacks the right to vote. 344 But as Congress’s constitutional
power over the Southern States waned, Republicans worried—and
Democrats asserted—that these fundamental conditions violated the equality
of the states and would become practically and constitutionally
unenforceable. 345
Moreover, the Republican Party’s double standard on the suffrage issue
appeared “ideologically inconsistent, politically expedient, and
constitutionally awkward.” 346 The 1868 Republican Convention produced a
party platform that compromised on the issue of black suffrage.347 Although
the platform praised the new Southern constitutions for “securing equal civil
and political rights,” 348 the convention declined to extend both bundles of
rights to Northern Blacks. Drafted behind closed doors, the compromise
provision read: “The guaranty by Congress of equal suffrage to all loyal men
at the South was demanded by every consideration of public safety, of
gratitude, and of justice, and must be maintained; while the question of

340

KOUSSER, supra note 76, at 19 fig.1.1.
FONER, supra note 8, at 353 & tbl.
342 MALTZ, supra note 12, at 132.
343 JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 33 (1980).
344 See, e.g., MATHEWS, supra note 224, at 18.
345 See id.; Colby, supra note 153, at 1162–64; see also infra note 347 and accompanying text
(discussing the Democratic Party platform).
346 Wang, supra note 248, at 2214.
347 Unsurprisingly, the 1868 Democratic Party platform rejected black suffrage. The Democratic
platform demanded “the regulation of the elective franchise in the States, by their citizens.” Gerhard
Peters & John T. Woolley, 1868 Democratic Party Platform, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (July 4, 1868),
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29579
[https://perma.cc/83MB-U4RK].
Foreshadowing the Article V debate over the Fifteenth Amendment, the Democratic platform declared
that “any attempt by congress, on any pretext whatever, to deprive any State of this right, or to interfere
with its exercise, is a flagrant usurpation of power, which can find no warrant in the Constitution.” Id.
The Democratic platform also called for an end to Reconstruction. See id.
348 Gerhard Peters & John T. Woolley, Republican Party Platform of 1868, AM. PRESIDENCY
PROJECT (May 20, 1868) (emphasis added), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29622
[https://perma.cc/XW3D-CNAT].
341
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suffrage in all the loyal States properly belongs to the people of those
States.” 349
Some Radicals—such as Thaddeus Stevens—were angered by the
Northern concession. 350 But the platform’s double standard mirrored the
Guarantee Clause argument employed throughout Reconstruction: the exConfederate States with their large black populations must guarantee
suffrage whereas the Northern States would be left to their own devices. 351
For their part, Democrats argued that disenfranchising Blacks in the
Northern and Border States while simultaneously requiring black suffrage in
the ex-Confederate States was evidence that the Republicans did not
genuinely care about Blacks’ rights but rather sought to exploit their loyalty
to the party for political gain. 352 By enfranchising Blacks in the Northern and
Border States, Republicans could finally harmonize their position and defuse
this Democratic talking point. Some moderate Republicans even viewed
nationwide black suffrage as the best means of putting the debate over
Reconstruction to rest and turning the Party’s attention to economic issues. 353
Turning to pragmatic reasons for moderate Republican support for
nationwide black suffrage, Congress’s failure to enforce Section Two was a
key factor. Ironically, by 1869, the states at risk of losing seats due to Section
Two were in the North. 354 If the Republican Congress sought to enforce the
Apportionment Clause, consistency demanded that the Border States face the
same fate as any other state. In fact, some Border States were
disenfranchising approximately one-fifth of their populations. 355 Even if
Republicans had decided to risk being labeled hypocrites and selectively
strip states of House seats, members of Congress from the Border States may

349

Id.; see also GILLETTE, supra note 11, at 37 (discussing the drafting process).
See GILLETTE, supra note 11, at 38; see also MALTZ, supra note 12, at 138 (describing the party
platform as “deliberately evad[ing] th[e] key issue” of black suffrage in the North).
351 See supra notes 305–308 and accompanying text (discussing the Guarantee Clause).
352 See MALTZ, supra note 12, at 132.
353 See MICHAEL LES BENEDICT, Reform Republicans and the Retreat from Reconstruction, in
PRESERVING THE CONSTITUTION: ESSAYS ON POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE
RECONSTRUCTION ERA 168, 182 (2006).
354 Cf. AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION, supra note 16, at 397 (noting that Blacks could vote in
the former Confederacy but not in many Northern States).
355 The percentage of the black voters in Kentucky, Delaware, and Maryland was 16.8%, 18.2%, and
22.5%, respectively. These states were well above the national average of 12.7%. GILLETTE, supra note
11, at 82 tbl.1.
350
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have hesitated to go along with the plan out of fear of setting a precedent that
would one day be used against them. 356
Furthermore, Republicans recognized that many Northern Whites still
harbored racist beliefs and feared that black suffrage would encourage
Blacks to move to their states. Thus, some Republicans supported a
nationwide solution that could eliminate the collective action problems
facing the ad hoc statewide referenda. 357
Finally, when it met for a third session in January 1869, the lame-duck
Fortieth Congress had only two months remaining in its term, 358 and
“seventeen Republican state legislatures were still in session in March, and
these legislatures could act on [any] Amendment before elections.” 359 By
acting quickly, Republicans could maximize the constitutionally determined
time before the next federal elections and delay any potential electoral
backlash. 360 Thus, the Radicals were in a “race against the constitutional
clock” 361 to enfranchise Blacks before the next election.
D. The Article V Debate
Contrary to what current doctrine would dictate, the Fourteenth
Amendment’s ratification in July 1868 did not enfranchise any black voters
at the time. When the lame-duck Fortieth Congress convened in January
1869, the country was evenly divided: seventeen states permitted black
suffrage whereas seventeen did not. Racially discriminatory laws remained
on the books in the Border States, the Mid-Atlantic, parts of the Midwest,
and the West. 362 By contrast, black suffrage had expanded from New England
to states in the Midwest and the former Confederacy.363 Black suffrage also
356 Section Two was also a half-measure: it applied only to the House and would not have impacted
Senate representation even if senators were selected by a state legislature elected solely by white male
voters. See U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 2.
357 See supra note 285 and accompanying text (discussing failed black suffrage referenda).
358 See supra note 292 and accompanying text.
359 GILLETTE, supra note 11, at 79.
360 See AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION, supra note 16, at 398.
361 ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 249, at 235. Professor Ackerman uses this phrase
to describe the Fourteenth Amendment, not the Fifteenth. Id.
362 To be specific, the following states had racially discriminatory suffrage laws: California,
Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, Nevada,
New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and West Virginia. See supra Sections III.A–III.B.
363 The right to vote free of racial discrimination existed in the following states: Alabama, Arkansas,
Florida, Georgia, Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Hampshire, North
Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Wisconsin. In addition, the exConfederate States that had not been readmitted—Mississippi, Texas, and Virginia—had black suffrage.
See supra Sections III.A–III.B.
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existed in the District of Columbia and the federal territories.364 The map
below depicts the status of black suffrage laws in January 1869.
FIGURE 1: STATUS OF BLACK SUFFRAGE LAWS IN JANUARY 1869

Note: Figure created with mapchart.net.

But even this categorization of states obscures the precarious position
of black suffrage. Of the former Confederate States, only Tennessee had
voluntarily enfranchised Blacks. 365 The remaining ten states had black
suffrage imposed via the First Reconstruction Act. 366 Mississippi, Texas, and
Virginia remained under congressional supervision, as they had not yet been
readmitted to the Union. 367 But by January 1869, Arkansas, Louisiana,
364 At the time, the federal territories were Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, New Mexico,
Oklahoma, Utah, Washington, Wyoming, and (the unified) Dakota. In 1869, Alaska had recently been
purchased from Russia and was treated as a military district. See ERIC SANDBERG, ALASKA DEP’T OF
LABOR & WORKFORCE DEV., A HISTORY OF ALASKA POPULATION SETTLEMENT 7–8 (2013),
http://live.laborstats.alaska.gov/pop/estimates/pub/pophistory.pdf
[https://perma.cc/993X-D3JT].
Hawaii was not annexed until 1898. Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 505 (2000) (“In 1898, President
McKinley signed a Joint Resolution, sometimes called the Newlands Resolution, to annex the Hawaiian
Islands as territory of the United States.”).
365 See DUBOIS, supra note 300, at 575.
366 First Reconstruction Act, ch. 153, § 6, 14 Stat. 428, 429 (1867).
367 See FONER, supra note 8, at 452.
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Alabama, Georgia, Florida, South Carolina, and North Carolina had been
readmitted to the Union. 368 Although Congress had imposed pro-blacksuffrage fundamental conditions in those states’ constitutions, 369 the legal
validity and practical longevity of those provisions remained in doubt. And
outside the South, Nebraska’s black suffrage law was also a fundamental
condition, 370 and Wisconsin’s black suffrage law was attributable to a judicial
decision. 371
By 1869, the Republican Party supported the once-radical idea of
nationwide black suffrage. The choice of means, however, was still
undecided. It is often assumed that once the Southern States were readmitted
to the Union, “Congress did not clearly possess alternative, constitutionally
permissible means of mandating black suffrage by statute.” 372 But many
Radicals contested this point, and the issue was hotly debated during the
lame-duck Fortieth Congress. In fact, the first nationwide black suffrage
proposal considered by the lame-duck Fortieth Congress was a “doublebarreled approach,” 373 favoring both a statute and an amendment. The
principal debate occurred over a bill introduced in the House by
Representative George Boutwell, while a speech by Senator Charles Sumner
provoked a brief discussion of the issue in the Senate. 374 The Fortieth
Congress ultimately selected the Article V route, but the reasons for that
choice uncover important evidence about the original meanings of the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.
1. The House Debate
The Article V debate in the House was led by Congressman George
Boutwell of Massachusetts, a Radical who “had been an early backer of the
Republican Party and a stout supporter of Reconstruction.” 375 On January 11,
368

See MALTZ, supra note 12, at 140.
See id. (discussing how “universal suffrage became a fundamental condition for . . . readmission”
to the Union).
370 See id. at 126–27.
371 Gillespie v. Palmer, 20 Wis. 544 (1866).
372 KLARMAN, supra note 225, at 29; see also MATHEWS, supra note 224, at 21 (“This condition of
affairs emphasized the need of supplying a new basis for the continuance of congressional control over
the suffrage conditions of the Southern States. This basis could be surely and safely supplied only by
means of a new grant of power from the nation in the form of a suffrage amendment to the
Constitution . . . .”).
373 GILLETTE, supra note 11, at 51.
374 Id.
375 CHERNOW, supra note 324, at 634. Boutwell had previously served as the Governor of
Massachusetts and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue during the Civil War. He would soon become
Secretary of the Treasury in the Grant Administration. See id. at 634–35; see also McConnell, Institutions,
supra note 148, at 183 (describing Boutwell as “one of the most radical of Republicans”).
369
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1869, Boutwell introduced both a suffrage bill and an amendment. 376
Boutwell’s proposed amendment was nearly identical to what would
eventually become the Fifteenth Amendment.377 Boutwell’s bill, H.R. 1667,
was intended “[t]o secure equal privileges and immunities to citizens of the
United States, and to enforce the provisions of article fourteen of the
amendments to the Constitution.” 378 The first section of Boutwell’s bill
provided:
That no State shall abridge or deny the right of any citizen of the United States
to vote for electors of President and Vice President of the United States, or for
Representatives in Congress, or for members of the legislature of the State in
which he may reside, by reason of race, color, or previous condition of slavery;
and any provisions in the laws or constitution of any State inconsistent with this
section are hereby declared to be null and void. 379

A few differences between the bill and the proposed amendment are
noteworthy. 380 First, the bill applied solely to the states, whereas the
amendment prohibited racial discrimination in voting at both the state and
federal level. Second, and relatedly, the bill protected the right to vote only
in certain elections—namely, federal elections and state legislative races.
Under Boutwell’s bill, Blacks could still be barred from voting for state
executive branch officials, state judges, and local officials. The proposed

376 CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 285 (1869) (statement of Rep. Boutwell). The bill was
originally introduced as H.R. 1463, but the number was changed to H.R. 1667 on January 23, 1869. See
id. at 285, 555.
377 The substantive provisions of Boutwell’s proposed amendment and the Fifteenth Amendment are
largely coextensive. Compare id. at 286 (“The right of any citizen of the United States to vote shall not
be denied or abridged by the United States or any State by reason of the race, color, or previous condition
of slavery of any citizen or class of citizens of the United States.” (emphasis added)), with U.S. CONST.
amend. XV, § 1 (“The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the
United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.”). The
enforcement provisions of the proposed and final amendments are also substantially similar. Compare
CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 286 (1869) (statement of Rep. Boutwell) (“The Congress shall have
power to enforce by proper legislation the provisions of this article.”), with U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 2
(“The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.”).
378 H.R. 1667, 40th Cong. (1869); see also CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 555 (1869) (statement
of Speaker Colfax) (introducing the suffrage statute).
379 H.R. 1667, 40th Cong. (1869). Section 2 required voter registrars to comply with the bill’s
substantive provision. Section 3 criminalized private interference with the right to vote on the basis of
race, color, or previous condition of servitude. Section 4 enforced Section Three of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s ban on office-holding for ex-Confederates. Section 5 conferred exclusive jurisdiction on
federal courts to hear claims arising under the statute. Id.
380 Given the similarities between Boutwell’s proposed amendment and the actual Fifteenth
Amendment, the salient distinctions apply to both.
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amendment, by contrast, was not limited to elections to specific offices.381
Boutwell specifically addressed this point, stating that “there must be power
in the national Government to provide whatever is necessary for its own
preservation.” 382 According to Boutwell, the federal government could
regulate its own elections and also the elections of state legislatures given
their role in selecting United States senators. 383
Debate over Boutwell’s bill would occur several days after its
introduction. On January 23, 1869, Boutwell defended his statute–
amendment two-step and specifically addressed those “who are of opinion
that the subject is not within the proper scope of legislative power, and that
the only way to secure equality of suffrage . . . without distinction of race or
color[] is by an amendment.” 384 Boutwell’s argument hinged on four sources
of congressional authority, each of which he viewed as independently
sufficient. 385
First, as hinted at above, Boutwell argued that the federal government
was authorized to regulate its own elections. 386 He claimed that this “general
principle[]” was supported by the “friends of the Constitution” during its
ratification. 387 Boutwell speculated that without such a power, the states
could refuse to hold elections for the House or decline to choose senators or
presidential electors. 388 Congress, according to Boutwell, could step in to
ensure that elections occurred with the electorate it so desired.
Second, Boutwell looked to Article I. He argued that Section Two,
Clause One—which requires that voters for the House of Representatives
“shall have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous
Branch of the State Legislature” 389—does not confer exclusive power over
suffrage to the states. Rather, Boutwell read the clause as ambiguous about
whether the states or the federal government could set suffrage

381 Cf. Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 523 (2000) (“The [Fifteenth] Amendment applies to ‘any
election in which public issues are decided or public officials selected.’” (quoting Terry v. Adams,
345 U.S. 461, 468 (1953))).
382 CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 556 (1869) (statement of Rep. Boutwell).
383 See id.
384 Id. at 555.
385 See id. at 560 (arguing that any one of these sources was “sufficient justification” to pass his bill,
but also speculating that Congress may have a “cumulative power” under the various sources of
authority).
386 See id. at 556.
387 Id.
388 See id.
389 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1.
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qualifications. 390 To resolve that ambiguity, Boutwell turned to the Elections
Clause. Under that clause, states may prescribe the “Times, Places, and
Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives” unless
Congress “make[s] or alter[s] such Regulations.” 391 Boutwell claimed that
the federal government was authorized to regulate suffrage in the states
because of the scope of the word “manner.” 392 Citing a debate between James
Madison and Patrick Henry, Boutwell relied on Henry’s expansive view of
federal authority under the Elections Clause—a view that he claimed was not
expressly denied by Madison. 393
Third, Boutwell invoked the Guarantee Clause—the Radicals’ favorite
font of authority against the Reconstructed South. 394 Boutwell stated that the
purpose of the Guarantee Clause was to empower the federal government to
prevent the establishment of an aristocracy in a state. Boutwell claimed that
“[t]he essence of an aristocracy is in this, that the Government is in certain
families made hereditary to the exclusion of others.” 395 Under this definition,
Boutwell argued that any state that disenfranchised any class of men was an
aristocracy and specifically named Delaware, Kentucky, Maryland, Ohio,
and Pennsylvania as examples of states that disenfranchised Blacks and
therefore violated the Guarantee Clause. 396 When pressed whether his theory
would require the enfranchisement of women or universal suffrage, Boutwell
dodged the question. 397

390 See CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 556 (1869) (statement of Rep. Boutwell) (“But there is
no declaration in this section that either [the States or the federal government] has the power, and certainly
not that either has the power to the exclusion of the other.”).
391 U.S. CONST. art I, § 4, cl. 1.
392 See CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 556 (1869) (statement of Rep. Boutwell) (“[C]an
anything be more clear than that the Congress of the United States has all the power which the States
could exercise, except merely as to declaring where the Senators shall be chosen?”); id. (“It includes . . .
everything relating to an election, from the qualifications of the elector to the deposit of his ballot in the
box.”).
393 See id. at 556–57. Contrary to Boutwell’s argument, the Court has subsequently held that the
power to “[p]rescrib[e] voting qualifications” falls outside the Elections Clause. Arizona v. Inter-Tribal
Council of Ariz., Inc., 570 U.S. 1, 17 (2013). The Court has also held that Congress’s authority under the
Elections Clause is not subject to the presumption against preemption. See id. at 13–14.
394 See supra notes 305–307 and accompanying text. But see Ryan C. Williams, The “Guarantee”
Clause, 132 HARV. L. REV. 602, 610–11 (2018) (looking to eighteenth-century treaties to argue that the
Guarantee Clause confers no authority on the federal government to intervene in state affairs).
395 CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 557 (1869) (statement of Rep. Boutwell).
396 See id. at 558.
397 See id. at 557 (statement of Rep. Niblack (D-IN)) (asking about female suffrage); id. at 557–58
(statement of Rep. Boutwell) (“I will listen most attentively to any argument . . . in favor of the right of
women to vote.”).

1607

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

Finally, and most importantly for this Article, Boutwell relied on the
recently ratified Fourteenth Amendment. 398 Boutwell’s first textual hook was
the Privileges or Immunities Clause, which he claimed encompassed the
right to vote. In support of this assertion, he produced a Kentucky Supreme
Court case about a Pennsylvania slave living in Kentucky when
Pennsylvania abolished slavery. Boutwell read aloud a lengthy portion of the
opinion, which mentioned once in dicta that “civil, political, and religious”
rights were among the “rights and privileges” of citizenship. 399 In addition,
Boutwell emphasized that the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment
allowed Blacks to exercise some political rights, such as the right to hold
office. Boutwell specifically cited the qualifications for President, arguing
that the office could be held by a disenfranchised, thirty-five-year-old,
native-born, black citizen. 400 For Boutwell, this “anomaly” militated in favor
of viewing suffrage as a privilege or immunity of citizenship. 401
Boutwell also relied on Section Two. He characterized the
Apportionment Clause as a “political penalty for doing that which in the first
section it is declared the State has no right to do.” 402 Boutwell claimed that
the Thirty-Ninth Congress was well aware that the Border States were
disenfranchising Blacks and that the Fourteenth Amendment was intended
to rectify that problem. 403 Boutwell failed to explain, however, why he
advocated nationwide black suffrage instead of Section Two’s explicit
punishment of the loss of House seats. 404
Boutwell’s argument about the Fourteenth Amendment ultimately
hinged on Section Five, which he characterized as a broad grant of authority.
Congress could invoke Section Five to enforce Section One and expand upon
398 In contrast to current doctrine, which views the Equal Protection Clause as the principal source
of voting rights protections in the Fourteenth Amendment, see supra Section I.A, Boutwell did not rely
on the Equal Protection Clause for his argument. See Harrison, supra note 238, at 1440.
399 CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 558–59 (1869) (statement of Rep. Boutwell). Although
Boutwell did not provide a citation, the decision is Amy v. Smith, 11 Ky. (1 Litt.) 326, 332 (1822). The
case did not involve the right to vote. Rather, it was an action for trespass, assault and battery, and false
imprisonment, and the question presented concerned whether the plaintiff was a slave at the time of the
torts. See id. at 327.
400 See CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 559 (1869) (statement of Rep. Boutwell).
401 Id.
402 Id.
403 See id. (“We knew that Kentucky, Maryland, and Delaware were doing what they were inhibited
from doing by the first section of the article, and we said that they should suffer in representation for so
doing.”).
404 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2 (“But when the right to vote at any election . . . is denied to any of
the male inhabitants of such State . . . the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion
which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years
of age in such State.”).
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Section Two’s remedy: “Power was given to Congress to remedy this evil,
and that power Congress is now called upon to exercise.” 405 Boutwell
rationalized Section Two as an interim penalty because “[i]t was uncertain
when Congress would exercise the power conferred by the fifth section of
the fourteenth amendment, and in order that the States should not take
advantage of their own wrong during the period while Congress might be
inactive a penalty [Section Two] was provided.” 406 Put simply, Boutwell’s
vision of congressional enforcement authority mirrored—and even
surpassed—the McCulloch standard:
[B]y the fifth section of the fourteenth article, Congress has power to enforce
by appropriate legislation the provisions of the article. Does anybody doubt—
in the presence of this provision of the Constitution, in view of the unlimited
power under the fourteenth article to legislate so as to secure to citizens of the
United States the privileges and immunities of citizens of any one of the
States—does anybody doubt our duty? 407

Boutwell concluded his speech by expressly defending his statute–
amendment two-step. Boutwell stated that the Fourteenth Amendment’s text
did not prohibit the federal government from limiting the franchise along
racial lines and that an amendment was therefore needed to prevent future
federal abuses. 408 And while maintaining that Congress possessed authority
under Section Five to ban racial discrimination in voting in all state elections,
he believed that the proposed Fifteenth Amendment would remove any doubt
about this power and would go beyond the offices specified in his bill. 409
To be clear, Boutwell was distorting some of the facts. When asked
about his own prior statements that the Fourteenth Amendment did not
encompass political rights, Boutwell either dodged or lied: “I have no
recollection of anything of that sort, though it may be that some persons did
make such a concession . . . . [A]nd I cannot say but that some members on
this side of the House may have disavowed that construction; but I was not

405

CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 559 (1869) (statement of Rep. Boutwell).
Id.
407 Id. (emphasis added).
408 See id. at 560 (“Why, then, not submit a bill alone? Because there is no provision in the
Constitution by which the United States is denied the power of abridging the right of citizens to vote.”).
409 See id. (“[A]lthough I am myself persuaded of the existence of the power, and that it covers all
State officers, still a different argument may be made against the proposition to legislate in reference to
State officers from that which can be made against the proposition contained in this bill.”); id. at 555
(acknowledging that the bill did not cover all state and local offices but asserting that “the powers of
Congress are probably broader than those set forth” in the bill).
406
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one of them.” 410 Notwithstanding this change of position, Boutwell was not
alone. Several Radical Republicans spoke in favor of Boutwell’s bill. 411
The Democrats’ response to Boutwell’s bill was predictably negative.
Even setting aside the universal Democratic opposition to black suffrage in
general, 412 Democrats cried foul over the suffrage statute in particular.
Democrats repeatedly attacked Boutwell’s bill on the grounds that it was a
blatant violation of the Republican Party’s platform. 413 Representative James
Beck (D-KY), for example, asserted that the platform was “intended to
delude and deceive the people” and that Boutwell’s bill “cannot be supported
by any man who did not publicly disavow the published principles of his
party.” 414 Democrats even tried to scuttle the bill by proposing a poison pill
that would have added protections for “sex, nativity, or age when over twelve
years.” 415

410

Id. at 559. But see CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2508 (1866) (statement of Rep. Boutwell)
(conceding that “[t]he proposition in the matter of suffrage falls short of what I desire, but so far as it goes
it tends to the equalization of the inequality at present existing”); id. (“I demand and shall continue to
demand the franchise for all loyal male citizens of this country . . . .”).
411 See CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 692 (1869) (statement of Rep. Shanks (R-IN)) (“I will
vote for the bill and proposed amendment of the gentleman from Massachusetts . . . .”); id. at 694
(statement of Rep. McKee (R-KY)) (“Without a law to enforce that constitutional amendment it stands
upon your statute-book to-day as a simple declaration.”); id. at 696 (“[W]hen this fourteenth amendment
was adopted, which made all these people citizens, and declared that they should be entitled to all the
rights and privileges of citizens, and declared that they should be entitled to all the rights and privileges
of citizens, I had no longer any doubt as to the constitutional right of the Congress of the United States to
declare that these men shall be voters in any and every State on the same footing with white men.”); id.
at 721 (statement of Rep. Kelley) (“[T]he Constitution vests in Congress the right to regulate the
suffrage . . . .”); id. at app. 94 (statement of Rep. Corley (R-SC)) (citing the Privileges or Immunities
Clause and stating that a “citizen of the United States is the political equal of every other citizen, and
cannot be constitutionally denied the right to the ballot in any State except for rebellion or crime”); id. at
app. 102 (statement of Rep. Broomall (R-PA)) (“[T]he bill is intended to produce immediately the same
result which it may require the amendment several years to accomplish . . . . I shall therefore support the
bill . . . .”).
412 See GILLETTE, supra note 11, at 73 n.111, 75 (showing that no Democrats voted for the Fifteenth
Amendment).
413 This criticism applied not only to the statute, but also the proposed amendment. See KLARMAN,
supra note 225, at 29.
414 CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 691 (1869) (statement of Rep. Beck (D-KY)); see also id. at
645 (statement of Rep. Eldredge (D-WI)) (“How many States would the party have carried upon the
measure now being urged?”); id. at 658 (statement of Rep. Kerr (D-IN)) (“[T]his bill is justly subject to
the same charge of bad faith . . . .”); id. at 697 (statement of Rep. Burr (D-IL)) (criticizing the Boutwell
bill as violating the 1868 platform).
415 Id. at 561 (statement of Rep. Brooks (D-NY)) (emphasis added).
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Democrats also argued that Boutwell’s bill was unconstitutional.416 On
January 27, 1869, Representatives Charles Eldredge (D-WI) 417 and Michael
Kerr (D-IN) 418 gave lengthy speeches during which they offered detailed
critiques of Boutwell’s bill’s constitutionality. 419 In response to Boutwell’s
assertion that the federal government had an inherent authority to impose
suffrage qualifications in federal and certain state elections,420 Eldredge
argued that the states’ authority over suffrage qualifications was “almost
unquestioned ever since and before the adoption of the Constitution” and that
any supposed federal authority on the subject was “long-conceded.” 421
Regarding Article I, Eldredge claimed that the Qualifications Clause
unambiguously gave states exclusive authority to establish suffrage
qualifications. 422 Indeed, as Eldredge pointed out, Boutwell’s interpretation
of the Qualifications Clause reversed the typical presumption that the federal
government is one of enumerated powers and all other powers are reserved
to the states. 423 Regarding the Elections Clause, Eldredge produced his own
lengthy list of Founding-era quotes and noted that Boutwell relied on
Henry’s formulation of the clause even though Henry opposed the
Constitution’s ratification.424 For his part, Kerr stated that the word “manner”
in the Elections Clause gave Congress authority to decide whether to use

416 See id. at 687–92 (statement of Rep. Beck) (criticizing Boutwell’s bill); id. at 697 (statement of
Rep. Burr) (stating that the Elections Clause gives Congress power over “the time and manner of electing
members of Congress—nothing more”); id. at 699 (claiming that the Fourteenth Amendment’s supporters
“held that the whole article affirmed the right of a State to act on suffrage, and that because they would
not all act alike it was necessary to equalize representation”).
417 Eldredge was a member of the House Judiciary Committee. See id. at 555. The Congressional
Globe misspelled Eldredge’s name as “Eldridge.” See Currie, supra note 203, at 453 & n.403.
418 Kerr would go on to become the first post-Civil War Democratic Speaker of the House in 1875.
See List of Speakers of the House, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES: HISTORY, ART & ARCHIVES,
https://history.house.gov/People/Office/Speakers-List/ [https://perma.cc/BLE6-B99J].
419 See CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 642–45 (1869) (statement of Rep. Eldredge); id. at 553–
62 (statement of Rep. Kerr).
420 See supra notes 389–393 and accompanying text.
421 CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 642 (1869) (statement of Rep. Eldredge); see also id.
(arguing that the federal government had “acquiesced” to the states setting suffrage qualifications).
422 See id. at 643 (“This right of the State to determine the qualification of the electors of the members
of its Legislature is older than the Constitution . . . . There is nothing in the Constitution . . . granting the
power to the Federal Government or prohibiting it to the State.”).
423 Eldredge made this point during Boutwell’s speech. See id. at 556 (asking Boutwell whether “the
States possess no powers except those which are granted to them in and by the Constitution” and
remarking that he “supposed the rule to be entirely the other way”).
424 See id. at 642–44 (statement of Rep. Eldredge). Boutwell interjected and effectively conceded
this point. See id. at 644 (statement of Rep. Boutwell).
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single-member districts or to require a secret ballot—but not over suffrage
qualifications. 425
As to the Guarantee Clause, Eldredge claimed that Boutwell’s argument
lacked any limiting principle. He explained that, when taken to its logical
conclusion, there were “no republican States, because no[t] one of the States
does allow all its citizens to exercise this privilege.” 426 On this point,
Eldredge remarked that the franchise was denied “to our citizens’ wives and
daughters” 427 without raising concerns under the Guarantee Clause.
And most importantly for this Article, the Democrats argued that the
Fourteenth Amendment did not protect political rights. Kerr explained why
suffrage was not a privilege or immunity of citizenship under Section One.
According to Kerr, “American citizenship does not depend upon or coexist
with the legal capacity to hold office and the right of suffrage.” 428 Kerr
pointed out that women were denied the right to vote whereas several states
had enfranchised aliens. 429 In addition, Eldredge emphasized that the ThirtyNinth Congress’s Republican caucus interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment
to exclude political rights.430 Eldredge further remarked that Section Two
was conclusive proof that suffrage regulations remained a state
prerogative. 431 Eldredge also accused the Republicans of hypocrisy and
changing their position for political gain. 432 Neither Eldredge nor Kerr
contested that McCulloch provided the governing standard under Section
Five. 433 This omission is telling because Eldredge and Kerr responded to
every other argument marshalled by Boutwell.

425

See id. at 657 (statement of Rep. Kerr).
Id. at 644 (statement of Rep. Eldredge).
427 Id.
428 Id. at 654 (statement of Rep. Kerr).
429 See id. (discussing alien suffrage); id. at 658 (noting that women were disenfranchised and
conceding that “[s]ex is no disqualification” for office).
430 See id. at 645 (statement of Rep. Eldredge) (“The power of the States to regulate and determine
the qualification of voters was not questioned . . . and no gentleman can truthfully deny the fact.”); see
also supra Section II.C.
431 See CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 645 (1869) (statement of Rep. Eldredge) (“It was
understood to be optional with the State to grant this right of suffrage to its negroes or have its
representation in Congress proportionately diminished. Hon. Thaddeus Stevens, the late leader of the
Republican party in this House, urged this view of the matter with peculiar emphasis.”).
432 See id. at 645 (arguing that the Republican Party platform “let the loyal States alone”); id. (“How
many States would the party have carried upon the measure now being urged?”); id. (criticizing Boutwell
for claiming that “this bill will add one hundred and fifty thousand voters to his party”).
433 In fact, Kerr appears to concede that McCulloch applies. See id. at 654 (statement of Rep. Kerr)
(“The language of the fourteenth amendment seems to have been intended to give Congress the power to
enforce [its] provisions.”); see also McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). Kerr,
426
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As they were outnumbered three-to-one, 434 Democrats could not stop
Boutwell’s bill. Rather, moderate Republicans held the balance of power and
blocked it. The Ohio House Republican delegation—led by future President
James Garfield—declared its opposition to the suffrage statute on
constitutional grounds and backed an amendment instead. 435 President Grant
voiced “doubt about the power of Congress to regulate suffrage by law, but
said that there could be no sound objection to submitting a constitutional
amendment to the people.” 436 Republican newspapers also expressed concern
that Boutwell’s bill was unconstitutional while endorsing the Fifteenth
Amendment. 437 Within Congress, Bingham reminded the chamber that he
believed suffrage was outside the Fourteenth Amendment, 438 and
Representative Samuel Shellabarger (R-OH) contested Boutwell’s view of
the Qualifications Clause and Guarantee Clause. 439 And on the pragmatic
front, even Radical Republicans worried about the prospect of Boutwell’s
bill passing and the amendment failing, meaning that a future Congress could
simply repeal nationwide black suffrage. 440
On January 28, 1869, Representative Boutwell announced that he
“underst[oo]d there has been a general agreement that some amendment to
the Constitution should be proposed.” 441 Boutwell conceded defeat and asked
that the amendment be voted on before the bill. 442 The next day, after
continued discussion of the statute by other representatives, Boutwell again
recognized the political reality that “there is a very general agreement that it

however, did not dwell on the question and turned his attention to his narrower interpretation of the
Privileges or Immunities Clause. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 654 (1869).
434 See ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 249, at 182.
435 See GILLETTE, supra note 11, at 51. Boutwell’s bill had been printed in full or discussed in-depth
in newspapers around the country. See Congress, LOWELL DAILY CITIZEN & NEWS, Jan. 25, 1869;
Impartial Suffrage, MILWAUKEE DAILY SENTINEL, Jan. 25, 1869; The Suffrage Question, DAILY
CLEVELAND HERALD, Jan. 18, 1869; see also Reconstruction and Suffrage in the House, DAILY
CLEVELAND HERALD, Jan. 25, 1869 (discussing Boutwell’s position).
436 Editorial, From Washington, LOWELL DAILY CITIZEN & NEWS, Feb. 3, 1869 (noting that the
interview occurred with Boston’s Advertiser newspaper). Grant later endorsed the Fifteenth Amendment
in his Inauguration Address. See CHERNOW, supra note 324, at 631–32.
437 See, e.g., The Suffrage Question in the House, MILWAUKEE DAILY SENTINEL, Jan. 26, 1869.
438 See CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 727 (1869) (statement of Rep. Bingham) (describing his
position on the Fourteenth Amendment and stating that a new amendment was needed to “establish
impartial suffrage”); supra note 216 and accompanying text (discussing Bingham’s prior statements).
439 CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 560 (1869) (statement of Rep. Shellabarger).
440 See GILLETTE, supra note 11, at 51–52 (“If the bill succeeded but the amendment failed, it was
argued, then a mere bill could repeal what the Boutwell bill extended—namely, Negro suffrage.”).
441 CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 686 (1869) (statement of Rep. Boutwell).
442 See id.
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is desirable to submit an amendment.” 443 After this announcement, the House
turned its attention to passing nationwide black suffrage via an amendment.
2. The Senate Debate
Senator Charles Sumner, a prominent abolitionist advocate and
martyr, 444 had long argued that Congress had the authority to impose black
suffrage on the states via statute. 445 On December 7, 1868, Sumner
introduced Senate Resolution 650, a bill “to enforce the several provisions
of the Constitution abolishing slavery, declaring the immunities of citizens,
and guarantying a republican form of government, by securing the elective
franchise to citizens deprived of it by reason of race, color, or previous
condition.” 446 Sumner’s statute resembled Boutwell’s bill, though it was
broader in scope. Its core provision provided that:
[N]o citizen of the United States shall be deprived of the elective franchise by
reason of race, color, or previous condition, but all citizens, without regard to
race, color, or previous condition, shall have the right, if not otherwise
disqualified, to be registered, and to vote at all elections for members of
Congress, presidential electors, representatives, and senators to State or
territorial legislatures, for all State, county, city, town, and other officers of
every kind, upon equal terms and conditions, and every provision of any
constitution, statute, and ordinance, and every custom in any State or Territory
inconsistent herewith, are declared null and void. 447

Sumner’s statute was short-lived. It was indefinitely postponed on
January 15, 1869—a few days before Boutwell’s bill met the same fate. 448
Compared to the House, there was not as lengthy a debate about whether
Congress could and should adopt both a statute and an amendment. 449

443

Id. at 725.
Sumner was an acclaimed orator and Congress’s “leading proponent” of black rights. DAVID
DONALD, CHARLES SUMNER AND THE RIGHTS OF MAN 7–9 (1970). After giving an 1856 speech
denouncing slavery, Sumner was brutally caned on the floor of the U.S. Senate by South Carolina
Representative Preston Brooks. See id. at 7–8.
445 See supra Section III.C (discussing previous bills introduced by Sumner).
446 CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 5 (1868) (statement of Sen. Sumner).
447 S. 650, 40th Cong. (1868). Like Boutwell’s bill, Sumner’s statute prohibited disenfranchisement
based on race, color, or previous condition of servitude; imposed obligations on voter registrars;
criminalized private interference with the right to vote; and created a cause of action to sue in federal
court. See id. Sumner’s statute, however, applied to a broader set of state and local elections. See id.;
supra Section III.D.1 (discussing Boutwell’s bill).
448 See CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 378 (1869).
449 Boutwell introduced both a statute and an amendment and served as floor manager of both. See
supra Section III.D.1.
444
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Nevertheless, Sumner and other Radical Republicans voiced their belief that
Congress could enact nationwide black suffrage via statute. 450
On February 5, 1869, a week after Boutwell’s bill died in the House,
Sumner gave a speech endorsing federal power to regulate suffrage in the
states. His arguments echoed Boutwell’s and addressed many of the same
points. 451 But Sumner’s vision of congressional power was arguably even
broader than Boutwell’s, and his views on the Reconstruction Amendments
merit attention. Sumner collapsed the political versus civil rights divide into
the general concept of human rights. 452 He declared that, under the
Reconstruction Amendments, “anything for Human Rights is constitutional.
Yes, sir; against the old rule, anything for slavery, I put the new rule,
anything for Human Rights.” 453 Sumner’s conception of congressional power
was holistic, combining the Guarantee Clause and the Thirteenth and
Fourteenth Amendments into a robust enforcement authority. 454
Sumner expressly compared his suffrage statute to the Civil Rights Act
of 1866, which had been authorized under Congress’s Thirteenth
Amendment enforcement authority and subsequently constitutionalized as
Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment. Sumner extolled congressional
power under the Thirteenth Amendment: “[a]lready Congress, in the exercise
of this power, has passed a civil rights act. It only remains, that it should now
pass a political rights act, which, like the former, shall help consummate the
abolition of slavery.” 455 In support of this interpretation, Sumner invoked “a
familiar rule of interpretation, expounded by Chief Justice Marshall in his
most masterly judgment,” 456 which can only be a reference to McCulloch.457
450 Indeed, Sumner went so far as to argue that an amendment was unnecessary because Congress’s
power under the Guarantee Clause, Thirteenth Amendment, and Fourteenth Amendment was “too clear
[to] question” and because a suffrage statute would “never be repealed” and would “be as lasting as the
National Constitution itself.” CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 903 (1869) (statement of Sen. Sumner).
Despite these assurances, Sumner questioned whether there were enough “States whose votes can be
counted on to assure its ratification within any reasonable time.” Id. at 904.
451 Regarding the Qualifications Clause, Sumner asserted that “[c]olor cannot be a ‘qualification’”
because it is “derived from nature,” whereas a qualification is attained. Id. at 902. In addition, Sumner
invoked the Guarantee Clause as a source of authority. Sumner defined “[a] Republic [a]s where taxation
and representation go hand in hand.” Id. at 903. Based on this definition, Sumner believed that denying
suffrage based on race created a “Caste or Oligarchy” in violation of the Guarantee Clause. Id.
452 See id. at 902 (“[A] State transcends its proper function, when it interferes with those equal rights,
whether civil or political, which . . . are under the safeguard of the nation.”); id. (“Whatever you enact for
Human Rights is constitutional. There can be no State Rights against Human Rights.”).
453 Id.
454 See id. at 903.
455 Id.
456 Id. (emphasis added).
457 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
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According to Sumner, “The Civil Rights act came under the head of ‘means’
selected by Congress, and a Political Rights act will have the same
authority.” 458 Turning briefly to the Fourteenth Amendment’s text, Sumner
claimed that suffrage was covered by the Privileges or Immunities Clause. 459
Given “the plenary powers of Congress to enforce the guarantee of a
republican government, the abolition of slavery, and that final clause
guarding the rights of citizens,” Sumner believed that his suffrage statute was
constitutional. 460 Sumner thus conceptualized Congress’s authority to
enforce the Reconstruction Amendments as broader than the McCulloch
standard.
Sumner’s statute made a brief reappearance on February 9, 1869, when
Sumner proposed that the Fifteenth Amendment’s language be replaced with
the text of his original bill. 461 Because Sumner’s statute included several
specific provisions—including criminal punishments and a federal cause of
action 462—it was immediately pointed out that “the matter under
consideration is an amendment to the Constitution, and this is a bill.”463
Although some Radical Republicans shared Sumner’s interpretation of the
Fourteenth Amendment, 464 this support did not run deep. Sumner’s proposal
was defeated 9–47. 465
3. The Fifteenth Amendment’s Drafting and Ratification
Following the Article V debate, the Fortieth Congress passed the
Fifteenth Amendment. Although other proposals were considered, 466 the
Reconstruction Framers eventually settled on language that was remarkably
similar to Boutwell’s initial proposal.467 As ratified, the Fifteenth
Amendment prohibits the denial or abridgment of the right to vote on the

458

CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 903 (1869) (statement of Sen. Sumner).
See id. (“Colored persons are citizens . . . and no State can abridge their privileges and
immunities.”).
460 Id. (emphasis added).
461 See id. at 1041.
462 See S. 650, 40th Cong. (1868).
463 CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 1041 (1869) (statement of Sen. Morrill (R-VT)).
464 See id. at 982 (statement of Sen. Ross (R-KS)) (arguing that Congress had Fourteenth Amendment
enforcement authority to enfranchise Blacks); id. at 1000 (statement of Sen. Edmunds (R-VT)) (asserting
that the right to vote was a privilege or immunity of citizenship).
465 Id. at 1041.
466 For example, one proposal rejected by the House would have expressly protected the right to hold
political office and prohibited discrimination based on “race, color, nativity, property, education, or
creed.” Id. at 1224–26.
467 See supra notes 377–383 and accompanying text (comparing Boutwell’s proposal to the Fifteenth
Amendment).
459
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basis of race, color, or previous condition of servitude and empowers
Congress to enforce its provisions by “appropriate legislation.” 468 Once
again, the Reconstruction Framers adopted the McCulloch standard.
IV. THE CONTEMPORARY SIGNIFICANCE OF THE ARTICLE V DEBATE
The Article V debate has been largely overlooked in the historical
literature 469 and has no doctrinal relevance to how the Court interprets the
Fifteenth Amendment—in stark contrast to the prominent role of the Civil
Rights Act of 1866. 470 This Part identifies the historical and normative
takeaways from the Article V debate. It then addresses how these insights
relate to modern doctrine on the Reconstruction Amendments’ substantive
scopes and enforcement authorities. Finally, this Part addresses how a more
expansive view of Congress’s Fifteenth Amendment enforcement authority
would help insulate numerous provisions of the VRA from constitutional
challenge. Even though the Article V debate occurred 150 years ago, it still
has relevance today.
A. The Article V Debate’s Historical and Normative Significance
The Article V debate illuminates several key points. The first is further
confirmation that the Reconstruction generation understood that the
Fourteenth Amendment did not protect political rights. 471 The Article V
debate is particularly persuasive evidence because it was Congress’s first
468

U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 2.
To take a few examples from the literature: Professor William Gillette’s seminal work on the
Fifteenth Amendment devotes only a few pages to the Article V debate and draws no doctrinal
conclusions. See GILLETTE, supra note 11, at 50–53. Professor John Mabry Mathews’s book on the
Fifteenth Amendment ignores the Article V debate and assumes that a constitutional amendment was the
starting point of the analysis. See MATHEWS, supra note 224, at 20–21. Professor Eric Foner’s canonical
account of Reconstruction largely ignores the Article V debate. See FONER, supra note 8, at 445–50; see
also ERIC FONER, THE SECOND FOUNDING: HOW THE CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION REMADE THE
CONSTITUTION 97, 100 (2019) (discussing only briefly Sumner’s and Boutwell’s belief that Congress
could impose nationwide black suffrage via statute). Professor Kurt Lash’s forthcoming documentary
history of the Reconstruction Amendments sheds some additional light on the Article V debate. See
1 KURT T. LASH, THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS (13TH, 14TH & 15TH): ESSENTIAL DOCUMENTS
60–62 (forthcoming June 2020). Finally, Professor Earl Maltz highlights the Article V debate in his
forthcoming paper on the Fifteenth Amendment. See Earl M. Maltz, The Coming of the Fifteenth
Amendment: The Republican Party and the Right to Vote in the Early Reconstruction Era, 69 CATH. U.
L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 29–30), https://papers.ssrn.com/a=3317813
[https://perma.cc/Y45L-DF3K].
470 See, e.g., McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 775 (2010).
471 The Article V debate also sheds light on how the Reconstruction Framers interpreted other
constitutional provisions, such as the Guarantee Clause. Because the Fortieth Congress’s views on the
original Constitution’s provisions are entitled to less interpretive weight than its views on the Fourteenth
Amendment, see infra note 472, this Article does not dwell on those provisions.
469
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sustained post-ratification deliberation on the Fourteenth Amendment’s
substantive scope and enforcement authority. 472 To be sure, the Article V
debate shows that the Fourteenth Amendment’s application to political rights
was contested at the time. But the Radicals lost that fight twice. The Radicals
failed to expressly expand the franchise when the Fourteenth Amendment
passed Congress—a fact that they conceded at the time. 473 And the Radicals
failed again when they could not convince moderate Republicans to pass a
nationwide black suffrage statute during the lame-duck Fortieth Congress. 474
The lines drawn by the Thirty-Ninth Congress when it passed the Fourteenth
Amendment and enfranchised Blacks in areas under federal control were not
crossed by the Fortieth Congress.
This new historical evidence concerning the Article V debate also
undercuts recent scholarly attempts to transform Section Two of the
Fourteenth Amendment into an affirmative right to vote or—when combined
with Section Five—a source of authority for Congress to enact laws targeting
racial discrimination in voting. 475 Most prominently, Professor Franita
Tolson has argued that “Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment was the
Reconstruction Congress’s attempt to constitutionalize a mechanism that
would allow Congress to all but legislate universal suffrage.” 476 According
472 See Balkin, supra note 135, at 1850 (looking at enforcement acts passed by the Reconstruction
Congresses to “give us a sense of how a Congress using the McCulloch standard believed it could draft
enforcement legislation”); McConnell, Desegregation, supra note 176, at 984 (“The actions taken by
Congress from 1868 through 1875 to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment and the congressional
deliberations over those measures thus present the best available evidence of the original understanding
of the meaning of the Amendment . . . .”); cf. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v.
EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 184–85 (2012) (looking to events in the early 1800s in interpreting the Religion
Clauses); District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 605–10 (2008) (discussing post-ratification
commentary in interpreting the Second Amendment).
473 See supra Section II.C; cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 586 (1952)
(concluding that the President lacked authority to seize steel mills because, inter alia, “[w]hen the TaftHartley Act was under consideration in 1947, Congress rejected an amendment which would have
authorized such governmental seizures in cases of emergency”).
474 See supra Section III.D.
475 Recall that Section Two—also known as the Apportionment Clause—penalizes states that
disenfranchise their male citizens by reducing their number of seats in the House. See supra Section
II.C.2.
476 Tolson, Abridgment, supra note 84, at 458; see also AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN
CONSTITUTION: THE PRECEDENTS AND PRINCIPLES WE LIVE BY 188 (2012) (arguing that Section Two
“provides the missing foundation for the general ‘right to vote’ championed by the Warren majority”);
Mitchell, supra note 206, at 1267–68 (arguing that the text of the Fourteenth Amendment does not
differentiate based on civil or political rights and therefore Congress may legislate to protect voting rights
of citizens). Other scholars have read Section Two narrowly. See, e.g., Morley, Equilibration, supra note
247, at 331 (“Section 2 does not, and was not intended to, permit Congress to compel states to expand
their electorates.”); Strauss, Constitution, supra note 29, at 39 (arguing that Section Two provides a
“specific remedy” of decreased representation).
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to Professor Tolson, Section Two is an all-purpose suffrage provision—not
limited to race-based concerns. She claims that it covers not only
intentionally discriminatory laws but also laws that have a disparate impact.
She further claims that Section Two is concerned not only with vote denial
but also vote dilution. 477 And because Section Two authorizes the “extreme
penalty” of reducing a state’s representation in the House, Professor Tolson
contends that Section Five authorizes Congress to impose “lesser penalties”
below Section Two’s “ceiling.” 478
But if these theories were an accurate account of the Reconstructionera public understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment, then the Article V
debate would probably have come out differently because moderate
Republicans would have agreed with the Radicals’ statutory proposal on
constitutional grounds and because the political climate would have been
much different if the Fourteenth Amendment were presumed to encompass
political rights. 479 Indeed, these theories mirror Boutwell’s view of Section
Two during the Article V debate, 480 an opinion that not only failed to
convince his fellow Republicans but was also at odds with his own prior
statements about the Fourteenth Amendment during that ratification
debate. 481
The second takeaway is that the Fortieth Congress assumed that
McCulloch provided the standard for Congress’s Fourteenth Amendment
enforcement authority during the Article V debate. In arguing that Congress
could pass a nationwide black suffrage statute, Boutwell and Sumner
invoked Congress’s McCulloch power, albeit a plenary conception of that
authority. 482 Significantly, neither moderate Republicans nor Democrats
contested that McCulloch was the touchstone. Rather, their criticism focused
on the exclusion of political rights from the Fourteenth Amendment’s scope.
477

See Tolson, Abridgment, supra note 84, at 457–58.
Tolson, Structure, supra note 246, at 401; see also id. at 404 (“[C]ourts can use [the
Apportionment Clause] as the reference point for determining whether Congress has exceeded the scope
of its enforcement authority in enacting voting rights legislation.”).
479 See supra Section III.D. In addition, these theories fail to adequately grapple with the
compromises underlying Section Two in particular and the Fourteenth Amendment in general. See supra
Section II.C.2. These theories also cannot avoid the doctrinal wrinkle that Boerne supplies the governing
standard for Congress’s Fourteenth Amendment enforcement authority, see supra Section I.B.2, a strict
standard that may prove problematic for such an expansive interpretation of Section Two’s neverenforced penalty provision.
480 See supra notes 402–403 and accompanying text.
481 See supra notes 230 & 410 and accompanying text. Two decades after the Fourteenth
Amendment’s ratification, Boutwell claimed that the Fifteenth Amendment repealed Section Two of the
Fourteenth Amendment. See Tolson, Structure, supra note 246, at 418–19.
482 See supra Section III.D.
478
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Of course, moderate Republicans had partisan reasons for sticking to their
prior position that the Fourteenth Amendment did not protect political rights.
Democrats, for their part, opposed any extension of black suffrage. However,
the central debate was not whether McCulloch was applicable but rather what
rights were protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. 483 In framing the debate
in such a way, the Fortieth Congress implicitly rejected Boutwell’s and
Sumner’s contention that the McCulloch power was plenary, since such
authority would not be bound by the distinction between civil and political
rights. In other words, McCulloch applies, but has limits.
By conceptualizing civil and political rights as distinct spheres,
Congress placed a self-imposed limit on its enforcement authority. It could
not enforce the Fourteenth Amendment by mandating political equality.
Boutwell and Sumner’s attempt to collapse the civil versus political rights
distinction was resoundingly defeated. The Article V debate reveals that the
Fortieth Congress still believed in bundles of rights and that citizenship was
not synonymous with suffrage. 484
The third, and related, point is that the Fifteenth Amendment was a new
font of federal authority. During Reconstruction, the political branches
engaged in a two-step process for eradicating slavery and protecting the
rights of the newly freed slaves. By abolishing slavery nationwide and
ensuring that the Emancipation Proclamation’s validity would not be
challenged in peacetime, the Thirteenth Amendment expanded and
entrenched federal authority. Moreover, the Civil Rights Act of 1866 was
constitutionalized by the Fourteenth Amendment—a key decision given the
483

This is not the only occasion when “opponents of civil rights legislation conceded that the
enforcement power under Section Five was equivalent to congressional power under the Necessary and
Proper Clause.” McConnell, Institutions, supra note 148, at 178 n.153. The same was true during the
passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1875. See id.; McConnell, Desegregation, supra note 176, at 990 &
n.194 (arguing that the Civil Rights Act of 1875 was “appropriate” enforcement legislation).
484 Near the end of Reconstruction, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1875, which prohibited
racial discrimination in public transportation and accommodations. Ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335, 335–37. On the
one hand, this legislation—which was invalidated by the Supreme Court in the Civil Rights Cases,
109 U.S. 3 (1883)—could be viewed as the first step of a failed statute–amendment two-step and as a
cautionary tale of what could have happened if the Radical Republicans had enacted only a suffrage
statute and had failed in amending the Constitution. On the other hand, Congress’s careful parsing of its
Fourteenth Amendment enforcement authority during the Article V debate is powerful evidence that
Congress can be trusted to self-regulate its enforcement authority. That argument is particularly
compelling because of the closeness in time between the Reconstruction Amendments and the Civil
Rights Act of 1875. Viewed from this perspective, Congress’s decision to invoke the Fourteenth
Amendment to pass the Civil Rights Act of 1875 is entitled to substantial deference. See McConnell,
Institutions, supra note 148, at 175 (“[S]upporters of the [Civil Rights] Act [of 1875] insisted that it
merely enforced rights already established by the Fourteenth Amendment.”); McConnell, Desegregation,
supra note 176, at 984 (discussing enforcement acts passed by the Reconstruction Congress).
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belief among prominent moderate Republicans that the statute’s
constitutionality was questionable when it was enacted. 485 In both situations,
the Reconstruction Framers entrenched a subconstitutional principle and
expanded federal and congressional authority through a constitutional
amendment.
So too with the Fifteenth Amendment. The Thirty-Ninth Congress went
to the outer limits of its perceived constitutional authority in enfranchising
Blacks in the District of Columbia, the federal territories, and the
Reconstructed South. In so doing, the Reconstruction Framers invoked
distinct sources of authority. For the District of Columbia and federal
territories, Congress acted pursuant to its Article I and Article IV authorities,
respectively. Regarding the conquered South, the Reconstruction Framers
invoked the Guarantee Clause. Although the Radicals believed that a Voting
Rights Act of 1869 would have been constitutional, Congress opted against
the statutory option because neither the original Constitution nor the recently
ratified Fourteenth Amendment provided sufficient authority. Put simply,
the Fortieth Congress continued to adhere to the distinction between civil
and political rights. The Fifteenth Amendment was thus a significant
expansion of congressional authority to regulate voting rights in the states.
And as an independent source of authority, the Fifteenth Amendment should
be treated as such under modern doctrine.
Furthermore, the Article V debate speaks to an ongoing scholarly
discussion over the validity of Section Two of the Fourteenth Amendment.
According to Professor Jack Chin, the Apportionment Clause “was repealed
upon ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment.” 486 Professor Chin forcefully
argues that the Fifteenth Amendment was passed, in part, because Section
Two’s “indirect approach” had failed to achieve nationwide black
suffrage. 487 Professor Chin claims that “the Fifteenth Amendment repudiated
[the Apportionment Clause]’s theoretical and structural approach to AfricanAmerican suffrage” 488 and that the two constitutional provisions “cannot
simultaneously regulate voting discrimination.” 489 The upshot, as Professor
Chin argues, is that Section Two’s endorsement of felon disenfranchisement
is no longer good law. 490
485

See supra notes 205–206 and accompanying text.
Gabriel J. Chin, Reconstruction, Felon Disenfranchisement, and the Right to Vote: Did the
Fifteenth Amendment Repeal Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment?, 92 GEO. L.J. 259, 260 (2004).
487 See id. at 261.
488 Id. at 262.
489 Id. at 263.
490 See id. at 263–64.
486
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The Article V debate supports Professor Chin’s contention that Section
Two was viewed as an insufficient penalty, but not his conclusion that it has
been repealed. On this specific point, I agree with Professor Tolson that “the
Fifteenth Amendment was meant to complement rather than replace [the
Apportionment Clause] as a source of congressional authority.” 491 Indeed,
the unsuccessful attempts to strip states of their House seats after the
Fifteenth Amendment’s ratification demonstrate that Section Two was not
viewed as a dead letter. 492 It is also possible to reconcile the two provisions:
Section Two imposes a severe federal-level penalty—reduction in House
seats that would otherwise be allocated pursuant to Article I—whereas the
Fifteenth Amendment mandates black enfranchisement and gives Congress
additional authority to enact prophylactic legislation.
Finally, the Reconstruction Framers’ decision to pursue a constitutional
amendment proved fortuitous. In the 1870s and 1880s, the Supreme Court
invalidated or severely curtailed laws that enforced the Fourteenth
Amendment. 493 In 1894, Congress repealed several Reconstruction-era laws
that protected the right to vote. 494 It is not difficult to imagine a similar fate
befalling a Voting Rights Act of 1869 if passage of that statute had backfired
politically and doomed the Fifteenth Amendment’s ratification. By
enshrining the right to vote free of racial discrimination in the Constitution,
the Reconstruction Framers preserved a powerful legal and rhetorical tool
that proved immensely valuable during the civil rights movement and served
as Congress’s font of authority when it first enacted Section 5 of the VRA. 495
B. The Article V Debate and Current Doctrine
By establishing that the Fifteenth Amendment was considered an
expansion of federal authority during Reconstruction, the Article V debate
demands that we rethink the erasure 496 of the Fifteenth Amendment by the
Fourteenth Amendment.

491

Tolson, Structure, supra note 246, at 405.
See Magliocca, supra note 245, at 786–89 (describing the 1871 attempt to invoke Section Two);
Tolson, Abridgment, supra note 84, at 474–77 (discussing the 1901 attempt to invoke Section Two).
493 See, e.g., The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) (invalidating the Civil Rights Act of 1875);
supra note 484 and accompanying text.
494 See Tolson, Abridgment, supra note 84, at 467.
495 See supra notes 101–109 and accompanying text.
496 Here, I borrow the concept of erasure from Bruce Ackerman & Jennifer Nou, Canonizing the
Civil Rights Revolution: The People and the Poll Tax, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 63, 119–23 (2009). Professors
Ackerman and Nou use the concept to describe the Court’s invocation of the Fourteenth Amendment—
rather than the VRA and the Twenty-Fourth Amendment—to invalidate the poll tax in Harper v. Virginia
Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
492
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1.

Rethinking the Substantive Scopes of the Reconstruction
Amendments
Imagine a world where we take the Fifteenth Amendment seriously.
Suppose we looked first to how a voting rights case should be resolved under
the Fifteenth Amendment before turning to the relevant precedent under the
Fourteenth Amendment. This doctrinal order of operations accords not only
with the original public understanding of the two Amendments, but also
follows the canons against surplusage and that the specific controls over the
general.
Treating the Fifteenth Amendment as an independent constitutional
provision would force a reassessment of Shaw and its hostility to raceconscious redistricting. Recall that the Shaw line of cases is based solely on
the Equal Protection Clause. 497 Yet, the most adamant defenders of Shaw on
the Court are originalists, 498 even though the Equal Protection Clause was
originally understood to exclude political rights. The insights gleaned from
the Article V debate would presumably be particularly relevant to these
Justices. 499
To be sure, it might be doctrinally feasible to defend Shaw under the
Fifteenth Amendment. But that presumes the debate over the colorblind and
anti-subordination theories of the Equal Protection Clause is applicable to
the Fifteenth Amendment. 500 After all, if we are to confront originalist
Justices on their own terms, then the fact that the Reconstruction generation
continued to adhere to the civil versus political rights distinction might mean
that different concerns apply to the franchise than to, say, the right to sign a
contract. And instead of a well-worn argument over whether equality is best
achieved through race-neutral or race-conscious means, the Fifteenth
Amendment may embody a distinctively different framework, such as the
empowerment of racial minorities through the ballot and their fair
representation at various levels of government. And after taking into account
that, during Reconstruction, Blacks were majorities or sizable pluralities of
497

See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 649 (1993); supra Section I.A.1.
See supra note 82 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Thomas’s support for Shaw).
499 Notwithstanding the position of originalist Justices on the colorblind Equal Protection Clause,
see, e.g., Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2215 (2016) (Thomas, J., dissenting); id. at
2220–21 (Alito, J., dissenting), there is substantial evidence that the Reconstruction Framers were
comfortable with race-conscious laws. See generally Eric Schnapper, Affirmative Action and the
Legislative History of the Fourteenth Amendment, 71 VA. L. REV. 753 (1985) (collecting examples of
Reconstruction-era race-conscious laws).
500 Cf. Reva B. Siegel, From Colorblindness to Antibalkinization: An Emerging Ground of Decision
in Race Equality Cases, 120 YALE L.J. 1278, 1286–89 (2011) (discussing the debate between advocates
of colorblindness and anti-subordination and identifying a middle-ground antibalkanization principle).
498
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the Southern and Border States and racially polarized voting was a fact of
political life, the Article V debate and the Fifteenth Amendment could
reshape how we think about Shaw. 501
Taking the Fifteenth Amendment seriously would also mean seeking
answers to questions that the Court has expressly reserved: whether the
Fifteenth Amendment encompasses a discriminatory-effects standard and
prohibits racial vote dilution. 502 If the answer to either of these questions is
“yes,” then Section 2 of the VRA is on firmer constitutional ground and
Congress would have more flexibility to enact voting rights legislation. 503 On
this front, relevant considerations include, inter alia, the meaning of the terms
“right . . . to vote” and “denied or abridged,” 504 the various draft amendments
considered during the Fortieth Congress, and post-ratification enforcement
legislation.
Of course, there are legitimate reasons for not upending the entirety of
voting rights doctrine based on the distinction between the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments. A lot of water has gone under the proverbial
Fourteenth Amendment bridge, and stare decisis strongly counsels against
overturning certain doctrines—such as one-person, one-vote for state
legislative districts—that have proven workable and have engendered
reliance interests. And even though the distinction between citizenship and
suffrage still had salience during Reconstruction, it has been substantially
weakened by the expansion of the franchise via the Nineteenth Amendment
(women’s suffrage), Twenty-Fourth Amendment (poll taxes), and TwentySixth Amendment (age). 505 Now that citizenship and suffrage are mostly
coextensive, the civil versus political rights divide may have less force as
well. Reconciling the living Fourteenth Amendment and the forgotten
Fifteenth Amendment is no easy interpretive task. Indeed, it is a task left to
future articles that examine the Fifteenth Amendment’s drafting and

501 See supra Section III.C. For an answer to this question, see Travis Crum, Reconstructing Racially
Polarized Voting, 70 DUKE L.J. (forthcoming 2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/a=3541863.
[https://perma.cc/PZL8-LFPX].
502 To be clear, the Court currently interprets the Fourteenth Amendment to prohibit intentional racial
vote dilution. See supra Section I.A.1. Accordingly, that question is not as salient as the discriminatoryeffects issue. However, there is the possibility the Court would apply Boerne to Congress’s attempts to
remedy intentional racial vote dilution under the Fourteenth Amendment.
503 There is also an available avenue for civil rights groups to force courts to reach these underlying
constitutional questions: the VRA’s bail-in provision, which authorizes courts to impose preclearance
based on a violation of the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendment. See supra note 22 (discussing Section
3(c)).
504 U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.
505 Id. amend. XIX; id. amend. XXIV; id. amend. XXVI.
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ratification, as well as the relationship between the Reconstruction
Amendments.
2. Rethinking Congress’s Enforcement Authority
The Article V debate provides additional evidence that Boerne is
wrongly decided. And even assuming that the Court refuses to overturn
Boerne, the Article V debate provides a reason for cabining Boerne to the
Fourteenth Amendment.
Recall that the Reconstruction Framers’ deliberate and repetitious
borrowing of the term “appropriate” sent a clear signal that Congress’s
enforcement authority was broad and uniform across the Reconstruction
Amendments. 506 This Article has uncovered additional evidence to reinforce
this point: that both sides of the Article V debate believed that McCulloch
provided the applicable standard for Congress’s Fourteenth Amendment
enforcement authority and that moderate Republicans declined to enact a
nationwide black suffrage statute because they believed that Congress could
not enforce civil rights by expanding political rights. The Reconstruction
Congress conceptualized the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments’
substantive scopes and enforcement provisions as discrete protections and
grants of authority. The Article V debate thus shows that the McCulloch
standard—while broad—is not plenary. And therein lies the rub.
The Article V debate shows that, even under the
McCulloch/Katzenbach standard, there is a limiting principle for Congress’s
Fourteenth Amendment enforcement authority. This is significant because
the Boerne Court fretted that “[i]f Congress could define its own powers by
altering the Fourteenth Amendment’s meaning, . . . . it is difficult to
conceive of a principle that would limit congressional power.” 507 The Article
V debate demonstrates that Congress can self-police its Fourteenth
Amendment enforcement authority. The Fortieth Congress’s decision to
respect the distinction between civil and political rights undermines Boerne’s
concern that Congress will improperly “decree the substance of the
Fourteenth Amendment’s restrictions on the States.” 508 Congress, in other
words, can be trusted with the McCulloch power—an authority that, after all,
it expressly conferred upon itself. 509
And even if, for reasons of stare decisis, Boerne continues to apply to
the Fourteenth Amendment, it should not apply to the Fifteenth Amendment.
506
507
508
509

See supra Section II.D.
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 529 (1997).
Id. at 519.
See Balkin, supra note 135, at 1805.

1625

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

Notwithstanding the passage of time, the Reconstruction Amendments
continue to protect distinct bundles of rights, and the Court can easily
differentiate between civil and political rights.
The Court has interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment’s broad language
to protect a panoply of rights. The Court, for example, has incorporated
nearly all of the protections enumerated in the Bill of Rights. 510 In addition,
the Court has held that “the ‘liberty’ specially protected by the Due Process
Clause includes the rights to marry; to have children; to direct the education
and upbringing of one’s children; to marital privacy; to use contraception; to
bodily integrity; and to abortion.” 511 And in a similar vein, under the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, suspect or quasi-suspect
classes include not only race 512 but also alienage, 513 sex, 514 and, in some
circuits, sexual orientation. 515 In light of the Fourteenth Amendment’s
breadth, Boerne’s congruence and proportionality test seeks to ensure that
“[t]he ultimate interpretation and determination of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s substantive meaning remain[ed] the province of the Judicial
Branch.” 516
These separation of powers concerns have little force in the Fifteenth
Amendment context. Under the Fifteenth Amendment, Congress is solely
empowered to prohibit racial discrimination in voting—a textually and
conceptually defined sphere of rights. 517 Giving the Fifteenth Amendment
independent meaning for Congress’s enforcement authority not only avoids
a superfluity, but also follows the principle that the specific should control
over the general. Although it is possible to imagine scenarios that would
likely overstep Congress’s Fifteenth Amendment authority—such as
mandating, as many countries do, that political parties have a certain
percentage of minority candidates 518—Katzenbach’s rationality standard
should provide an ample check on Congress.
510 See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 147–48 (1968) (enumerating provisions of the Bill of
Rights which have been incorporated).
511 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) (citations omitted).
512 See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995).
513 See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971).
514 See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532–33 (1996).
515 See SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 740 F.3d 471, 484 (9th Cir. 2014).
516 Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 81 (2000).
517 The Fifteenth Amendment’s targeted language also alleviates the federalism concern that
Congress could invoke it to exercise “virtually plenary police power.” Caminker, supra note 99, at 1191.
518 See Mona Lena Krook & Diana Z. O’Brien, The Politics of Group Representation: Quotas for
Women and Minorities Worldwide, 42 COMP. POL. 253, 257–58 tbl.2 (2010) (collecting examples of such
mandates).
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C. Congress’s Fifteenth Amendment Enforcement Authority and the VRA
If Katzenbach supplies the governing standard for Congress’s Fifteenth
Amendment enforcement authority, the VRA would be on firmer
constitutional ground. That is because Katzenbach’s rationality standard
gives Congress far greater authority to interpret the Constitution and fashion
remedial schemes. 519
Under Boerne, the Court is the sole interpreter of “what the law is.”520
By contrast, under Katzenbach, Congress and the Court share interpretive
responsibilities, and so long as Congress’s construction of an ambiguous
constitutional provision is reasonable—that is, appropriate—the Court
should defer even if it would have interpreted the relevant provision
differently. 521 Moreover, at the first step of the congruence and
proportionality test, the Court must “identify with some precision the scope
of the constitutional right at issue.” 522 The Katzenbach standard does not
require the Court to make that precise determination. Recall that the Morgan
Court declined to decide whether New York’s English language literacy
requirements violated the Fourteenth Amendment. 523 And in upholding the
1975 reauthorization of the VRA in City of Rome v. United States, the Court
assumed, without deciding, that the Fifteenth Amendment prohibited only
intentional racial discrimination in vote-denial cases. 524 The Katzenbach
standard thus accords with judicial minimalism: the Court need not
definitively expound on the meaning of the Constitution and can defer to a
coordinate branch. And, significantly for this Article’s breadth, if there is no
need to fully ascertain the precise metes and bounds of the underlying right,
then a comprehensive account of the Fifteenth Amendment’s scope is
unnecessary.
Katzenbach and Boerne also diverge on Congress’s remedial
authority. 525 Under both lines of cases, Congress may enact prophylactic
519

See supra Section I.B.
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803); see also Schmidt, supra note 100, at
101–03 (discussing Boerne).
521 See Balkin, supra note 135, at 1827–28; McConnell, Institutions, supra note 148, at 172, 194–
95.
522 Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 365 (2001).
523 See supra notes 116–118 and accompanying text.
524 See 446 U.S. 156, 173 (1980) (“We hold that, even if § 1 of the [Fifteenth] Amendment prohibits
only purposeful discrimination, the prior decisions of this Court foreclose any argument that Congress
may not, pursuant to § 2, outlaw voting practices that are discriminatory in effect.” (footnote omitted)).
525 Under a strictly remedial view, Congress’s enforcement authority is limited to actual
constitutional violations. See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 559 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(“Nothing in § 5 allows Congress to go beyond the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to proscribe,
520
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legislation that prohibits conduct that is not per se unconstitutional. 526
Katzenbach, however, gives Congress far greater leeway in crafting the
remedial scheme, as Boerne limits Congress to remedying violations of
constitutional rights as those rights are defined by the Court and requires a
far tighter fit between the constitutional wrong and the remedy. 527
Congress has exercised its interpretive and remedial authority in
enacting, revising, and reauthorizing the VRA. Indeed, Congress has
repeatedly reaffirmed its commitment to protecting voting rights and has
responded to Supreme Court decisions that unduly narrowed the Fifteenth
Amendment’s protections. Perhaps most famously, Congress statutorily
overrode the Court’s plurality opinion in Bolden. In that decision, four
Justices concluded that Section 2 of the VRA was coextensive with the
Fifteenth Amendment, which, in turn, they construed as limited to intentional
discrimination in vote-denial cases. 528 In the 1982 amendments to the VRA,
Congress revised Section 2 in two significant ways. First, Congress
established a discriminatory-effects standard. 529 Second, Congress expanded
Section 2 to prohibit racial discrimination in vote-dilution cases. 530 Thus, in
revising Section 2, Congress exercised its Fifteenth Amendment
enforcement authority to decide when “the right . . . to vote” has been
“denied or abridged . . . on account of race.” 531 Under Katzenbach, the Court
should defer to Congress’s finding that the right to vote is denied or abridged
on account of race by laws with a discriminatory effect—or, alternatively
prevent, or ‘remedy’ conduct that does not itself violate any provision of the Fourteenth Amendment. Socalled ‘prophylactic legislation’ is reinforcement rather than enforcement.”); id. at 559–60 (endorsing the
enactment of federal cause-of-action statutes and disclosure provisions).
526 Id. at 520 (majority opinion) (“When Congress seeks to remedy or prevent unconstitutional
discrimination, § 5 [of the Fourteenth Amendment] authorizes it to enact prophylactic legislation
proscribing practices that are discriminatory in effect, if not in intent, to carry out the basic objectives of
the Equal Protection Clause.”). Congress, for example, can ban literacy tests on the grounds that they
were likely enacted with a discriminatory intent and have a disproportionate impact on racial minorities
notwithstanding precedent holding that those tests are facially constitutional. Compare Oregon v.
Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 132 (1970) (opinion of Black, J.) (upholding the VRA’s nationwide ban on
literacy tests), and South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 333–34 (1966) (upholding the VRA’s
geographically and temporarily limited ban on literacy tests), with Lassiter v. Northampton Cty. Bd. of
Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 50–53 (1959) (holding that literacy tests are facially constitutional).
527 See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 527 (“Any suggestion that Congress has a substantive,
non-remedial power under the Fourteenth Amendment is not supported by our case law.”); Katz, supra
note 134, at 2362–68 (discussing remedial authority).
528 See City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 60–61 (1980) (plurality opinion) (interpreting Section
2 as coextensive with the Fifteenth Amendment); id. at 65 (discussing the Fifteenth Amendment’s scope).
529 See Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131 (codified at
52 U.S.C. § 10301 (2012)).
530 See id.; see also Stephanopoulos, supra note 74, at 1576 (discussing the 1982 amendments).
531 U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.
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framed, that a discriminatory-effects standard is appropriate prophylactic
legislation given the difficulty in ferreting out discriminatory intent. The
Court should similarly defer to Congress’s determination that vote dilution
is an abridgment of the right to vote.
The Katzenbach standard would also help bolster the constitutionality
of the various VRA provisions that protect language minorities. 532 Under
current doctrine, the voting rights of language minorities are often treated
under the Fourteenth Amendment, as that is the approach Congress and the
Court took in Morgan. 533 But if Congress is given leeway to define what
constitutes discrimination “on account of race[] [or] color” under the
Fifteenth Amendment, 534 then it could reasonably find that language is a
proxy for race. Indeed, the Court made a similar logical inference in Rice v.
Cayetano, 535 where it concluded that “[a]ncestry can be a proxy for race” in
striking down a Hawaiian constitutional provision that limited suffrage based
on whether a prospective voter was of Hawaiian descent. 536 Congress, for its
part, could conclude that English language requirements enacted in response
to a recent increase of minority voters is discrimination on the basis of race
or color—not just language. And if Congress could make that finding under
the Fifteenth Amendment, it would be given deference under Katzenbach’s
rationality standard.
Finally, the Katzenbach standard would further strengthen Section
3(c)’s bail-in provision, which authorizes courts to impose preclearance
based on a violation of the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendment. 537 Since
Shelby County, numerous lawsuits have been filed seeking to bail-in
jurisdictions, including high-profile cases against North Carolina and

532

As discussed above, see supra notes 110–112, Section 4(e) protects language minorities. So does
Section 2. 52 U.S.C. § 10301. Section 203’s coverage formula for providing bilingual election materials
also protects language minorities. See id. § 10503. That latter provision, however, would be reviewed
under Shelby County. See supra note 155 (discussing Shelby County and Section 203).
533 Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 646–47 (1966). Because Section 4(e) was added toward
the end of the drafting process, there is nothing in the legislative history about why Congress chose to
rely on its Fourteenth Amendment enforcement authority. One potential explanation is that federal courts
had rejected challenges to New York’s English language requirements on the grounds that the Fifteenth
Amendment permits language-based discrimination. See JAMES THOMAS TUCKER, THE BATTLE OVER
BILINGUAL BALLOTS: LANGUAGE MINORITIES AND POLITICAL ACCESS UNDER THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT
33 (2009); Warren M. Christopher, The Constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 18 STAN. L.
REV. 1, 24–25 (1965). In my view, Congress would have been well within its Fifteenth Amendment
enforcement authority to enact Section 4(e).
534 U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.
535 528 U.S. 495, 514 (2000).
536 Id.; see also supra notes 69–73 (discussing Rice).
537 52 U.S.C. § 10302(c).
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Texas. 538 And although the Shelby County Court issued no decision on
preclearance itself, 539 it is probable that, at some point, a bailed-in
jurisdiction will challenge Section 3(c)’s constitutionality. 540 By giving
Congress greater leeway in fashioning a remedial scheme, the Katzenbach
standard would ensure that preclearance remains a viable remedy in voting
rights litigation.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has declared that “[t]he Fifteenth Amendment has
independent meaning and force.” 541 But on the Fifteenth Amendment’s
sesquicentennial, the Court’s doctrine belies that grand statement. By
examining why the Fortieth Congress passed the Fifteenth Amendment
instead of a Voting Rights Act of 1869, this Article has taken the first step
toward reconceptualizing the Fifteenth Amendment as a truly independent
constitutional provision. The Article V debate problematizes the Court’s
current doctrine in numerous ways, perhaps most significantly in the realm
of enforcement authority. The doctrinal upshot of the Article V debate is that
Katzenbach’s rationality standard should apply to nationwide statutes—such
as Sections 2 and 3(c) of the VRA—that are enacted pursuant to Congress’s
Fifteenth Amendment enforcement authority.

538 See Veasey v. Abbott, 888 F.3d 792, 804 (5th Cir. 2018) (holding that Texas’s revised voter ID
law meant that “there is no equitable basis for subjecting Texas to ongoing federal election scrutiny under
Section 3(c)”); N.C. State Conference of the NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204, 241 (4th Cir. 2016)
(declining to bail-in North Carolina notwithstanding a finding of intentional discrimination); Perez v.
Abbott, 390 F. Supp. 3d 803, 807 (W.D. Tex. 2019) (finding intentional discrimination in the enactment
of a redistricting plan but declining a request for Section 3(c) relief); see also Crum, Recent Bail-in
Litigation, supra note 22 (discussing Veasey and McCrory).
539 See Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 557 (2013). For why Shelby County’s equal
sovereignty principle is inapplicable to a nationwide statute like Section 3(c), see supra Section I.B.3.
540 In the post-Shelby County cases, no state or jurisdiction has facially challenged Section 3(c). Cf.
Travis Crum, The Prospect of Bailing-in Texas: The Constitutional Argument for Bail-in, ELECTION L.
BLOG (Sept. 16, 2018, 9:43 AM), https://electionlawblog.org/?p=101141 [https://perma.cc/4GG7-4R2U]
(“It’s telling that Texas lacked the chutzpah to argue that Section 3(c) was facially invalid.”).
541 Rice, 528 U.S. at 522.
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